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 ABSTRACT 
 
VOTER TURNOUT IN THE 2009 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS: 
MEDIA COVERAGE AND MEDIA EXPOSURE  
AS EXPLANATORY FACTORS 
 
 
MARKETA CANAYAZ 
 
Ph.D. Thesis, August 2015 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ali Çarkoğlu 
 
Keywords: European Elections, media effects, post-Communist 
 
This study examines the impact of European Union (EU) news coverage and of media 
exposure on voter turnout in the 2009 European Parliament elections in the 27 EU 
member states. It analyzes media content data and voter survey data from the PIREDEU 
project and builds the hypotheses on the existing literature on media coverage, media 
exposure, voter turnout, and the second-order elections theory. The study matches data 
on the visibility and tone of EU news in countries’ media outlets with voters’ usage of 
these outlets. This allows for examination of the effects of exposure to individual outlets 
on voter participation in the European elections. The study finds that people exposed to 
media in which the EU news coverage is highly visible are more likely to vote in the 
European election. The tone of the news does not play an important role in this 
equation, as long as the EU news is salient. Additionally, the study examines the 
differences in the media effects between countries of Western and Central and Eastern 
Europe, finding lack of media effects in the latter group. Low voter turnout in the 
European Parliament elections may signify voters’ lack of interest in the EU and low 
level of knowledge about the EU. The results further indicate the lack of EU’s external 
communication and a deepening of the democratic deficit in the EU, as well as the lack 
of interest in the EU from national political parties and candidates to the European 
Parliament. 
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ÖZET 
 
KİTLE İLETİŞİM ARAÇLARININ 2009 AVRUPA PARLAMENTOSU 
SEÇİMLERİNE KATILIMA ETKİSİ 
 
MARKETA CANAYAZ 
 
Ph.D. Thesis, August 2015 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ali Çarkoğlu 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Parlamentosu Seçimleri, Kitle iletişim araçlarının etkileri, 
Komünizm sonrası Avrupa 
 
Bu çalışma Avrupa Birliği (AB) üyesi 27 ülkedeki kitle iletişim araçlarında yer alan AB 
içerikli haberlerin 2009 Avrupa Parlamentosu seçimlerine katılıma olan etkisini inceler. 
PIREDEU projesinden alınan kitle iletişim araçları kaynaklı içerik verilerini ve seçmen 
tercihlerine dair kapsamlı kamuoyu yoklaması verileri ile birleştirip incelemek suretiyle; 
kitle iletişim araçlarının içeriği ve tesiri, seçimlere katılım ve ikinci derece seçim 
kuramı konularındaki mevcut kaynakların üzerine hipotezler geliştirir. Toplanan veriler 
AB hakkındaki haberlerin görünürlüğü, tonu ve buna ek olarak seçmenlerin bahsi geçen 
kitle iletişim araçlarını kullanımları hakkında bilgi içerdiğinden, bu veri grubu seçimlere 
katılım veri grubuyla birleştiğinde seçmen seviyesinde haber tüketimini ve bunun 
seçimlere katılımına olan etkisini incelemeye imkân sunabilmektedir. Bu çalışma kitle 
iletişim araçlarında AB hakkında haberlere maruz kalan seçmenlerin Avrupa 
Parlamentosu seçimlerine katılma olasılığının arttığına dair sonuçlar içerir. Haberlerin 
tonundan ziyade çokluğu seçimlere katılımı açıklamaktadır. Bu çalışma ayrıca Batı, 
Orta ve Doğu Avrupa ülkelerindeki kitle iletişim araçlarının etkilerinin farklılığını da 
inceler.  Batı ve Orta Avrupa ülkelerinde kitle iletişim araçlarındaki haberlere maruz 
kalan seçmenlerin Avrupa Parlamentosu seçimlerine katılma olasılığını artırırken, Doğu 
Avrupa ülkelerinde benzer bir olumlu etki görülmemektedir. Avrupa Parlamentosu 
seçimlerine düşük seviyedeki seçmen katılımı seçmenlerin AB'ye olan ilgisizliği veya 
AB hakkındaki bilgi eksiklikleri ile ilişkilendirilebilir. Bu sonuçlar ayrıca AB'nin 
kendini tanıtımındaki eksiklikler, derinleşen AB demokrasi açığı, ve son olarak AB'deki 
partilerin ve adayların Avrupa Parlamentosu’na olan ilgisizliği ile de ilişkilendirilebilir. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
The European Union (EU) has been blamed for a lack of democracy and legitimacy 
since its beginnings as the European Community. Direct elections to the European 
Parliament (EP) after 1979, and subsequent expansion of the Parliament’s 
competencies, were supposed to improve the EU’s image as a democratic, legitimate 
entity; from both institutional and its ‘people’s’ perspectives on legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, providing citizens with the chance to select their representative in the EP 
did little to fix the legitimacy crisis of those early years, and the debate about EU’s 
democratic deficit continues to this day. 
Democracy in the EU is generally evaluated from two perspectives, one 
examining its institutions and governance, the other looking at the people it governs and 
the public discourse about it. These concepts link two views on the question of EU 
legitimacy: output legitimacy and input legitimacy. Output legitimacy encompasses the 
performance of EU institutions and how they govern people; referring to the perceived 
policy performance and efficiency of rules, laws, and policy-making processes. Input 
legitimacy concentrates on people’s participation in the policy-making processes; and 
the responsiveness and capability of the system, such as the EU, to deliver what its 
citizens require (Lindgren and Persson, 2010; Risse 2006; Scharpf, 1999; Schmidt, 
2010). In other words, output legitimacy can be described as democracy for the people, 
while input legitimacy is considered democracy by and of the people. 
In the past, output legitimacy in the EU primarily presented itself in the form of 
traditional democratic processes, but this has declined with its enlargement, the 
deepening of European integration, and limiting of the legislative powers of EU 
member states. At present, output legitimacy is largely damaged because the EP, as the 
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only directly elected body within the EU, has limited powers compared to the European 
Commission or the Council. Additionally, although chosen directly by EU citizens, the 
members of the EP are elected mainly on the basis of national issues. Consequently, 
since output legitimacy is very institutionalized and difficult to alter, recent debate has 
concentrated on improving the input legitimacy rather than that of output. Involving 
citizens in the EU democratic processes is seen as the best way to help improve the EU 
legitimacy crisis (H. ritier, 2003; Horeth, 1999). For these reasons, I will concentrate on 
the problems of input legitimacy and the ways it can be improved. 
The low level of voter participation in the EP elections contributes to the input 
EU legitimacy crisis. Not only is the EP the only EU institution directly elected by the 
citizens, but the low voter turnout also signifies people’s lack of interest in this unique 
opportunity to choose their representatives in the EP, consequently damaging the EU 
legitimacy. Voter turnout in the EP elections has been decreasing ever since the first 
direct election in 1979. On that occasion, the average turnout was 62%. By 1999 it 
dropped to nearly 50% and then, even lower, to 43% in 2009, remaining at this level in 
2014 (European Parliament, 2014). 
While these figures are substantial, we can see even more striking differences in 
the participation levels across the individual EU member states. Comparing the Western 
and Central and Eastern (i.e. post-Communist) EU member states presents an 
outstanding example. In 2004, the average turnout for the Western EU member states 
was just over 49%, while for the eight post-Communist countries it was 26%. This gap 
of about 20% remained in both the 2009 and 2014 EP elections1. 
The overall decline in turnout in the EP elections is apparent, but the turnout gap 
between the EU’s Western member states and the post-Communist countries is more 
remarkable. Studies on turnout in the EP elections tend to take this gap for granted and 
do not look for further explanations above the usual characteristics of post-Communist 
legacy; including unstable governments, volatile party systems, corruption, lack of party 
affiliation, distrust to political elites and media, or the lack of voting tradition 
(Flickinger and Studlar, 2007; Gagatek, 2009; Howard, 2002). Nevertheless, data 
analyses of these studies indicates that these factors do not fully describe the low 
turnout in the post-Communist countries, and that there still is much variance left to be 
                                                 
1 Country-level participation data obtained from the Directorate-General for Communication, 2014. Please refer to 
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 for more detailed turnout data.  
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explained. On the following pages, I propose, and empirically test, an additional 
explanation of this phenomenon, by examining the content of the national media and 
people’s exposure to it in the weeks prior to the EP elections. 
A significant component of the input legitimacy is transparency of EU processes 
and easy access to information about policy-making and the functioning of the 
organisation. This is where news media can play an important role in helping to 
strengthen the input legitimacy, by providing relevant and information about the EU 
(Héritier, 2003). However, national news media are regularly blamed for not providing 
enough information about the EU, and for contributing to the democracy deficit. Media 
allow elites to publicize the EU policies, and they also help people gain knowledge 
about the EU. News media continue to be used by the majority of people as their main 
source of information, especially about remote issues such as the EU. Despite the 
expansion of online media, print newspapers and television broadcasting remain among 
the most used and trusted sources of information in 2009 (Special Eurobarometer 308). 
Being more informed about the EU enables people to form opinions and eventually 
decide who to vote for in the EP elections. 
While there is of course news about the EU in the media across the member 
states, there remains too much variation in how - and how much - national media in the 
different countries cover EU affairs. The EU media system is further characterized by 
the lack of common language, EU-wide news media, common communications policy 
and interest from the elites. All these factors make the creation of European public 
sphere, the common European discourse, very challenging (Sifft et al., 2007; Trenz, 
2004; van de Steeg 2006). Nevertheless, providing more information about the EU 
across national media could not only create the European public sphere, but also 
increase voter participation in the EP elections and help solve the EU input legitimacy 
crisis (Meyer 2005; Wessler et al. 2008). 
I see this as a vicious circle: as there is less at stake at the EP elections, and their 
results do not decide who runs an individual country, political parties and candidates 
devote less interest, time, and money on the EP election compared to national election 
campaigns. Consequently, there is little for the media to write about, and the lack of 
news concerning the EU and the EP elections results in citizens not receiving sufficient 
information about these topics. They can also become confused about whether the 
elections matter since it seems that neither media or political parties and candidates are 
actually concerned about them. As a result, many people choose not to vote in the EP 
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elections simply because they do not know what the EP does, what the purposes of the 
elections are, where they can vote or who they should vote for. This chain of events is 
detrimental to the EU legitimacy but, as I show later, it could be prevented if the media 
reported more news about the EU, the EP elections, parties, and candidates. 
I argue that people who are exposed more often to a high amount of news about 
the EU are more likely to vote in the EP elections. EU news can provide information 
essential for people to vote, including who the candidates are, where they can vote, what 
the powers of the EP are, or how EU policies relate to their everyday lives. By making 
news about the EU and the EP election more visible, the media can also send out a 
message that the elections are important and relevant to the member country, 
consequently increasing citizens’ motivation to vote. I expect the media effects to be 
weaker, or non-existent, in the CEE countries due to the low levels of EU news 
visibility as well as the lack of trust to media. 
I further argue that the tone of the news, defined as whether the story evaluates 
the EU or the EP positively or negatively, does not influence the effects of the exposure 
to news. As long as the EU news is well-visible, exposure to it has a positive impact on 
people’s likelihood to vote. Finally, I argue that there are differences in the effects of 
exposure to various media types. This is due to the different content presented in the 
newspapers and on television. Newspapers tend to publish more EU news than 
television and, similarly, quality newspapers and public television channels present 
more news about the EU than tabloid newspapers and commercial television channels.  
My results show a weak but statistically significant, positive relationship 
between people’s exposure to news about the EU in the weeks prior to the 2009 EP 
elections and their participation in the elections. These effects are not present for 
citizens in the CEE countries, in contrast to Western EU member states. My data 
analysis also provides evidence for my claim that the tone of the EU news plays an 
insignificant role in the relationship between exposure to media and voting. The effects 
of exposure to positive and to negative EU news do not reach conventional levels of 
statistical significance. This can, nevertheless also be the results of the low proportions 
of EU news with a positive or a negative tone 
Furthermore, I find clear differences in the effects of content exposure between 
various media types. Exposure to EU news in newspapers, both quality and tabloid, has 
stronger impact on the likelihood to vote than exposure to EU news on television. 
Additionally, exposure to EU news in tabloid newspapers is likely drive people away 
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from voting compared to exposure to quality newspapers, which, conversely, is likely to 
mobilize them. The effects of content exposure to all the various media types is, 
nevertheless, very weak. 
Finally, I simulate a situation to show how turnout would change if content 
exposure to EU news increases. My results clearly display that turnout would increase if 
people’s exposure to news about the EU and the visibility of EU news is increased. 
These effects are larger in the CEE countries, compared to the Western European 
countries, suggesting that as both the turnout and the EU news visibility were lower in 
the CEE countries, there is more scope for a change. The following paragraphs now 
outline how I explore my argument and reach my findings.  
On the following pages, I search for new explanations for the very low turnout 
in the post-Communist countries, aiming to fill the gap in the literature and understand 
whether these countries possibly contribute more to the EU legitimacy crisis than their 
Western counterparts. I analyze the content of the news media outlets across the 27 EU 
member states and the exposure of EU citizens to these outlets to determine whether 
exposure to more EU news impacts one’s likelihood to vote in the EP elections. 
Examining the visibility and tone of news about the EU in national newspapers and 
television channels in the weeks prior to the 2009 EP elections, I assess to what extent 
the news media actually fulfil their function as information providers. I tackle the 
central questions about the legitimacy of the EU, the effectiveness of political 
communication of the EU, and the extent of the attention that national media pay to the 
EU, considering specifically the post-Communist countries. The setting of the EP 
elections offers a unique opportunity to study voter behavior and media effects, since it 
allows researchers to examine the role of individual and contextual factors on the 
decisions of voters across diverse countries but voting in the same election (Van der 
Eijk and Franklin 1996). 
In Chapter 2 I present a survey of existing research on voter turnout, news 
coverage about the EU, effects of media on voting behavior, and the characteristics of 
the post-Communist EU countries in relation to voting behavior. I also link the findings 
and arguments from the surveyed literature to my research questions and outline the 
expectations and assumptions for my analysis. In Chapter 3 on data and measurement, I 
describe the three datasets used and explain their main variables. I also describe the 
creation of the main independent variable of interest, the content exposure, which 
combines the content of news media outlets and citizens’ exposure to it. At the end of 
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this chapter, I present the method used here and explain why it is the most fit to explain 
my research questions.   
In Chapter 4 I discuss the context of the 2009 EP elections, including the 
campaigns, turnout, and news coverage. I present numerous figures on the turnout 
across the EU member states, the visibility of EU news and its tone in national news 
outlets across the EU and the variations in news coverage across different media types. I 
also discuss the topics covered in the media and argue that the 2009 EP elections 
campaign, as portrayed by the national media, has little to do with the EU itself.   
In Chapters 5 and 6, I present the data analysis and discuss the results. Chapter 5 
looks at the effects of exposure to EU news based on the visibility of EU news, while 
Chapter 6 considers the effects along with the tone of the EU news. In these two 
chapters, I analyze the data using multilevel analyses, and also calculate marginal 
effects of exposure to media for various groups of observations; for example, people in 
different age groups, those with high and low interest in the EU, and those living in the 
Western EU member states and CEE countries.   
Succeeding the results chapters, in Chapter 7 I present alternate scenarios 
debating the extent of the impact elites and media could make by altering the media 
content. I examine how turnout would change if the content exposure across the EU 
countries either increased or decreased. I find that increasing the amount of news about 
the EU in the media and people’s exposure to it could indeed boost turnout, especially 
in the CEE countries. Finally, in Chapter 8, I summarize the findings and present them 
in the light of the EU legitimacy crisis.  
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CHAPTER 2
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
 
Elections are a central feature of democratic countries, and of the EU itself, and 
a high turnout is desirable to ensure the governing bodies are legitimate and truly 
representative (de Vreese, Banducci, Semetko and Boomgaarden, 2006). Over the past 
decades, voter turnout in European national and EP elections has declined, prompting 
researchers to look for explanations for this trend. Studies have found that, in addition 
to the numerous factors traditionally used to explain voter turnout, exposure to mass 
media also has an impact on one’s decision to vote in an election (Esser and de Vreese, 
2007; Norris, 2006). 
By providing information to citizens about political affairs and the workings of 
the governments, among other topics, media play an important role in a democratic 
society. Particularly in the times of elections, many people rely on mass media to obtain 
the knowledge that will enable them to cast an informed vote, thus giving it great power 
to influence their decision to vote as well as actual vote choice. This effect is likely to 
be stronger in the case of the EP election, as people generally know less about EU 
politics and candidates to the EP than their national politics. This leaves considerable 
space to the mass media to provide the information needed and help form opinions 
about parties and EP candidates (Boomgaarden et al., 2013; de Vreese et al., 2006; 
Elenbaas, Boomgaarden, Schuck and de Vreese, 2013; Esser and D’Angelo, 2006; 
Mughan and Gunther, 2000; Norris, 2004). 
I link the cognitive mobilization theory of media effects to the rational choice 
and mobilization theories of voter turnout. In line with the former theory, by providing 
information about the elections, media help decrease the costs of voting, and are thus 
likely to help boost the turnout. Similarly, related to the second theory, by the provision 
of election news, media show its importance and can help mobilize citizens. I examine 
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these theories in the setting of the 2009 EP elections which offers a unique setting for a 
comparative research because the same event is held across 28 different political, 
electoral, and media systems, so both country-level and individual-level explanatory 
variables can be considered (Boomgaarden, de Vreese, Schuck, Azrout, Elenbaas, van 
Spanje and Vliegenthart, 2013; Schuck, Boomgaarden and de Vreese, 2013).  
When studying the effects of media in voter turnout, both the content of the 
media and people’s exposure to it need to be taken into account in order to obtain a 
complete picture (Azrout, van Spanje and de Vreese, 2012; de Vreese and 
Boomgaarden, 2006c; Elenbaas et al., 2013; Slater, 2004). Regarding the content, 
studies generally examine the visibility of the EU news; i.e. the proportion of EU news 
items amongst all other news reports (de Vreese et al., 2005; Machill et al., 2006), the 
tone of EU news; i.e. whether this in any way evaluates the EU or its institutions 
(Bruter, 2004; de Vreese and Semetko, 2006), and the ‘Europeanness’ of the news; i.e. 
the extent to which the news refers to the EU, as opposed to being about an EU issue 
described within national context (Schuck and de Vreese, 2011; Trenz, 2004). A 
number of studies also seek to explain differences in EU news coverage across the EU 
(Boomgaarden et al., 2013; Schuck and de Vreese, 2011; Schuck, Vliegenthart, 
Boomgaarden, Elenbaas, Azrout, van Spanje and de Vreese, 2013) and over time 
(Boomgaarden et al., 2013).  
Studies have found that exposure to news about politics or a particular issue 
helps make people interested in that issue (Baek, 2009; de Vreese and Semetko, 2002; 
Norris, 2006) but may also increase political cynicism; i.e. create or increase the gap 
between voters and politicians (Schuck, Boomgaarden and de Vreese, 2013). Findings 
about the tone of the news are inconclusive, with some commentators holding the view 
that tone impacts upon people’s views about a particular issue; i.e. a positive tone 
makes them think positively about the issue and vice versa (Norris, 2000), while others 
say that any tone, whether positive or negative, helps make the news more memorable, 
thus having effectively the same impact on those exposed to it (Feldman, 2001; Marcus 
et al., 2000).  
 I examine the media effects across the 27 EU member states and look at the 
differences in the effects between countries in Western Europe and the CEE, i.e. post-
Communist countries. The turnout in the latter group, especially in the EP elections, is 
generally lower than in the former. This is commonly explained by the lack of voting 
tradition, volatile party systems, low levels of party affiliation and interest in the EU 
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from both voters and candidates, high rates of political corruption and lack of trust in 
politics (Flickinger and Studlar, 2007; Guerra, 2010; Schmitt, 2005). I further suggest 
that due to these characteristics, and a lack of trust in media, the media effects are likely 
to be weaker compared to Western European countries and thus unable to help boost the 
turnout.  
In the following literature review chapter I first tap into the issue of EU 
legitimacy and then present an overview of existing research on voter turnout in 
national and EP elections, outlining theories on voter turnout as well as the numerous 
factors that have proved significant in explaining it. I further discuss the relationship 
between media and elections, the nature of media coverage of the EU, and the effects of 
exposure to media on voting behavior. Lastly, I present the characteristics and 
peculiarities that impact voting behavior and turnout in the CEE countries.  
 
 
 
2.1. EU Legitimacy 
 
 
 
The lack of democratic legitimating processes in the EU has been an issue present 
on both political and academic agendas for several decades. While there are many types 
of legitimacy within the EU, on the whole it can be defined as the “…acceptability of a 
social or political order.” (Lindgren and Persson, 2010: 450). For an institution to be 
legitimate, it needs to have the means to achieve what its citizens require and to have 
support from those whom it affects by its policies (Horeth, 1999; Lindgren and Persson, 
2010). In the case of the EU, this suggests that it needs to know what its citizens want; 
which can then be expressed via their vote in EP elections for parties and candidates 
that represent their needs and wishes. Furthermore, citizens across the EU member 
states need to express their support for the EU system either actively, by participating in 
the EU politics - for example, by voting in the EP elections - or passively, by following 
EU regulations. 
Of the numerous sources of political legitimacy, discussion in terms of output 
and input democratic legitimating processes is the best fit for the EU (Meyer, 1999; 
Scharpf, 1999). Output legitimacy refers to the perceived policy performance and the 
efficiency of rules, laws and policy-making processes, i.e. democracy for the people. 
Input legitimacy is described as democracy by and of the people. It entails citizens’ 
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participation in EU politics and the EU’s responsiveness to them, expressed as taking 
into account conflicting interests when making decisions. A significant component of 
the input legitimacy is transparency of EU processes and easy access to information 
about policy-making and the functioning of the EU. This is where news media can play 
an important role to help strengthen the input legitimacy by providing relevant and 
information about the EU (Héritier, 2003; Lindgren and Persson, 2010; Meyer, 1999; 
Schmidt, 2010). 
Output legitimacy had primarily been present in the EU in the past in a form of 
traditional democratic processes but has declined with the enlargement of the EU, 
deepening of the European integration and the limiting of the legislative power of EU 
member states. At a present day, the output legitimacy is largely damaged because not 
only is the EP the only directly elected body within the EU, it also has limited powers 
compared to the European Commission or the Council. The input legitimacy is 
weakened by the lack of citizens’ support for the EU expressed as low voter turnout in 
the EP elections2 and the fact that voters tend to choose their EP representatives mainly 
on the basis of national issues rather than EU-wide questions (Follesdal and Hix, 2006; 
Héritier, 2003). 
The recent debate about EU legitimacy has therefore concentrated on improving 
the input legitimacy rather than output because involving citizens in the EU democratic 
processes is seen as the best way to improve the EU legitimacy crisis (Horeth, 1999). 
Citizens can participate in EU decision-making - and thus justify the legitimacy of the 
EU - only if they have sufficient information about it. This nevertheless seems to be 
another of EU’s problems; usually referred to as the communication deficit. The theory 
of EU communication deficit suggests that it is the EU’s own representatives who are 
responsible for not providing sufficient accessible and comprehensible information 
about the EU. The official information released by the EU tends to be very technical, 
making little sense to ordinary citizens without prior knowledge or experience about 
organisation. Similarly, the news coverage about the EU by national media is generally 
very limited and does not provide the information citizens need to be able to get 
involved in the EU processes (Meyer, 1999). 
This brings me back to the vicious circle described in the introduction: EU 
representatives provide either too little information about the EU and its functioning, or 
                                                 
2 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the turnout in the EP elections. 
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make it too technical in nature, and thus news about the EU is generally missing from 
the national news media. EU citizens then receive little information about the EU, 
which prevents them from participating in the EU politics. As a result, the EU 
communication and democratic deficits keep growing. Nevertheless, there seems to be a 
relatively simple solution to stop this detrimental chain of events.  As I show in Chapter 
7, boosting the visibility of EU news in the media and people’s exposure to it can have a 
very positive impact on voter participation  
I discuss the aspects of communication deficit relating to the media coverage of 
the EU later in this chapter. First, I will turn to the overview of the literature on voter 
turnout, describing the factors that influence voter turnout in studies of both national 
and EP elections. 
 
 
 
2.2. Voter Turnout 
 
 
 
As advocated in the previous section, citizens’ participation in policy making 
and other democratic processes is essential for the legitimacy of a democratic political 
system. Many researchers have examined the reasons why citizens participate in 
elections and why they do not, presenting numerous factors The majority of studies 
agree that the most important determinants are education and the levels of political 
information and political interest, in addition to country specific characteristics such as 
those describing the political, party, and electoral systems (Lassen, 2005; Mattila, 
2003). Generally, country-level variables are said to play the most important role in 
determining an individual’s voting behavior, but the explanatory variables differ 
depending on the particular theory. I will examine these aspects on the following pages. 
 
 
 
2.2.1. Theories of Voter Turnout 
 
 
From the numerous theories which seek to explain voter turnout, the rational 
choice theory, the mobilization theory, and the political-institutional model form the 
basis of this study. The rational choice theory bases its assumptions on a calculation of 
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costs and benefits of voting. Studies have established that there are more costs 
associated with voting (including going to the polling place, obtaining information 
about the election and the candidates, missing work etc.) than there are perceived 
benefits (such as civic duty, supporting one’s favorite party or candidate, feeling 
involved in the policy-making process etc.). Furthermore, in most elections, citizens are 
aware that a single vote is very unlikely to change the outcome of the election and this 
often discourages them from voting (Downs, 1957; Dowding, John and Rubenson, 
2012). Franklin and Wessels (2010) point to the same problem in the EP election when 
they conjecture the reasons for anyone to vote in an election that has no clear purpose. 
They suggest that it is actually rational for people not to vote and those that vote do so 
because of their deep interest in the election and its outcome.  
Empirical studies based on the rational choice model usually consider a set of 
independent variables, including voting in previous elections, caring about elections, 
sense of civic duty, positive evaluation of candidates, personal costs and benefits of 
voting, evaluation of personal and national economic situation, or propensity to vote 
(Blais, 2000; Rallings, Thrasher and Borisyuk, 2003; van Ham and Smets, 2012). 
In recent decades, voter turnout rates have been declining paralleled with the 
number of people who identify themselves with a political party. Therefore, the need for 
capturing the effects of mobilization has been recognized by those supporting the 
concept of the mobilization theory. They suggest that voting is a social behavior in the 
sphere of social norms, where the default is to not vote and that people exercise their 
vote just because they are asked to do so by parties, candidates, interest groups, social 
movements, campaigners and media, or because their family and friends do so 
(Arceneaux and Nickerson, 2009; Gerber and Green, 2000; Rallings et al., 2003).  
This is where the media, the main interest of this study, play an important role; 
by reporting on the elections, media provide voters with information and also help 
persuade them to cast their vote, possibly helping to decide who to vote for. Analyses 
based on the mobilization theory include media exposure, in addition to factors such as 
mobilization by parties and non-partisan groups, membership in organizations, union 
membership, attendance to religious service, or exposure to political advertising (van 
Ham and Smets, 2012). 
Finally, the importance of institutional factors, originating from aggregate-level 
studies, is put forward by the political institutional model. The contextual country-level 
variables used to explain turnout include compulsory voting, concurrent elections 
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(important especially for second-order election), closeness of the election race, electoral 
system, or effective number of parties (Arceneaux and Nickerson, 2009; Blais, 2000; 
van Ham and Smets, 2012). 
 Some studies have found that although the act of voting is done by individuals, 
individual characteristics do not have as strong explanatory power as systemic and 
contextual factors, such as the country-level indicators of compulsory vote, weekend 
polling, the availability of postal votes, time until the next election or electoral system 
and voter registration processes (Franklin, 1996; van der Brug and Franklin, 2005; 
Norris, 2007). Nevertheless, despite these factors being viewed as significant in 
numerous research pieces, their importance may be exaggerated (Blais, 2006). In the 
end, it is the voters’ own decision to vote or not based upon whether they see the 
election as important and whether they believe that their vote will impact the election 
outcome. I use both country-level and individual-level variables to explain voter turnout 
in the 2009 EP elections,  
Due to different causal mechanisms being prominent for voters in diverse 
contexts, a single theoretical approach may not be sufficient for each study, particularly 
if this looks into variances in turnout across countries with different characteristics. 
Additionally, a cross-national study of variance in voter turnout should consider 
variables on both individual and country levels because factors from both these levels 
have an impact on voter behavior. It is, nevertheless, a difficult challenge “…to link 
these [individual and contextual] approaches, so that individual-level behavior is 
understood within its broader institutional context.” (Norris, 2007: 5).  
I include both levels of explanatory factors, as well as ideas from several 
theoretical concepts. I base my principal assumptions on the main idea behind the 
rational choice model, suggesting that in order for people to vote, the benefits need to 
outweigh the costs. Considering that it is nearly impossible to increase the benefits of 
voting, especially in the case of EP elections, the costs need to decrease. As indicated 
above, the costs of voting are diverse, including the time and effort it takes for a citizen 
to obtain information about the election itself (for example, where the polling booths are 
and how to obtain a voting ballot) and about the parties and candidates, in order to 
decide who to vote for. By having this information readily available, the costs of voting 
could decrease. As news media continue to be mentioned as the source of information 
people use the most, it is perfectly placed to provide such information. 
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One may argue that providing such information in the media creates only a small 
increase in the quantity of information available to people and, thus, just a little 
reduction in the voting costs. However, marginal changes to the costs of voting have 
been shown to have an impact. A Canadian study, for example, showed that 
“…marginal adjustments to the costs of voting were likely to have a small, though 
measurable impact on voter turnout” (Blais, 2000; Rallings, et al., 2003). This is also 
where the mobilization theory comes into play. Apart from providing information and 
decreasing the costs of voting, by publishing news about the election and candidates, the 
media give importance to the election, make it salient in the news, and place it on the 
country’s agenda. When people see that the election is important and that the media and 
politicians care about it, they are more likely to vote than if they do not see, hear, or 
read about it in their daily lives. 
Finally, given that voter turnout in this study is examined across 27 countries 
that differ in, for example, turnout rates, party and political systems, media systems, 
public opinion about the EU, contextual explanatory variables originating from the 
political-institutional model also play an important role in this research. I expect to see 
differences between individual countries as well as between blocs of countries, namely 
Western European countries and CEE countries.  
 
 
2.2.2. Factors Affecting Voter Turnout 
 
 
Despite the vast amount of research carried out on voter turnout, the findings are 
somewhat inconclusive. In their review of 90 empirical studies of individual level voter 
turnout in national elections, published in ten top journals between 2000 and 2010, van 
Ham and Smets (2012) found over 170 independent variables that could be used to 
explain voter turnout; none of them was included every single study. Only 8 of these 
variables were included in more than 25% of the studies. These are education, age, 
gender, ethnicity, party identification, income, marital status, and political interest. Age 
and education, the two most common explanatory variables, were included in 72% and 
74% of studies, respectively (van Ham and Smets, 2012). I utilize most of the traditional 
variables used to explain voter turnout and searches for new variables, namely those 
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related to the media and campaign that could add more explanatory power to the 
models.  
Although the effect of compulsory voting on turnout has been confirmed by all 
studies which utilize it, there still are differences found among countries with 
compulsory voting. These differences relate to whether the countries apply sanctions or 
not; it has been found that compulsory voting matters only when there are sanctions for 
not voting (Blais et al., 2003). Among the EU countries used within this study, Belgium, 
Cyprus, Greece and Luxembourg have compulsory voting systems. Other institutional 
variables, such as the proportionality of electoral system, unicameralism, 
competitiveness of election, impact of one’s vote, voting age, and voting rules have 
been used in a huge number of studies and the significance of their effects has been 
shown; however, they do not have the same effect in all countries (Blais, 2006; Hirczy, 
1995). 
The nature of the electoral system is an interesting variable when studying the 
EP elections. Although all countries vote in the same election, there are only some basic 
common rules regarding the electoral system. This results in most countries using 
slightly different electoral systems. The optimal way then to compare the systems is 
using a degree of proportionality of the electoral system (Norris, 2000). I therefore use 
this measure.  
Socio-demographic indicators, including gender, age and education, have been 
proven to influence one’s likelihood to vote on the individual level (Blais, 2000). The 
effect of education has been widely researched and discussed. Despite some findings 
suggesting that education is not a significant determinant of voting in all countries (for 
example, in certain Western European countries it does not appear to play a role) a 
positive relation between time spent in education and turnout has been found in many 
studies. The rational choice approach explains the effect of education to the extent that 
those with fewer resources (i.e. less education) tend to be less informed about politics, 
feel alienated from politics, and outside of the groups targeted by parties and candidates 
during campaign. Thus, they come across more challenges when they seek information 
about the election and the seemingly simple decision of whether to vote or not can 
become very difficult, making them more likely to not vote (Downs, 1957; Gallego, 
2010).  
It is well-established that younger people are less likely to vote than older people 
(Gallego, 2010). The main rationale for this difference is that many older people have 
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had a chance to develop a habit of voting and socialize in an environment where voting 
is a norm while the younger members of society are still in the process of socialization. 
Despite most of the research with these conclusions coming from the USA, it is often 
generalized so as to fit European countries as well (Esser and de Vreese, 2007). 
Comparing the 2004 USA presidential election with the 2004 EP election 
(notwithstanding dissimilarities between the two processes), Esser and de Vreese (2007) 
found that turnout of young voters (aged 18 - 29), was lower in Europe than in the USA. 
Nevertheless, age is an important variable and is included in the models in this study.  
Political variables are important determinants of voter behavior at both 
individual and aggregate levels. Hirczy (1995) shows this while examining turnout in 
Malta. Even without the presence of compulsory voting, Malta has the highest turnout 
of all EU countries without compulsory voting: it is always above 90% in national 
elections and around 80% in EP elections. This is due to the characteristics of voters 
and of the party and electoral system: strong partisanship and party loyalty, deep 
polarization, single transferrable vote system (ranking candidates no matter what party 
they come from), low volatility (for the two main parties), high participation in other 
political events, intensive campaigning by candidates and parties (Hirczy, 1995).  
Exposure to media and their content have been said to have an impact on voter 
turnout although there has been much discussion about the direction and extent of the 
effect (e.g., Banducci and Semetko, 2003; Esser and de Vreese, 2007; Norris, 2006). 
The following paragraphs look briefly into the determinants of voter turnout in the EP 
elections, and the next section in this literature overview examines the relationship 
between media and voter turnout. 
 
 
 
2.3. European Parliament Elections 
 
 
 
As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, the EU has been suffering from 
legitimacy crisis ever since its early days. Although the direct elections to the EP and 
expansion of its powers were aimed at fixing this issue, the lack of EU citizens’ 
participation in the elections keeps the democratic deficit in the centre of research 
agenda. On the following pages I will briefly mention the history of the EP elections 
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and outline its characteristics relating to campaigning and turnout. I will also explain the 
links between EU news coverage and voter turnout in the EP elections. 
 
 
2.3.1. Turnout in the EP Elections 
 
 
Voting is the central element of democratic political systems. The EU is a 
democratic entity, so a high turnout in European elections is a prerequisite for a well-
functioning democracy in the EU (de Vreese, Banducci, Semetko and Boomgaarden, 
2006). The direct EP elections were established a response to early critiques of the 
democratic deficit and “…to establish a direct link between the individual citizen and 
decision-making at the European level” (Marsh and Mikhaylov, 2010: 5; Follesdal and 
Hix, 2006; Franklin and Hobolt, 2011).  
The EP is the only EU institution directly elected by the citizens of all the 
member states, and thus forms the ultimate democratic body. However, it is only 
wishful thinking on the part of politicians and political scientists that citizens of the EU 
have the desire to participate in the EU policy making by electing their country’s 
representatives to the EP; despite the fact that the EP elections are the only time when 
citizens can directly influence the EU politics and choose their national representation, 
the turnout figures show that Europeans do not take advantage of their unique 
opportunity to participate in the EU’s democratic process of decision-making 
(Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Karp, Banducci and Bowler, 2003b). The voter turnout 
at EP elections has been decreasing since the first direct election in 1979. On that 
occasion, the average EU turnout was nearly 62%. By 2009, it had dropped to 43%, and 
it remained at this level in 2014 (European Parliament, 2014). I discuss the change of 
turnout over time as well as the differences across individual EU member states in 
Chapter 4.  
Soon after the first direct elections to the EP, political scientists realized that 
voting behavior in these elections is not precisely similar to that displayed in national 
elections. Reif and Schmitt (1980) referred to EP elections as ‘second order national 
elections’ because they play no role in deciding who rules the country, and there is thus 
‘less at stake’ than in national elections. Nonetheless, the same candidates and parties 
often compete in both first and second order elections – and, often, about the same 
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national issues - even though the ideal is that the EP elections are about EU issues 
(Franklin and van der Eijk, 1996; Franklin, 2006; Schmitt, 2005).  
By their nature, second order elections show lower voter turnout than first order 
elections (Marsh and Franklin, 1996). Despite the situation changing since the first 
European election and voters knowing more about the EU today, they still have little 
knowledge about EU politics compared to their national politics, and they often see EU 
affairs as irrelevant to their everyday lives. Voters also rarely have preferences for EU 
policies because they believe that they do not affect them, which makes them less likely 
to vote in the European election (Mattila, 2003). This is what makes the EP different 
from other second-order elections (for example, regional or municipal): they are trans-
national, which is often reflected in voters not feeling European or believing that the EU 
membership benefits their country or themselves personally (Marsh and Mikhaylov, 
2010). 
There is “less at stake” in second-order elections and some aspects result 
directly from it, including the lower voter turnout, news coverage, and interest in 
campaigning by politicians (as compared to national elections). When attention is paid 
to the EP elections in the news, it is usually in connection with national political leaders, 
parties or national issues, while the EU issues are often pushed to the side (Reif and 
Schmitt, 1980; Schuck and de Vreese, 2011). Voters do not consider second-order 
elections to be very important and are very likely to follow their feelings rather than 
making a rational decision about who to vote for; they often vote for parties that they 
would not vote for in national elections. Consequently, the outcomes of EP election do 
not reflect outcomes of national elections (Marsh, 2007; Reif and Schmitt, 1980).  
National voting systems and institutional settings and rules also have an impact 
on the public’s interest in the EP election. Turnout is influenced by the position of EP 
election in the country’s electoral cycle, by the closeness to any previous elections, or 
whether there is another election running at the same time as the EP election (Reif and 
Schmitt, 1980). Holding EP elections on the same day as any other elections, whether 
national or local, is likely to boost voter turnout in the country as more citizens choose 
to vote in the other election that decides who runs their country or a region. 
Subsequently, while they are at the polling station, they would often cast their vote in 
the EP election as well. One the other hand, holding the EP elections just a short time 
before or after other elections has a negative impact on turnout as voters experience 
fatigue; they may feel the need to choose one election to vote in, and the EP election is 
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rarely the choice. Different EU countries went through these two scenarios during the 
2009 EP elections, and I will discuss this further in Chapter 4. 
There are opposing views on what happens when second-order elections take 
place for the first time. Either too much is unknown and too many questions and doubts 
are raised by the public, politicians, and journalists, which results in low turnout and 
low media coverage (Reif and Schmitt, 1980) or a ‘first election boost’ occurs, which 
causes high turnout and a visible media coverage (Franklin, 2007: 56). In the case of the 
EP elections, the first election boost occurred in all new members except for the CEE 
countries; I discuss this in more detail in the later sections of this study. 
 
 
2.3.2. Factors Affecting Turnout in the EP Elections 
 
 
Despite the ‘second-order’ nature of the EP elections, studies that examine EP 
elections turnout generally use the same individual-level explanatory factors as those 
related to national elections (mentioned in previous pages). I build my model utilizing 
the individual-level variables commonly used in electoral studies, including age, 
education, income, gender, closeness to or identification with a party, and political 
interest (Franklin et al., 1996; Marsh and Franklin, 1996; Mattila, 2003).  
While one would expect that people’s opinion about the EU serve as an indicator 
of how likely they are to vote in the EP elections, there is little agreement in the existing 
literature: while some say these factors play no significant role (Franklin, van der Eijk 
and Oppenhuis, 1996; Schmitt and van der Eijk, 2002), others suggest that they do 
(Blondel et al., 1997). I include two variables indicating respondents’ attitudes toward 
the EU in my models as well and discuss their significance later in the paper.  
As in this study, turnout in the EP elections is generally studied across several or 
all EU member states. Therefore, country-level variables are vital to the explanation of 
the EP elections turnout variation. Country-level indicators are comprised of 
institutional variables, including the type of electoral system, compulsory voting, the 
existence of concurrent national election, and the position of EP election in electoral 
cycle. These contextual variables explain a great deal of variance in turnout in the EP 
elections between countries (Franklin et al., 1996, Franklin, 2007; Norris, 2007; 
Schmitt, 2005).  
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The cross-country variance that cannot be explained by the contextual variables 
could be assigned to the campaign mobilization, or rather the lack of it, by parties and 
mass media. To examine these aspects, researchers use variables that include political 
interest, exposure to campaign, or appeal by main party (Franklin et al., 1996). Media 
coverage of EU affairs and the EP elections has been singled out as important influence 
on voter turnout and - at the same time - been blamed for providing too little 
information about the elections to the citizens. I utilize campaign mobilization and 
exposure to news regarding the elections as the main explanatory factors in this study. 
Despite the situation changing since the first EP election, with media paying 
more attention to EU affairs (Boomgaarden et al., 2013; Schuck and de Vreese, 2011) 
and voters knowing more about the EU today, EU citizens still have little knowledge 
about the EU politics compared to their national politics, and they often see the EU 
affairs as irrelevant to their everyday lives. Voters also rarely have preferences for EU 
policies because they believe that they do not affect them (Mattila, 2003). All these 
aspects have an effect on turnout in the EP elections, but they do not explain it fully. In 
the rest of this study I search for additional explanations of voters’ decision to vote in 
the EP elections, utilizing content of the media and exposure to it as one of the most 
prominent explanations. 
 
 
 
2.4. Role of Media in the EP Elections 
 
 
 
Media play a very important role in the democratic political process, especially 
during election campaigns. As Esser and D’Angelo (2006) state, “Election campaigns 
are a staple of modern democracies” and they receive much attention from the media 
(44). The EU strives to be a modern democracy but the media fall behind with their lack 
of campaign coverage which tends to leave voters uninformed about the election 
(Boomgaarden et al., 2013; Elenbaas et al., 2013). 
The EU is a complex political entity that requires effective political 
communication to function in a proper and legitimate way. However, most of the 
communication produced by the EU serves only the elite since its content, language, 
and accessibility can be complicated and hard to understand for an ordinary citizen 
(Meyer, 1999; Peter, 2003; Schlesinger, 1999). On a national level, EU communication 
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usually originates from national political elites and often concentrates on domestic 
rather than EU-wide issues. Political communication between EU institutions and the 
public is one of the main functions of the democratic EU, and while media are the tool 
to make such a communication happen, they frequently fail at this task (Schuck and de 
Vreese, 2011; Trenz, 2004). 
The study of media coverage of an event such as an EP election, and its effect on 
voting behavior, matters because media are the most important source for Europeans to 
get information about the EU (Special Eurobarometer 308). Availability of information 
is necessary for quality decision-making by both public and policy makers: for the 
public to vote for those who accurately represent their views, and for policy makers to 
respond to the peoples’ needs (Norris, 2004).  
Considering they are a part of the EU decision-making process, European 
citizens should be able to gain as much knowledge about the EU as they wish, in order 
to make an educated and reasonable choice when electing their country’s 
representatives to the EP. High visibility of news about the EU in the media is thus 
desirable because this is the most important source of information for the public, 
particularly about remote issues such as the EP elections (de Vreese et al., 2006; 
Mughan and Gunther, 2000). According to the rational choice theory, voters see voting 
as an act with low benefits and high costs, especially when, as in the European 
elections, the benefits are hard to delineate. To boost the participation rate, the 
perceived benefits need to be increased and/or the costs decreased. Easier access to 
information - such as that obtained from media - can lower the costs associated with 
voting. Greater campaign coverage in national media could thus increase turnout as it 
would decrease the cost of voting by providing information to the citizens. More 
politically informed citizens are more likely to be interested in the matters of politics 
and elections and are then more likely to vote. This set of propositions forms the main 
idea behind this study. I will examine the links between these in the data analysis 
section.   
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2.5. Media Theory and News Coverage 
 
 
 
Media play an important role in embracing a country’s democracy as they 
publicize the opinions of political and economic elites. Many researchers have agreed 
that media have a positive impact on democratization and human development. To 
strengthen democracy and government’s responsive to citizens, media need to provide 
plurality of opinion, serve as a watchdog for the government and a place for public 
debate, and to be easily accessible to the wider public (Elenbaas et al., 2013; Norris, 
2004).  
Despite the EP election not being a first-order election or being preceded by a 
highly visible campaign in the media, political scientists often study the media effects 
on voting in the EP elections. Since the elections are not salient, the media are likely to 
play an even greater role in this election than in national elections by providing 
information about issues, candidates, and voting procedures, that citizens are distanced 
from or have generally little knowledge about. Consequently, as the main hypothesis of 
this paper states, higher intensity of the EP election campaign and higher visibility of 
news about it could also increase turnout as voters would perceive the EP to be of 
greater importance (Banducci and Semetko, 2003; Banducci, 2005). 
There is a variety of research of media coverage of EU issues and its effects on 
public opinion on issues such as European integration, EU enlargement, the ‘Euro’ 
currency union, and the benefits and effectiveness of the EU in general. The EU leaders 
cannot inform European citizens about its processes and policies on their own 
(Anderson and McLeod, 2004; Meyer, 1999; Morgan, 1995) and so have to rely “…on 
the media to indirectly strengthen its legitimacy by increasing citizens’ awareness of its 
activities and policies” (de Vreese et al., 2005: 185).  
Media can help increase not only public’s knowledge but also its interest in the 
EU, and can also contribute to the formation of a common European identity (de Vreese 
and Semetko, 2004; de Vreese et al., 2006; Schuck and de Vreese, 2011). However, EU 
news can sometimes be very technical and complicated making it difficult for the public 
to understand and learn from. This is when stereotypes about the EU are created, for 
example the one about the EP setting standards for bent bananas (Bruter, 2004; de 
Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2006a: 421; Meyer, 1999; Morgan, 1995).  
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Research about the EU media coverage is necessary for learning about the 
functioning of its democratic processes and for the discussion of its communication and 
democratic deficits (de Vreese et al., 2005 and 2006: 478; see also Boomgaarden et al., 
2013). It is important that citizens are informed because then they can make an educated 
decision in the EP election and thus participate in EU policy making. Following the 
arguments of rational choice and mobilization theories, high visibility of EU news in the 
media is desirable considering that it is very important source of information for the 
public (de Vreese et al., 2006; Mughan and Gunther, 2000; Norris, 2000; Peter, 2003; 
Prior 2005). By providing information about the EU and the EP election, media can not 
only help reduce the costs of voting but can also serve as mobilizing actors when, by 
intensively covering the EP elections, they assign importance to them (Baek, 2009).  
Media tend to publish news about election campaigns when they feature tight 
competition and are well visible. However, as I outline on the following pages, parties 
and candidates rarely campaign for the EP elections as intensively as they do for 
national or local elections, so the news media have little incentive to cover it. 
 
 
 
2.5.1. EP Election Campaigns  
 
 
The intensity of campaign activity is closely linked to both voter turnout and 
news coverage about the election; if it is of high intensity, it can have a positive impact 
on citizens’ likelihood to vote (Bowler and Farrell, 2011; Karp, Bowler and Banducci, 
2003). It has been established that parties and candidates do not campaign for EP 
elections as much as they do in national or local election because the parties do not hold 
the EP election to be as important as a national election. Thus, they often devote little 
money, time, and effort to campaigning for the EP election.  
Campaign styles and efforts vary across the EU member states. In countries with 
compulsory voting, campaign efforts are usually even lower and are targeted on specific 
candidates or parties since little effort is needed to bring voters to the polls (Bowler and 
Farrell, 2011). Additionally, the type of electoral system in use is linked to the intensity 
of campaigning: under the PR system, elections are generally more competitive and 
parties have a higher motivation to campaign since votes proportionally translate into 
seats (Karp et al., 2003). Campaigning is thus expected to be more intensive under the 
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PR system. Countries with candidate-based systems (Ireland, for example) can generate 
intense and individual mobilization; nevertheless, it has been shown that turnout is 
generally higher in countries with proportional electoral systems rather than plurality 
systems or candidate-based systems. Most countries in the EU use a PR system, so the 
electoral system as explanatory variable has very little power (Karp et al., 2003). 
Nevertheless, due to various country specifics of the electoral systems, the actual degree 
of proportionality differs even across PR systems and thus is often used in the analyses 
explaining voter turnout, as in this study.   
Many have suggested that the problem of lower turnout may partially be caused 
by the lack of campaign and media coverage about the EU and the EP election. Even if 
there is some campaign and coverage, national issues play the main role in it and 
European issues are seen within the framework of national politics. People know very 
little about how the EP works, what it does, and who the MEPs are; political parties and 
mass media, although having the potential to improve this, do little to change this, by 
continually failing to engage the citizens (Boomgaarden et al., 2013; Elenbaas et al., 
2013; Marsh and Mikhaylov 2010).  
Mass media could be used as a tool to increase people’s awareness of the EU 
and the EP elections, combatting low visibility of the EU and EP election campaign in 
the media, EP elections framed within domestic political affairs, lack of interest from 
citizens in the EU and the election, and consequently citizens’ hesitation to go cast a 
vote. In the following section I examine the literature on news coverage and media 
effects and explore the ways in which the mass media could improve the current state of 
the EP election affairs. 
 
 
 
2.5.2. News Coverage 
 
 
Many studies examine the relationship between media and politics. News media 
play a prominent role during elections as the most common channel of communication 
between parties and voters. News media allow parties to reach a wide audience, 
including less partisan voters. There are many political and contextual factors that 
influence the amount of EU news coverage, and these vary among countries and 
although detailed explanation is beyond the scope of this study, awareness of these 
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factors helps explain the different levels of EU news coverage across the EU countries 
but also the varying effects of people’s exposure to the media (Blumler, 1997; 
Boomgaarden et al., 2013; de Vreese, 2005; Mughan and Gunther, 2000; Norris, 2006; 
Schuck and de Vreese, 2011; Schuck et al., 2013; Peter, 2003).  
The process of European integration is driven mainly by actions of national and 
European-level political elites, and their opinions concerning the EU have an impact on 
the EU news coverage. Higher levels of public satisfaction with domestic democracy, 
and that of the EU, increase EU news coverage and make it more prominent 
(Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Peter and de Vreese, 2004; 
Peter, 2003).  
Although media are acknowledged as an important source of information, they 
are often blamed for the lack of EU news and for creating a communications deficit, 
which along with other factors leads to democratic deficit (Boomgaarden et al., 2013; de 
Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2006a; de Vreese, 2007; Norris, 2000; Schuck and de 
Vreese, 2011). Most of the studies agree that the coverage of EU issues in the news is 
generally very low and peaks only around important events (Boomgaarden et al., 2010 
and 2013; de Vreese et al. 2005 and 2006; Peter 2003; Machill et al. 2006; Peter and de 
Vreese, 2004; Semetko et al., 2000).  
Therefore, scholars examine media coverage generally, in ‘routine’ periods 
(Peter et al., 2003; Trenz, 2004), but more often concentrate their studies around 
important EU events, such as the EP election (Boomgaarden et al., 2013; de Vreese et 
al., 2006; de Vreese et al,. 2005; Peter et al,. 2004; Schuck et al., 2013), referenda (e.g. 
Danish referendum on Euro – de Vreese and Semetko, 2002 and 2004), EU enlargement 
(Schuck and de Vreese, 2006) or introduction of Euro in 1999 (de Vreese et al., 2001).  
Some studies examine only the visibility of EU news (Boomgaarden et al., 2013; 
de Vreese et al., 2005), while others study its tone (Bruter, 2004; de Vreese and 
Semetko, 2002; Schuck et al., 2013) or the visibility along with prominence of specific 
EU topics (Peter et al., 2003, 2004; Peter and de Vreese, 2004; Schuck and de Vreese, 
2011). Although the EU is not covered much in the news, when it is covered it is given 
high prominence, i.e. it is placed on the front page of a newspaper or at the beginning of 
the television newscast, or a large space or long time is devoted to it (Peter and de 
Vreese, 2004). When studying the tone of EU news, scholars have found that the EU 
news is generally negative or neutral toward the body and its representatives (de Vreese 
et al., 2006; de Vreese and Semetko, 2002; Peter et al., 2003). 
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The EU news also differs in the extent to which it actually talks about the EU or 
simply mentions it: there are numerous instances when the news item mentions the EU 
but this is often in connection to national issues and actors; fewer news items actually 
discuss an EU matter in great detail (de Vreese et al., 2005 and 2006; Peter et al., 2004; 
Semetko et al., 2000; Trenz, 2004).  
 
 
 
2.5.3. EU News in Various Media Types 
 
 
Media content and its effects vary across media types. Studies look into the 
differences in the effects of exposure to news in newspapers and on television, and 
between different types of newspapers, such as tabloid or quality, and television 
channels, such as public and commercial (Boomgaarden et al., 2013; de Vreese et al., 
2006; Peter et al., 2003 and 2005; Schuck and de Vreese, 2011). 
Nevertheless, it is not the actual type of the media outlet that matters but it is the 
content typical for each media type. Quality newspapers and public television channels 
tend to include more political and economic news as well as, in relation to this study, 
more news about the EU. Tabloid newspapers and commercial television channels, on 
the other hand, are likely to present more soft, sensational news, i.e. news that appeal to 
human interest. To support this argument, upon investigating the relationship between 
various media types, political knowledge, and participation in Denmark and The 
Netherlands, de Vreese and Boomgaarden (2006c) concluded that media had a positive 
effect on political knowledge and participation only when it contained a substantial 
amount of political news; meaning that exposure to quality news and public television, 
rather than tabloid news and commercial television, is likely to boost people’s 
likelihood to vote (de Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2006c; see also Newton, 1999). I find 
similar outcomes in this study.  
Nevertheless, research indicates that newspapers tend to have more news about 
the EU than television. Additionally, more attention and effort is needed to follow news 
in newspapers as compared to television, which would suggest that by doing so, one 
learns more and can thus become more politically interested. Furthermore, while 
frequent television-watching may distract people from voting and politics in general, 
reading newspapers can make them more likely to vote (Esser and de Vreese, 2007). 
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When people watch television, they are often distracted in their ability to fully see and 
understand the message and, consequently, their preferences are not likely to be 
affected. Furthermore, people tend to trust news on television less than news in print 
media, which also affects whether one is influenced by the message or not.  
Distinctions are also often made between quality and tabloid newspapers and 
between commercial and public television. Generally, quality newspapers and public 
television channels tend to contain more stories about the EU compared to tabloid 
newspapers and commercial television channels, respectively (Blumler, 1997; 
Boomgaarden et al., 2013; de Vreese et al., 2006; Peter et al., 2003; Peter and de 
Vreese, 2004; Schuck and de Vreese, 2011). The findings in the latter chapters in this 
study are in line with existing research.  
While the news content of national media is important, it is not the only aspect 
to be considered when examining the effects of exposure to media. National media 
system, i.e. the broader context in which media operate, including the regulations, 
pressures, and accountabilities, also greatly influences the content of the media and its 
potential impact on voters’ likelihood to vote. 
 
 
 
2.5.4. Media Systems 
 
 
When examining news coverage and its effects on voter behavior, one needs 
keep in mind that voters live in not only different electoral and political systems, but are 
also exposed to a variety of media systems. The EU news coverage varies greatly 
among member countries (Boomgaarden et al., 2013; de Vreese and Boomgaarden, 
2006b; Peter et al., 2004; Schuck et al., 2013; Semetko et al., 2000); knowing the 
political and economic context along with the national media systems is crucial to 
understanding the extent of and variations in media coverage between countries (de 
Vreese et al., 2001, 2006; Linek and Lyons, 2007; Peter, 2003; Peter et al., 2003; 
Semetko et al., 2000; Trenz, 2004).  
There is a close connection between the political and media systems. Numerous 
issues need to be included when examining this connection, including news production 
(all factors involved in creating the message: e.g. political environment, media 
regulations, and journalistic integrity), content (what is actually broadcast or printed), 
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and audience (how people react to the messages) and, in this case, the impact of the 
news on the audience (Oates, 2008). It is beyond the scope of the current study to 
examine the process of news production, but both the content and audience are 
considered in this study. 
The study of media systems is limited and often based only on a number of 
selected countries. Hallin and Mancini’s work on media systems (2005) set the direction 
for consequent studies on this topic. Because media system classification in regards to 
all EU countries is slightly outdated and unclear, it is not directly utilized as a variable 
in this study. Nevertheless, familiarity with media systems is crucial for understanding 
the differences in EU news coverage and media effects across the countries. Hallin and 
Mancini (2005) outline four factors to consider when comparing media systems: (1) the 
development of media markets; (2) political parallelism; (3) the development of 
journalistic professionalism, and; (4) the degree and nature of state intervention in the 
media. The first of these factors, the development of media markets, is usually 
measured by newspaper circulation, while political parallelism is interpreted by the 
extent to which political actors influence media. The development of journalistic 
professionalism and the degree and nature of state intervention in the media are often 
legacies of countries’ history and are reflected in the type of news in country’s media 
outlets (Hallin and Mancini, 2005). 
Hallin and Mancini (2005) developed three main models of media systems. 
First, is the polarized pluralist model, which is common in the southern Europe and 
involves more political organization-tied media than commercial and a strong role for 
the state. Second, is the democratic corporatist model found in northern Europe where 
commercial and state-tied media co-exist, and state has an active but legally limited 
role. Third, and lastly, the liberal model can be found in the UK and USA, based on 
market mechanism, commercial media, and a small role of state, with the media serving 
as the watchdog of the state (Oates, 2008). These models are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive as characteristics of each could be found in one country. In fact, these models 
are now slightly outdated as most modern, developed democracies have tended to shift 
toward the liberal, market-based model. 
It is apparent that, although being applicable to many countries, these three 
models cannot explain the media structure in every single country. Nevertheless, they 
are a good starting point for a discussion about the differences in media across 
countries. There are different views on which media system is the best for a democratic 
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society; for example, the social responsibility model with public service broadcasting in 
the main role or the ‘libertarian’ theory with its free and private press (Baek, 2009: 
377). In additional to the media system, the split of audience between public and private 
broadcasting, level of political parallelism in press, and laws on paid political 
advertising on television, all influence the amount and quality of information that the 
public receives through mass media (Baek, 2009).  
Normally, it is assumed that public broadcasting, compared to commercial, gives 
more information about public affairs and politics in general; therefore, it lowers 
information costs to the public and can induce higher turnout. Commercial television 
stations, on the other hand, rely on income from advertising and have to deal with 
competition to obtain high ratings; consequently, they often offer only low quality 
programming and sensational news which has rather low impact on voters’ behavior 
(Baek, 2009). Similarly, with higher levels of political parallelism (aka ‘partisan press’) 
in a country, there is likely to be higher turnout since in this way, political parties are 
able to give more information to voters through mass media (Baek, 2009: 379). Some 
media systems allow for paid political advertising on television, whether public or 
commercial, while others do not. Where political advertising is allowed, it enables the 
public to access information easily and thus voter turnout tends to be higher (Baek, 
2009). 
Keeping in mind the media systems along with the content of the news, on the 
following pages I outline several theories on media effects, each proposing different 
direction and extent of effects of exposure to media.  
 
 
 
2.5.5. Theories of Media Effects 
 
 
Media can be a very powerful tool to influence public in a certain way. The 
discussion about the possible effects of media exposure is extensive although 
inconclusive, with one side proposing negative effects of media leading to 
disengagement of people from politics (video malaise), while the other side suggesting 
that information in media leads to positive effects on political participation (cognitive 
mobilization). The video malaise theory suggests that media drive citizens away from 
voting by covering politics unfavorably and creating distrust and cynicism toward not 
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only media outlets but also politics and political elites (Baek, 2009; de Vreese and 
Semetko, 2002; Newton, 1999; Norris, 2000).  
The cognitive mobilization theory, on the other hand, proposes that the 
information in media make people more likely be interested in politics and to vote 
(Baek, 2009; de Vreese and Semetko, 2002; Newton, 1999; Norris, 1996 and 2006). 
Numerous studies, based mainly in the USA, have found that exposure to newspapers 
and television leads to increases in turnout and voters’ level of political knowledge, and 
is also likely to alter their opinions and preferences or reinforce pre-existing preferences 
(Della Vigna and Kaplan, 2006; Gerber, Karlan, and Bergan, 2006; Goldstein and 
Freedman, 2002; Iyengar and Simon, 2000). Newspapers, rather than television, have 
been found to be positively related to participation in election (Eveland and Scheufele, 
2000; Scheufele, 2002). In a study on media exposure of young people and their turnout 
in the EP election, Esser and de Vreese (2007) found that mass media and messages 
sent during election campaigns played a considerable role in engaging people in the 
election and politics and that, indeed, “…exposure to traditional news sources such as 
newspapers or television news […] contribute positively and significantly to EP 
turnout.” (Esser and de Vreese, 2007: 1210). 
The cognitive mobilization theory works alongside the rational choice theory. 
People are the most likely to vote when the benefits outweigh the costs. Considering 
that, especially in the case of EP elections, it is nearly impossible to increase the 
benefits of voting, the costs need to be decreased. Among the costs of voting is the time 
and effort it takes for a citizen to obtain information about the mechanics of the election 
process, such as where the polling booths are and how to obtain a voting ballot, and 
deciding which parties and candidates to vote for. By having this information readily 
available, the costs of voting could be decreased. News media, the source of 
information people use the most (Special Eurobarometer 308), provide the most suitable 
tool for obtaining such information. 
The mobilization theory of voter turnout now comes into play. Apart from 
providing information and decreasing the costs of voting, by writing about the election 
and candidates, the media give a message that they believe the election is important and 
make it salient in the country’s news agenda. When people see the national media 
discussing the EP elections, they get the idea that the election matters and are 
consequently more likely to vote than if there is no or little mention of the elections in 
the media. Nevertheless, most of the news across the EU gives no or very little 
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information about the election or the EU in general. This could in turn be explained by 
the lack of campaigning by parties and candidates, which completes a negative cycle: 
parties and candidates do not campaign enough; therefore, media do not cover the 
elections enough, and, consequently, citizens do not have enough information about the 
elections, do not think they are important, and do not vote (Banducci, 2005; Schmitt, 
2005; Toka, 2007).  
The majority of scholars agree that media and their coverage of EU have an 
effect on the public opinion (Bruter, 2004; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Peter, 2003: 8) 
and, indirectly, on voter turnout (de Vreese et al., 2005 and 2006; de Vreese and 
Semetko, 2002 and 2004; de Vreese, 2005; Norris, 2000). Many also agree that 
although media is an important source of information, they are often rightly blamed for 
the lack of EU news (Semetko, de Vreese and Peter, 2000; Banducci, 2005; de Vreese, 
2007; Toka, 2007).  
Apart from the lack of electoral campaigning, the low media coverage is also a 
result of the lack of EU’s external communication; referred to as the communication 
deficit, and closely related to the democratic deficit (Peter and de Vreese, 2004). It is 
unlikely if there was actually a large-scale political discussion about the EU that the 
media would not cover it. The studies on EU news coverage agree that the handling of 
EU issues in the news is generally very low and peaks only around important events, 
such as European elections, the introduction of Euro, or referenda about EU issues, but 
that it has increased in the past decades (Boomgaarden, Vliegenthart, de Vreese, and 
Schuck, 2010; de Vreese et al., 2006; Peter and de Vreese, 2004; Semetko et al., 2000). 
When examining the effects of media coverage of election campaigns on voter 
behavior, both media context and use need to be considered. Context of media 
encompasses the country’s media system and news content, including visibility and tone 
of news. Media use shows the patterns of exposure of individuals to media outlets. 
When only one of these variables is used (which is often the case in media effects 
research) the picture one gets is not precise, as it misses out an important component of 
media influence. Thus, the analysis in this study uses a combination of both content and 
exposure measures. 
In research examining media effects in the EU and EP elections context, the 
most often used measure is the visibility of EU news, measured as the ratio of news 
about the EU and EU-related issues among other political and economic news. The 
tone, or valence, of the EU news (i.e. how the news evaluates the EU and its 
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institutions) is also frequently used, as I discuss on the following pages, especially when 
predicting attitudes toward the EU or participation in the EP elections. Finally, the 
European nature of the news, depicting the extent to which the EU news actually 
discusses the EU, has also been proven to matter (de Vreese et al., 2006).  
 
 
 
2.5.6. Tone of the News 
 
 
The possibly diverse effect of news with a different tone (i.e. news that evaluates 
political actors or institutions in a certain way) has also been widely discussed. The 
findings are nevertheless inconclusive, with some commentators arguing that the tone 
does not matter, while others seek to demonstrate different effects of positive or 
negative news.  
Examining the tone of the news in an EU referendum campaign, Schuck and de 
Vreese (2009) found that by increasing the perception of the likelihood of approving the 
referendum, exposure to positive news about the particular issue mobilized those in 
opposition to this issue to vote against it in the referendum. Similarly, Martin (2004 and 
2008) found that it is negative, rather than positive, messages that create more interest 
and involvement in campaigns by mobilizing those who do not agree with the negative 
message. Applying this logic to the EU news, exposure to positive news about a certain 
party or candidate may mobilize opponents of the party or candidate to vote for 
someone else or, vice versa, negative news about a particular party or candidate may 
mobilize supporters to vote for them.  
In their experimental study on the effects of positive and negative news framing 
public perception of EU enlargement, Schuck and de Vreese (2009) show that exposure 
to positive information increased people’s positive opinion of the enlargement, and vice 
versa, confirming findings from previous research (see also de Vreese and 
Boomgaarden, 2006a). 
Others however suggest that any tone of the news, as long as there is some, 
helps those exposed to the news memorize it more easily. This can be true for negative 
news as well: “Negative information is thought to be more attention grabbing. By 
stimulating anxiety, negative ads may encourage greater attention [to the message in the 
news].” (Marcus et al., 2000). Also, negative news provides a kind of evaluative 
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framework that allows the voter to classify the information and thus recall in memory 
easily when needed (Feldman, 2011).  
This is a similar mechanism to that at work for people with strong partisanship 
when they evaluate information they learn from the media based on their party 
preferences. In both cases, a person exposed to the news finds it easier to understand the 
message. Claibourn’s empirical analysis (2012) of the effects of news with various 
tones on understanding of the campaign message shows slightly mixed results. While 
positive news has a positive impact on voters understanding of the message, the effects 
of exposure to negative news rarely reach levels of conventional statistical significance, 
while, in some cases, the effects of negative news on the understanding of ad messages 
are even stronger than the effects of positive news.  
As this brief overview of the impact of tone of the news on media effects shows, 
the findings from existing research are inconclusive, often contradicting each other. 
While some see the tone of the news having a positive relationship with the media 
effects, others argue that the tone does not play a significant role. With these findings in 
mind, I aim to shed more light on this relationship in the context of EP elections by 
examining the effects of exposure to positive and negative EU news on voting. 
 
 
 
2.6. Central and Eastern European Countries   
 
 
 
My priority in this study is to compare the media effects on voting behavior 
between Western EU member states and Central and Eastern ones. I also refer to the 
latter group as post-Communist countries as, apart from their geographical location, this 
is another aspect they have in common. In the following paragraphs, I outline the 
historical, cultural, and political reasons, stemming from the Communist legacy, behind 
considering the CEE countries as a distinct group.  
Participation or the lack thereof, in elections and other acts of civic engagement 
in CEE countries needs to be explained differently compared to other young 
democracies where usually, after the fall of a non-democratic regime, people are eager 
to exercise their right to vote (Hughes and Guerrero, 2009). Voting was compulsory 
under the Communist regime and although the extent of freedom and fairness could be 
discussed, the fact remains that citizens were required to vote under that system of 
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government. Consequently, despite being enthused about the democratic elections in 
their countries, many voters have been discouraged from voting by memory of 
compulsory voting under the Soviet rule. In many CEE countries, citizens exercised 
their franchise in the founding elections of their new countries, but later became 
dissatisfied with the way affairs were being run and turned away from voting. This lack 
of voting tradition results in very low voter turnout rates. In an attempt to break from 
the Communist past, no CEE country has compulsory voting (Fauvelle-Aymar and 
Stegmaier, 2008; Schmitt, 2005).  
Disappointment about the way that the political and social scene has developed 
since the fall of the Communist regime is among the main factors contributing to the 
lack of interest and participation in politics among the citizens of CEE countries. The 
issues that prevailed in the politics of these countries during Communist regime, and 
shortly after its fall, such as corruption, ‘friendship networks’ among politicians, and the 
governing parties’ attempts to gather power have persisted till this day. Over the past 
decades, these aspects have been accompanied by political instability and party 
volatility, which has resulted in deepening citizens’ mistrust of political and social 
organizations and their representatives (Flickinger and Studlar, 2007; Gagatek, 2009; 
Howard, 2002).  
While it could be expected that these attitudes might disappear with a 
generational shift, the post-Communist political systems have retained all the 
characteristics outlined in the previous paragraph, not giving their citizens a chance to 
disconnect from the past. All these factors then lead to low participation in civil 
organizations, i.e. a weak civil society, as well as low voter turnout rates, both of which 
are necessary to build and sustain a legitimate democratic system  (Howard, 2002). 
As suggested above, CEE countries have generally lower voter turnout both in 
national and the EP elections compared to the Western EU countries, but the gap is 
much greater for the EP elections3. The even lower turnout in the EP elections suggests 
that there are certain features specific to the EP elections that dissuade CEE citizens 
from casting their votes. The context of the EU, low-profile election campaigns, and the 
lack of public discussion about the EU have been mentioned among the factors that fail 
to mobilize CEE citizens (Franklin and Wessels, 2010). 
                                                 
3 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the turnout in the EP elections. 
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The voting behavior of CEE citizens in the EP elections has challenged the 
previously established ‘first-election boost’ theory. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
this theory sees turnout in EP elections likely to increase when the election takes place 
for the first time in the country, because of the initial enthusiasm about EU membership 
(Franklin, 2006; Mattila, 2003). This hypothesis is well-supported by evidence from the 
established EU member states, but it does not hold true for the CEE countries. As a 
group, the overall turnout in the CEE countries increased slightly from 26% in 2004 to 
28% in 2009, and then sank again to 27% in 20144. There are nevertheless great 
differences in turnout between the individual CEE countries, implying that caution 
should be paid when treating these countries as a single group5. 
Some propose that in 2004, voters in the new member states suffered from voter 
fatigue, as only a year or less previously many of them voted in referenda on EU 
accession, and several of the states had also held general or presidential elections. For 
many voters and political elites in the CEE countries, the EU accession was an issue of 
the highest priority; once it was achieved the political elites no longer considered it 
necessary to promote the EU. They therefore put little effort into creating a salient 
campaign that would mobilize the voters prior to the 2004 EP elections; consequently, 
the citizens did not find a strong enough reason to go to the polls in their first EP 
elections (Franklin, 2007; Lodge, 2005).  
This trend, however, continued in 2009 as well. Voter fatigue may have played a 
role again, as most of the CEE countries held national, presidential, or local elections 
close before or soon after the EP elections: namely, Bulgaria (national election in July 
2009), the Czech Republic (early national election planned for October 2009, postponed 
to June 2010), Estonia (local election in October 2009), Hungary (national election in 
April 2010, local in October 2010), Latvia (national election in October 2010), 
Lithuania (national election in October 2009, presidential election in May 2009), Poland 
(presidential election in June 2010), Romania (national election in November 2008), 
Slovakia (presidential election in April 2009) and Slovenia (national election in 
September 2008). Being asked to come to the polls relatively often makes people less 
likely to vote in some or all of these elections. People are likely to pick which election 
they intend to participate in, and when presented with a choice to vote in either in the 
                                                 
4 See Figure 4.2 for the overview of the turnout trend in the EP elections. 
5 See Figure 4.1 for a discussion of the turnout of individual CEE countries in the EP elections. 
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EP election - about which they have little idea - or in a general election which decides 
who will run their country, most would clearly choose the latter (Gagatek, 2009). 
Furthermore, the lack of news coverage and public debate about the EU and the 
elections was typical in all CEE countries. Where public debate took place, it was 
framed in a national context and was generally negative, often describing the elected 
members of the EP as receiving a lot of money for very little work or outlining the 
pressures and regulations imposed by the EU on these countries. This type of news 
undoubtedly discourages voters from going to the polls to vote in the EP elections 
(Gagatek, 2009). 
There are numerous other plausible reasons for why the turnout in European 
elections in the CEE countries is so low. One of then is the remoteness of the EU and its 
perceived lack of importance in people’s daily lives. The CEE countries are 
geographically farther away from Brussels than their Western counterparts, which only 
add to the CEE citizens’ perception that their countries do not play an important role in 
Europe (Batory, 2005). This perception is closely linked with people’s lack of 
knowledge about the EU. Being EU members for a shorter period of time than the 
Western countries, people in the CEE EU member states tend to know less about the EU 
and its policies. Both lack of knowledge about the EU and the perceived absence of its 
relevance can lead to people not being interested in the organization, and, thus, not 
supporting it. Lack of interest in and support of the EU is linked to the low turnout in 
these countries. Research on non-voters in the EP elections has shown that the major 
reason for not voting in the CEE countries was lack of support for or interest in the EU; 
this was rarely mentioned as a reason by non-voters in the Western EU countries 
(Gagatek, 2009; Schmitt, 2005). 
Furthermore, several CEE countries have relatively small populations, which 
results in low number of MEPs: Estonia, Latvia, and Slovenia each had less than 10 
representatives to the EP in 2009, and Lithuania and Slovakia had 12 and 13 
respectively. If citizens of the above mentioned countries are aware of the small number 
of their representatives in the EP, they are likely to see the elections as irrelevant and 
consider that their MEPs do not have much say in the EP. This is then likely to further 
discourage them from voting (Brinar, 2005). 
As outlined at the beginning of this section, the political environment in CEE 
countries remains under the influence of their Communist past, and connects to still-
present corruption and bribery scandals and instable governments. For example, just 
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before the 2009 EP elections, governmental crises and corruption scandals were on the 
agenda in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, and Slovakia. This may have 
dissuaded many voters from casting their vote simply because they did not want to get 
involved in a political landscape about which they had heard so much negativity. The 
volatile and corrupted political scene is reflected in voters’ distrust in politics and 
politicians and has projected into the perception of EU politics as well (Gagatek, 2009; 
Guerra, 2010; Schmitt, 2005).  
Distrust in media, and the belief that they are influenced by the government and 
political elites, is also widespread among citizens of the post-Communist countries, 
again stemming from the Communist legacy. Because of this distrust, media have a 
lower potential to impact people’s decision to vote. On the other hand, people in the 
CEE countries tend to know less about the EU than their Western counterparts; 
consequently, even a little information about the EU and the elections in the media can 
make a great difference in attracting people to the polls (Guerra, 2010; Schmitt, 2005). 
Although media were an important tool of Communist propaganda, by 
expanding the media market to private domestic and foreign owners, mass media has 
increasingly gained popularity. However, comparing the news coverage of the 2003 
referenda on EU accession to that of the 2004 EP elections, it is clear that the media 
paid more attention to the referenda than the election. It is apparent that once they had 
secured their places as EU members, political elites, citizens, as well as media, in CEE 
countries lost interest in EU affairs (Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmaier, 2008). 
I examine the diverse media effects between the Western and the CEE member 
states, following on the work of Franklin and Wessels (2010) who “…unwrapped [a] 
black box…” of post-Communist countries which “…were thought to be inexplicably 
low turnout countries…” and found two equally inscrutable “…black boxes of low 
mobilization and lack of habitual voting.” (Franklin and Wessels, 2010: 17). Trying to 
explain the low turnout in the EP elections, they searched for additional variables and 
found that mobilization by mass media and political parties could be the key to 
understanding the post-Communist low turnout phenomenon. Uutilizing media content 
and voters’ exposure to the news content as indicators of the strength and intensity of 
the election campaign, I seek to ‘unwrap the black box’ of low mobilization. In so 
doing, I aim to contribute to the literature on media effects and voter turnout in the CEE 
countries.  
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2.7. Research questions 
 
 
 
The research reviewed on the previous pages raises many questions, some of 
which I examine in the rest of this study. Primarily, I aim to show the impact of 
exposure to news about the EU on one’s likelihood to vote in the EP elections. Given 
the large turnout gap between Western EU countries and the CEE member states, I will 
search for different patterns of media effects in these two groups. I will also compare 
the differences in the effects of exposure to various types of media outlets. The 
literature suggests there are variations in the size and direction of the effects of exposure 
to newspapers and television channels, quality and tabloid newspapers, and public and 
commercial television. 
In the first part of the analysis section, I test whether more frequent exposure to 
media outlets with higher visibility of EU news increases voter participation in the 2009 
EP elections. The average visibility of EU news across the EU is nearly 36%, meaning 
over one third of news were about the EU, but the range across all members states is 
from 14% to 62%, signifying great variance across the countries (see Figure 2). 
Three theories underpin mu expectations. The cognitive mobilization theory of 
media effects suggests that by providing information about the elections, media help 
decrease the costs of voting, and are thus likely to help boost the turnout. The rational 
choice and mobilization theories of voter turnout also propose that by reporting news 
about the elections, media stress the importance of the elections and can help mobilize 
citizens. I therefore anticipate findings that respondents who are more often exposed to 
media with higher visibility of EU news are more likely to vote in the EP election. 
I am especially interested in the different patterns of media effects in the 
Western and the CEE EU member states. While there is virtually no literature on the 
media effects in the CEE countries, the very low turnout in these countries along with 
their unique characteristics indicate that also media effects may show different patterns 
there compared to the Western EU countries. To illustrate this, in 2009, turnout in the 
EP elections was 47% in Western EU and 28% in the CEE member states and the 
average visibility of EU news in the Western countries was 38% and in the CEE 
countries this was nearly 31% (see Figures 2 and 3). The post-communist legacy of lack 
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of trust to media and to politicians, of party identification and political participation all 
lead to the assumption that media effects are weaker in the CEE countries. The size of 
the effects will nevertheless be affected by the visibility of the EU news in the media; 
low visibility would lead to practically non-existent effects while higher visibility could 
boost the effects. 
Researchers have found diverse effects of exposure to various media types. 
Newspapers generally contain a higher content of political, and thus EU, news, so 
stronger effects are generally reported for the exposure to newspapers compared to 
television. Similarly, tabloid newspapers and commercial television channels tend to 
concentrate on sensational news and report less serious, political news, so the effects of 
exposure to these channels are likely to be weaker compared to quality newspapers and 
public television channels, respectively.    
The second part of the analysis studies the role of the tone of the EU news in the 
above question. The tone of the news summarizes how the news evaluates the EU, 
whether it refers to the EU, its representatives and institutions in a positive or negative 
way. The majority of the EU news is neutral, and the positive or negative news items 
make up between only 0.2% to 6% of all EU news across countries (see Figure 4). The 
effects of exposure to news with a specific tone have been discussed, with many 
suggesting that positive news mobilizes while negative news demobilizes, others saying 
that any tone in the news makes the information more easily memorable, thus any tone 
of the news would be likely to mobilize people to vote.   
My assumptions are based on the latter approach and I expect to find little or no 
difference between the effects of exposure to positive and negative news as they both 
provide information about the EU and the elections, and, in this way, help reduce the 
costs of voting, thus making people more likely to vote. Additionally, as the proportion 
of positive and negative EU news is very low across the national media in the EU, I do 
not expect the tone of the news to play a significant role in the media-turnout 
relationship.  
As in the first part of the analysis, I will compare the media effects between 
Western and CEE EU member states. There is no existing research on this particular 
issue, so my expectations are in line with those outlined in the above paragraphs. Due to 
the nature of CEE countries and their people’s lack of trust in media, I expect weaker 
media effects in these countries with the tone of the news playing insignificant role in 
this relationship. 
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I will also examine the role of the tone of the news in relation to effects of 
exposure to various media types. I expect to find same results as to the first research 
question: when accounting for the tone of news, no matter whether it is positive or 
negative, exposure to newspapers, especially quality newspapers, is more likely to have 
a positive effect on turnout than exposure to television. Similarly, exposure to positive, 
negative or neutral news in tabloid newspapers and on commercial television channels 
is likely to have weak or negative effects on turnout compared to quality newspapers 
and public television channels, respectively.    
Before starting with the data analysis, I first present the overview of the data and 
methods used in this study. In the following data and measurement chapter, I describe 
the datasets used in this study, including the voter study, media study and contextual 
components of the PIREDEU project. I outline how these datasets are matched and 
which variables are used. I include basic descriptive statistics for some of the variables 
and describe the calculation of the main variable in question, the content exposure, 
along with the numerous alterations of this variable. Finally, I outline the method used 
here and explain why it stands out among other methods utilized in the studies of media 
effects on voter participation. 
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CHAPTER 3
 
 
DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I will first tap into the various issues in the survey research of 
media effects including selective exposure, overreporting of exposure, and the lack of 
studies using media content. I will then describe the different datasets, outline how they 
are matched and which variables are used. I will also explain the calculation of my main 
variable of interest, the content exposure. Finally, I explain the statistical method used 
here and compare them to other methods that are utilized in the studies of media effects 
on voter participation. 
 
 
 
3.1. Research Design 
 
 
 
The study of media effects has, for a long time, been criticized for unresolved 
faults, mostly relating to the research design. While to an outside observer it is probably 
clear that media must have some impact on people’s views due to their widespread 
presence and varied content, researchers repeatedly fail to reach a consensus (Barabas 
and Jerit, 2009; Bartels, 1993). The fact that a similar message can be found in studies 
16 years apart suggests that, despite the efforts made, media effects research has 
progressed very little in the past two decades. The use of different research designs and 
methods seems to be behind the varying directions and sizes of media effects found 
across studies (Banducci, Barabas, Jerit, Pollock, Schoonvelde and Stevens, 2014; 
Bartels, 1993). 
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Media effects are generally studied using experiments, whether in the laboratory 
(e.g. Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon and Valentino, 1994; Iyengar, 1991) or in the field 
(e.g. Gerber and Green, 2000), using aggregate-level data (e.g. Johnston, Hagen, and 
Jamieson, 2004) and individual-level survey data (e.g. Elenbaas et al., 2013; de Vreese, 
2005; de Vreese and Semetko, 2002, 2004; de Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2006a, 2006c; 
Schuck and de Vreese, 2006, 2009; Peter, 2003). While experimental research shows 
the impact of exposure to media on people’s behavior and views, and avoids some of 
the fall-backs of survey research, it does remove respondents from their normal context 
and lacks external validity (Barabas and Jerit, 2009; Bartels, 1993; Prior, 2009). 
Aggregate-level studies examining country-level media content and public opinion tend 
to be too high level to be able to distinguish between the actual media effects and those 
of, for example, an actual event (Bartels, 1993; Prior, 2009). Survey research is the most 
widely used to identify the effects of exposure to a certain message on people’s 
opinions and behavior, but the level of statistical significance, direction, and size of the 
effects vary greatly between individual studies (Banducci et al., 2014; Bartels, 1993).  
Furthermore, survey research faces great problems relating to selective exposure, 
overreporting of the exposure by respondents, and lack of direct links between the 
exposure and the media content. Selective exposure refers to the impact of pre-existing 
knowledge and views on people’s selection of the media outlets that they read or watch. 
In other words, people are likely to read the newspaper that shares their views. The 
effects of exposure to these media outlets - for example, on vote choice - are then likely 
to be endogenous to the effects of the pre-existing beliefs. Similarly, people with higher 
interest in politics are generally more likely to actually be exposed to political news in 
the media, especially in newspapers, but at the same time these people are also more 
likely to participate in elections (Banducci et al. 2014; Bennett and Iyengar, 2008; 
Gvirsman, 2014; Price and Zaller; 1993).  
While I acknowledge the potentially harmful impact of selective exposure on 
media effects studies, it is based on several assumptions that may not hold true in every 
country and for every respondent, especially when studying mainstream national media. 
Selective exposure assumes that different media outlets have unique, clearly identified, 
views behind their reporting. Although this may be true for news outlets in many 
countries, it certainly does not seem to be the case everywhere, especially for some of 
the most popular, mainstream national media, for example, that found in the Czech 
Republic. Selective exposure also assumes that people prefer to read or watch news that 
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aligns with their own beliefs. Again, though this is undoubtedly correct for many 
respondents, some people may like to read articles that oppose their ideas, whether to 
get a different perspective or strengthen one’s opposition to those views. Finally, the 
correlations charts (Table D.3) shows very low correlation value (0.25) between the 
political interest variable and content exposure, the main media variable of interest. Due 
to these reasons, the problem of selective exposure should be approached differently in 
each study.  
I am certain that selective exposure has little impact on the findings in this study 
due to the messages examined and the media outlets used. I study the visibility of news 
about the EU and its tone in each country in the three national newspapers with the 
highest circulation and the two most popular national television channels. In some 
countries (for example, the United Kingdom), the polarisation of the main national 
newspapers is relatively high with specific newspapers linked to a particular political 
party. This, however, tends to be an exception across the EU rather than the rule, 
especially in countries with a higher number of parties in the government. Television 
channels tend to be polarised to an even smaller degree. Furthermore, even if there are 
links between media outlets and political parties, it is likely to have little relationship to 
the amount of news about the EU that these news outlets publish. It may affect the tone 
of the news about the EU, but not really its actual visibility. Finally, even if there are 
patterns in the EU news content over time in various news outlets, and people are aware 
of it, it is beyond their control and knowledge to be aware of exactly what the news 
content will be on a particular day in a particular news outlet. For these reasons, as long 
as the factors influencing citizens’ decision to vote are included in the model (such as 
party identity, interest in politics, or engagement in the election campaign) selective 
exposure does not play a significant role in this study. 
Another issue that survey-based media effects studies must face is the 
overreporting of exposure by respondents (Dilliplane, Goldman and Mutz, 2013; Price 
and Zaller, 1993; Prior, 2009, 2009b; Vavreck, 2007). This is a relatively common 
occurrence in survey research as respondents have the tendency to overreport much 
political and non-political behavior. The act of voting is an example of this, as 
mentioned earlier, as well as going to church or participating in protests. Some 
behavior, such as turnout, can be checked against the true values, but there is no 
straightforward way of checking the true exposure. Respondents’ self-reported exposure 
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has on several occasions been compared to the independent monitoring data of media 
companies, but even those figures are error-prone estimates (Prior, 2009, 2012). 
Social desirability tends to serve as the explanation for overreporting of some of 
the behaviors, for example that of turnout, but in the case of media exposure, the 
difficulty to recall the correct answer has been put forward as the main reason (Price 
and Zaller, 1993; Prior, 2009). Often people cannot remember the exact details of the 
event or time they are asked about or may need to make an extra effort to interpret the 
question they are asked. For example, when asked, “How often in a typical week do you 
watch political programs on national network television?” and given options, “Never, 
rarely, sometimes, or often?” respondents have to make an effort to comprehend the 
question. They have to think about what ‘a typical week’ means to them, decipher the 
context of ‘political program’ and ‘national network television’, and interpret the 
frequency categories. Consequently, lacking motivation to give the correct answer, 
respondents are likely to make a guess and give an estimate of their exposure which 
tends to be higher than the true exposure. The accuracy of respondents’ answers is 
therefore dependent to a great extent on how the question is asked. Although great 
developments have been made in the construction of the survey questions, they have yet 
to solve the overreporting problem (Dilliplane, 2013; Price and Zaller, 1993; Prior, 
2009, 2013). 
If all respondents overreported the exposure at the same rate, the statistical 
analysis would be able to make correction for this. Nevertheless, different people tend 
to overreport to different levels; for example, younger, more educated and politically 
interested respondents tend to overreport at a higher rate (Prior, 2009; Vavreck, 2007). 
Consequently, media effects may in fact be a result of the different degrees of 
overreporting rather than the actual differences in exposure and the effects (Prior, 
2009). 
The questions about media exposure used in this study ask each respondent, “In 
a typical week, how many days do you watch the following news programmes?”, and, 
“In a typical week, how many days do you read the following newspapers?” They are 
then presented with the names of the country’s two main evening newscasts (one on a 
public channel and one on commercial) and the names of the country’s most popular 
newspapers, (two quality and one tabloid). Although respondents need to evaluate what 
‘a typical week’ means to them, there should be no uncertainties about the specific 
media outlets and a programs they are asked about or about expressing the frequency of 
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exposure, thus making the recall easier. Additionally, I include age, education, and 
interest in politics in my model in order to check for the impact of these. 
One additional critique of survey research on media effects revolves around the 
lack of use of media content in addition to the exposure. Including content in the 
research design enables researchers to link respondents’ exposure to the content to 
which they were likely to be exposed, thus bringing important advantages to the media 
research (Banducci et al., 2014; Barabas and Jerit, 2009). The datasets used in this study 
allow me to link individual’s exposure to a specific media outlet with the content in the 
same outlet. This enables me to create a unique measure of ‘content exposure’. I will 
now describe the datasets used and steps carried out to create this measure. 
 
 
 
3.2. Data 
 
 
 
To investigate the above-described hypotheses, I use datasets developed within 
the framework of PIREDEU, Providing an Infrastructure for Research on Electoral 
Democracy in the European Union, funded by the European Union’s FP 7 program. I 
use the voter survey data for the 27 EU countries from Voter Study part of the 2009 
European Election Study (EES 2009; van Egmond et al. 2009) and media content 
analysis data from the Media Study (Schuck et al. 2010). Apart from these two datasets, 
PIREDEU also includes data on party manifestos, survey data on MEP candidates, and 
contextual data. Several variables included in this study come from the contextual 
dataset. 
The magnitude of the PIREDEU datasets and their comparability across all EU 
countries offer researchers a unique opportunity to study elections, voting behavior and 
parties across the whole EU. This is especially important for the study of CEE countries 
because data, particularly on media content and exposure, comparable across all CEE 
countries are very rare.  
Before looking further into the datasets, explanation is needed on the number of 
countries included in this study. Although there were 27 EU countries participating in 
the 2009 EP elections, data for the Belgian regions of Flanders and Wallonia were 
collected separately, creating 28 political contexts. In this study, as well as in the 
majority of research about the EU, 28 political contexts are generally employed due to 
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the different political systems in use in the two regions in Belgium (Hobolt and Spoon, 
2010). Dutch is spoken in Flanders and French in Wallonia, and different parties run for 
office in these regions. Furthermore, due to the different languages spoken in the 
regions, different media outlets were collected and examined in the content analysis.  
 
 
 
3.2.1. Voter Study 
 
 
The Voter Study was carried out during four weeks after the EP elections in June 
2009, starting on the first working day after the EP elections (4 to 7 June 2009). It 
consists of independently-drawn samples of about 1,000 respondents in each of the 27 
EU member states, and approximately 500 respondents for each of the Belgian regions 
Flanders and Wallonia. The surveys were translated from the English version into the 
relevant national languages, resulting in surveys with identical questions, wording, and 
question order which enabled subsequent collection of national, international, and 
historically comparable data for all EU member states.  
The survey contains 120 questions about a variety of topics, including the most 
important problem facing respondents country, media exposure, involvement in election 
campaign, attitudes toward government and politics in general, voting, political parties 
and party choice, economy, knowledge about and attitudes toward the EU, and 
demographics (PIREDEU). Data collection was done by phone interview, but in seven 
countries (specifically, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania and Slovakia) to achieve a representative sample 70% of interviews 
were carried out in person ‘face-to-face’ and 30% by phone (EES 2009; van Egmond et 
al. 2009).  
 
 
3.2.2. Media Study 
 
 
The Media Study dataset offers a unique overview of news content measured at 
the same time across 28 media systems, enabling research into numerous aspects of 
media and news content. The ability to match this dataset with other datasets from the 
PIREDEU study opens up even greater opportunity for media research. Similar datasets 
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are available as a part of the European Election Study (EES) series for the previous EP 
elections, allowing for a time-series analysis.  
The 2009 Media Study analyzes the content of three newspapers and two 
evening news programs on television channels in each EU country6 during three weeks 
before the European elections. It examines national television and newspapers because 
these media are regularly mentioned as the most important sources of information about 
the EU for European citizens (Special Eurobarometer 308). In each country, the main 
national evening news broadcasts of the most widely watched public and commercial 
television stations are included, making up in total 58 television channels. Furthermore, 
two quality and one tabloid newspaper are analyzed in each country, making up in total 
84 newspapers. The newspapers chosen had the highest circulation in the country, 
judged separately for quality and tabloid newspapers, and the television news had the 
highest viewership in a country, judged separately for public and commercial channels. 
These media outlets aim to provide a comprehensive image about the news coverage 
across the EU. The relevant news media were collected either digitally (TV and 
newspapers) or as hardcopies (newspapers) by research teams at the University of 
Exeter and University of Amsterdam.  
After all material was collected, it was distributed among two teams totaling 58 
coders trained specifically for this study. The majority of coders were citizens of the 
countries for which they were coding the material and all were native speakers of the 
respective languages. Following the training, but before the actual coding commenced, 
inter-coder reliability tests were carried out on all coders and satisfactory results 
returned. The coding was done electronically using an online survey and database 
developed specifically for the study, which allowed for automatic and real-time storage 
of all data, ease in following the coding progress, and immediate identification of any 
problems that might arise (Schuck et al. 2010). 
The coding unit is a news story, defined separately for newspapers and television 
(see Appendix 1). All news stories from television newscasts were coded. A selection of 
news was coded from the newspapers, including all news stories on the main page, all 
                                                 
6 As mentioned earlier, Belgium is treated as two media systems i.e. Wallonia and Flanders. There are three 
newspapers in each country and two television channels in most countries except for Germany (four television 
channels), Slovenia, and Spain (three television channels) and Luxemburg (one television channel). For the analysis 
in this paper, I used two television channels for all countries (except for Luxemburg that has only one) because the 
additional channels in the three countries mentioned did not add statistically significant explanatory power to the 
analysis. The list of outlets can be found in Schuck et al. (2010). 
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news stories on one randomly selected page, and all ‘EU stories’ and ‘EP election 
stories’ from the whole newspaper. To qualify as an EU story in a newspaper, “…the 
EU or any EU institution, policy or synonym had to be mentioned at least once in the 
story. In order to be classified as EU election story, the election or the campaign had to 
be mentioned explicitly at least once in the story.” (Schuck et al. 2010: 6). It was the 
coders’ task to select the news stories to be coded based on these conditions and 
detailed instructions provided in a codebook.  
The topics examined are similar to those in previous European Election media 
studies: Europeanness of news coverage, agenda setting, economic voting, framing and 
mobilization (Schuck et al. 2010). All selected news stories were coded for a set of 
variables, including the type, length, and placement of the news story, its location, and 
main topic. If the story was about a specified topic (including European integration, 
environment, and globalization) additional items were coded, including evaluation of 
the situation described in the news and assignment of responsibility for the situation. 
Some coding questions were identical to those surveyed in the Voter Study, enabling a 
variety of research involving both datasets. The common variables include the most 
important problem facing a country, evaluation of national government and the EU, and 
topics involving economy, environment and immigration.  
The stories classified as EU stories were coded for an additional set of variables 
such as the actors in the story and their evaluation, EU-specific topics, whether the story 
evaluated the EU or EP positively or negatively, the potential enlargement to Turkey 
and Croatia, or whether the story included a reference to a conflict, responsiveness of 
the EU, and benefits or disadvantages of EU membership. Additionally, stories about 
the EP election or the campaign were coded for extra variables, including whether the 
story mentioned polls, talked about the expected turnout at the EP elections, or included 
reference to the role of media in the election campaign.  
The coding data were consequently collated, cleaned by the two teams, and 
made available to the public on the PIREDEU website. Without any doubt, the Media 
Study data are unique and present a valuable contribution to media research. There are, 
nevertheless, some aspects of the data collection that may have an impact on the quality 
of the data, particularly the selection of the stories to be coded, the different selection 
method between newspapers and television, and the human factor of the coders.  
Different selection criteria applied to newspapers and television. While the entire 
television newscasts were coded, only a selection of pages and news items was coded in 
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the newspapers. Practical limitations did not allow for coding the entire newspapers as 
these can consist of more than 50 pages in some countries (Boomgaarden et al., 2013). 
For newspapers, all stories on the front page, all stories on one randomly chosen page, 
and all stories mentioning the EU or the EP were to be coded. The randomly chosen 
page and all the EU and EP stories were to be selected from specific sections of the 
newspapers, including political, news, editorial, and business or economy sections. Such 
a method does allowed the coders to obtain the total number of the EU news stories, but 
is does not give a clear idea of the proportion of EU news out of all news in the 
newspaper. Coding all news on the front page helped identify the extent of prominence 
that was assigned to the news stories. However, coding a randomly chosen page seems 
to add very little to the data. 
The other issue is that for television, the entire newscasts were coded, excluding 
the weather forecast and sports. This clearly biases the sample toward the television 
news, not necessarily in the total number of stories coded, as television newscasts 
include less news items than a newspaper, but in the relative proportions. For television, 
one can safely say that, for example, across the EU, 25% of all news stories on the main 
evening newscasts were about the EU. For newspapers, however, it can only be 
assumed that 25% of all coded news stories were about the EU. Additionally, keeping in 
mind the story selection method and the fact that all EU news within the newspaper was 
coded, this is likely to bias the percentages toward newspapers.  
There are also great differences in the numbers of stories coded and the numbers 
of stories deemed as being about the EU across countries. A great proportion of these 
differences is caused by the different levels of attention paid to the EU, EU popularity 
and EP campaign intensity as well as different media systems, journalistic cultures and 
other political and social factors. Nevertheless, because a different coder coded each 
country’s media outlets, the human factor also needs to be considered.  
Table 1 shows the numbers of stories in each country, first column referring to 
all coded stories, the second to stories that were coded as being about the EU. The 
numbers of all coded stories range from 1,004 in Lithuania and 1,044 in Estonia to 
3,629 in Cyprus, 2,928 in Greece and 2,745 in Spain. As mentioned above, a great deal 
of these differences can be attributed to the variations of journalistic cultures between 
the countries as well as, for example, different lengths of television news, sizes of the 
newspaper pages or lengths of the newspaper stories. Additionally, as Cyprus, Greece 
and Spain were among the countries most affected by the financial crisis in 2009, it is 
50 
 
likely that there simply was more news. Looking at the numbers of stories about the EU, 
the lowest numbers were identified in the Czech Republic, 186, and Lithuania, 210. 
Greece and Malta have the highest numbers of stories about the EU, 1,915 and 1,245, 
respectively. The low numbers of EU news in the two post-Communist countries are in 
line with the assumptions in this paper: media in these countries paid very little 
attention to the happenings before the EP elections. The high number of EU news in 
Greece can again be explained by the impact of financial crisis and, consequently, 
public discussion about the EP elections and how the EU can help Greece. Skipping 
ahead to the contextual chapter where I examine the topics of the news, the most 
commonly discussed topics in Greece were campaigning in the EP elections, economic 
conditions, public opinion about the EU and national political corruption. Finally, as I 
outline elsewhere in this study, Malta is characterized by highly polarized party system, 
which reflects in intense election race and, consequently, high media coverage.  
The table is further broken down for newspapers and television, and a similar 
pattern emerges, involving the same countries as to those discussed in the previous 
paragraph.  Attention needs to be paid to the very low numbers of EU news in the 
television newscasts in some countries, for example the United Kingdom, Luxembourg 
and Ireland, as it mean the television channels, both public and commercial, pay 
exceptionally little attention to the EU. Finally, also noteworthy is the proportion of all 
stories coded in the newspapers and on television. While in some countries, the total 
figures for newspapers and television are very similar, for example in both parts of 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Lithuania, Malta and Slovakia, in other countries, 
there are large differences in the figures between the two types of media. Furthermore, 
not only are these figures different, the countries also vary in whether there are more 
news stories coded in the newspapers or on television. Although in most countries, the 
figures are higher in newspapers than on television, in Estonia, Spain and Romania, the 
total numbers of storied coded are higher for television than newspapers.  
It is not my aim to explain all these differences, but it is crucial to be aware of 
them when I analyze the data later in this study. The Media Study data of PIREDEU 
form a unique dataset that allows me to study media effects surrounding the same even 
across 28 media context, and although much effort was made to ensure the reliability of 
the coding, as any data dependent of human coding, they need to be approached with 
caution.  
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Table 3.1: Number of news stories coded, by country 
 
  Stories coded 
  All media outlets Newspapers Television 
Country All EU news All EU news All EU news 
AT 1,607 868 1,286 804 321 61 
BE-F 1,762 558 884 472 878 87 
BE-W 1,290 315 660 269 630 48 
BG 2,153 1,010 1,402 889 751 122 
CY 3,629 537 2,547 1,680 1,082 234 
CZ 1,235 186 598 139 637 47 
DE 2,159 653 1,358 579 801 76 
DK 1,159 553 773 500 386 54 
EE 1,044 227 482 166 562 59 
EL 2,928 1,915 2,264 1,602 664 317 
ES 2,745 1,022 1,239 835 1,506 191 
FI 1,338 382 917 324 421 60 
FR 2,016 786 1,037 705 979 82 
HU 1,626 513 897 428 729 85 
IE 1,475 565 1,159 526 316 39 
IT 1,751 249 1,053 203 698 46 
LT 1,004 210 507 158 497 52 
LU 1,358 698 1,071 672 287 28 
LV 1,405 469 844 390 561 79 
MT 2,212 1,245 1,140 831 1,072 414 
NL 1,810 588 1,320 536 490 54 
PL 1,659 826 1,333 736 326 93 
PT 1,824 670 1,202 508 622 160 
RO 1,849 309 821 235 1,028 75 
SE 1,474 714 1,055 647 419 66 
SI 1,912 814 1,186 647 726 169 
SK 1,357 378 678 282 679 97 
UK 1,202 416 907 393 295 25 
 
Source: PIREDEU Media Study. Author’s own compilation.  
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3.2.3. Contextual Dataset 
 
 
In addition to the Voter Study and Media Study, country level data from the 
contextual part of the study were also used here. This dataset contains country level and 
party level data on political and economic indicators in each EU country, such as the 
number of voters, turnout, its number of MEPs, the number of votes each party 
received, age breakdown of population, unemployment figures, GDP or the government 
expenditure (Czesnik et. al., 2010). Contextual variables used in this study include 
compulsory voting, holding multiple election on the same day as the EP election, 
electoral threshold, and the proportionality of the electoral system. 
As mentioned in the literature overview, the type of electoral system can have an 
effect on voter turnout with countries with a higher degree of proportionality in their 
electoral system likely to produce higher turnout. The EU member states have to follow 
certain rules regarding the electoral system and the majority of EU countries utilize 
some form of proportional electoral system. There are, nevertheless, some differences in 
the degree of proportionality and other features across the countries. The measure of 
proportionality of the electoral system, as calculated using a formula from Gallagher 
(2001) is therefore used as the indicator for the levels of proportionality in individual 
countries (Czesnik et. al., 2010). 
 
 
 
3.3. Variables  
 
 
 
3.3.1. Dependent Variable  
 
 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether or not a 
respondent voted in the 2009 EP election, taking value ‘0’ for not voting and ‘1’ for 
voting. The average turnout across the EU member states is 70.60%, as reported by the 
survey respondents. However, this is nearly twice as much as the official turnout 43%. 
This is a usual phenomenon in voter surveys despite the survey question being phrased 
such as to suggest that not voting is very common, thus: “A lot of people abstained in 
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the European Parliament elections of June 4, while others voted. Did you cast your 
vote?” 
Every voter survey faces the problem of respondents’ overreporting of turnout. 
This problem has been widely discussed (e.g. Cassel 2003, Karp and Brockington 2005, 
Franklin and Wessels, 2010). To avoid false estimation of coefficient and standard 
errors, I weighted the self-reported turnout by the actual country's turnout. When used in 
analysis, however, using both the weighted and self-reported turnout yielded very 
similar results (as also in, for example, Franklin and Hobolt, 2011). Therefore, the 
tables presented in this paper were carried out using non-weighted turnout. The 
variation in turnout both among individuals and across the EU countries is significantly 
large and is, therefore, fit to be used as the dependent variable. I analyze the turnout 
variable in more detail in Chapter 4.  
 
 
 
3.3.2. Independent Variables: Main Media Variables – Matching the Datasets  
 
 
The design of all PIREDEU datasets allows them to be matched with each other, 
opening great research opportunities. The voter study and media study datasets offer a 
unique chance to study media effects across 28 media systems in the same election. 
Apart from a number of topics included in both sets, the voter study contains questions 
regarding the number of days in a typical week that a respondent is exposed to a 
particular news outlet, naming specifically the news outlets included in the media study. 
The media dataset then contains data on the general and EU-specific content of the 
same news outlet. Matching these two datasets allows identification of the news content 
each respondent was actually exposed to, enabling quite specific examination of media 
effects.  
These characteristics make this dataset stand out since very few datasets offer 
such precise measurement of the content of the media that respondents are actually 
exposed to. If they do, it is usually only within one country or regions within the 
country. The PIREDEU dataset contains this information for 28 media systems, 
allowing for a cross-country study capturing and utilizing the news content and 
exposure to the news. I will explain the exact method of matching the datasets  
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The main independent variables of interest are made up of media content and 
media exposure data. The media content data describe the visibility and tone of the 
news about the EU among all coded news. The relevant coding questions are described 
in Appendix 2. The overall amount, or the visibility, of EU news in the media outlets 
covered by the study across all EU member states is measured as the number of news 
classified as ‘EU stories’ (see explanation above) out of all news analyzed in the media 
study.  
Apart from the visibility of the EU news, this study also utilizes the variable 
measuring the tone of the news, i.e. the proportion of news that evaluates the EU. As 
was mentioned previously, news stories were coded based on whether they included a 
positive or negative evaluation about the EU, its institutions, or representatives. The 
possible implications of exposure to news with positive or negative tone were discussed 
earlier in this paper in the literature review and will be examined further in the data 
analysis and results section. Both the visibility and tone variables are further described 
in Chapter 4, including country level aggregate descriptive statistics.  
The second component of the media variables is the respondents’ reported 
exposure to individual news outlets examined in the media study. The survey asked, “In 
a typical week, how many days do you follow the following news programs?” and 
“How many days do you read the following newspapers?” The list then included the 
names of the newspapers and television newscasts coded in the media study.  
The media content and exposure variables were used to calculate the compound 
measure of EU news coverage and the respondents’ exposure to it, the “content 
exposure”. As mentioned above, the voter study included questions about the frequency 
(as the number of days in a typical week) of exposure to particular news media outlets. 
These were the same news outlets analyzed in the media study. Therefore, I am able to 
match the news content to the respondent’s exposure to this content to obtain a measure 
of the amount of EU news respondents were exposed to in the three weeks prior to the 
election.  
The actual calculation of the measure is as follows. I first obtained values for the 
visibility and tone of the EU news each media outlet separately, so as to know the 
amount and tone of EU news contained in each coded newspaper and television 
channel. I was also aware of the frequency of respondents’ exposure to these outlets, so 
I matched these two variables to get a coefficient of the content exposure to EU news 
for each news outlet for each respondent, i.e. exposure multiplied by the content of EU 
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news. Since it was possible, and very common, that a respondent was exposed to more 
than one media outlet, the coefficients for all media outlets a respondent was exposed to 
were averaged for the final measure. This provides a unique measure of the potential 
effects the media have on respondent’s behavior. A more specific example of how this 
measure was constructed is in the following paragraphs.  
Using the media data, I created variables describing the amount of EU news for 
each media outlet in each country7. These media content variables were matched with 
media exposure data from the voter surveys. Respondents exposure to individual outlets 
was originally measured on a scale from zero to seven (days), and it was recoded to 
values between zero and one, i.e. the number of days divided by seven, to be used in 
this paper. The media variables were created as follows (as suggested by Banducci and 
Xezonakis, 2010): if, (for example) UK voter A reported reading The Sun four times per 
week and The Sun contained 14% of EU news out of its total news coverage, the content 
exposure of voter A to The Sun concerning visibility of EU news was calculated as 4/7 
x 14 = 8. This was then repeated for every voter and every media outlet (in the 
corresponding country) resulting in a coefficient of content exposure for each outlet and 
respondent.  
The overall value for the content exposure for all media outlets a respondent was 
exposed to was calculated using rowmean Stata function. This resulted in a single 
coefficient for a respondent, signifying the amount of EU news one was exposed to 
based on amount of time spent on media. As the coefficient gets higher, i.e. as the 
amount of EU news and the frequency of exposure to it increase, I expect to find a 
stronger, positive effect on the respondent’s likelihood to vote. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 See Appendix 2 for detailed description of the questions and variables used. 
56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Calculation of the main media variable – content exposure 
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3.3.3. Tone of the EU news and media types 
 
 
The process described in the paragraph above was then applied to obtain the 
positive content exposure and negative content exposure; instead of the proportion of 
EU news, the percentages of positive and negative EU news out of all EU news in each 
news outlet were used. Additionally, the three variables were also constructed 
separately for each media type for every respondent: newspapers, television channels, 
tabloid newspapers, quality newspapers, public television channels, and commercial 
television channels8. The result is the following set of media variables (see Table 2) 
used in the data analysis in this study to determine the effects of exposure to EU news in 
the media on one’s likelihood to vote. I present the descriptive statistics and further 
analysis of all the content exposure variables in Chapter 4.   
 
 
Table 3.2: Content exposure variables used in this study 
 
Media outlets 
included 
Media Study variables 
Visibility of EU 
news 
Positive tone of EU 
news 
Negative tone of EU 
news 
All Content exposure 
Positive content 
exposure 
Negative content 
exposure 
All newspapers 
Content exposure 
in newspapers 
Positive content 
exposure in newspapers 
Negative content 
exposure in newspapers 
All television 
channels 
Content exposure 
on television 
Positive content 
exposure on television 
Negative content 
exposure on television 
Tabloid newspapers 
Content exposure 
in tabloid 
newspapers 
Positive content 
exposure in tabloid 
newspapers 
Negative content 
exposure in tabloid 
newspapers 
Quality newspapers 
Content exposure 
in quality 
newspapers 
Positive content 
exposure in quality 
newspapers 
Negative content 
exposure in quality 
newspapers 
Public television 
channels 
Content exposure 
on public television 
Positive content 
exposure on public 
television 
Negative content 
exposure on public 
television 
Commercial 
television channels 
Content exposure 
on commercial 
television 
Positive content 
exposure on 
commercial television 
Negative content 
exposure on 
commercial television 
 
 
                                                 
8  The types of media outlets were classified according to Peter et al. (2004), the European Journalism Centre Website 
and the natives of the countries. 
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3.3.4. Independent Variables – Individual and Country Level 
 
 
In addition to the main media variables, numerous explanatory variables 
traditionally used in the voter turnout studies are also included in the data analysis in 
this study. Although the aim of this paper is to show the importance and explanatory 
power of the media variables, all other independent variables need to be included as 
well, as they make up the standard of a model explaining voter turnout.  
On the individual level, political variables along with respondents’ personal 
characteristics are included9. The political variables include the following: (1) exposure 
to the campaign based on five questions, indicating whether a respondent was exposed 
to EP election campaign in newspapers, on television, online, or attended a campaign or 
rally, or talked about the election with friends and family; (2) the respondent’s interest 
in the EP election campaign; (3) the respondent’s interest in politics; (4) voting habits 
describing whether a respondent voted in the previous national election; (5) party 
identity capturing whether a respondent related to a particular political party; (6) 
evaluation of the benefits of EU membership; and (7) the level of satisfaction with 
democracy in respondent’s own country.  
Among individual characteristics and demographic variables, the model 
includes; (8) whether respondent feels ‘European’ as opposed to his or her own 
nationality (i.e. level of ‘Europeanness’); (9) knowledge about the EU expressed as a 
proportion of correct answers out of 7 questions asked in the survey; four variables 
measuring respondent’s living standard; (10) occupation; (11) social class as 
respondent’s own subjective evaluation; (12) whether living in a rural or urban area; and 
(13) respondent’s subjective evaluation of his or her standard of living. Finally, 
included in the model is; (14) gender; (15) age; (16) education at the age when 
respondent finished full-time education; and (17) a dummy variable indicating if the 
respondent was still studying.  
As this study examines voter turnout across 28 political contexts, a number of 
country-level variables that are traditionally used in turnout studies also apply here: (18) 
compulsory voting; (19) time until the next national election; (20) proportionality of 
                                                 
9 See the Appendix for detailed description of these variables. 
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electoral system10; (21) electoral threshold; (22) number of members of the EP (MEPs); 
(23) the year of EU accession11; (24) post-Communist dummy variable; and (25) the 
aggregated country-level visibility of EU news12. The basic model used in this study is 
outlined in the method section. 
 
 
 
3.4. Comparing Media Effects between Groups of Observations 
 
 
 
 
Apart from analyzing media effects within the whole EU and comparing the 
effects of different media types, the media effects are compared between groups of 
observations with similar characteristics. The literature suggests that some variables, 
such as identification with a political party, interest in politics, or knowledge about 
politics moderate the media effects and the analysis in this study confirms this. For 
example, media effects are examined for those respondents who claim they feel close to 
a political party as opposed to those who do not. Alternatively, media effects for those 
with low levels of knowledge about the EU are compared to those with medium and 
high levels of EU knowledge.  
The analyses for these groups of observations are carried out using logit model 
because the multilevel model is not applicable here as when individuals are split into the 
groups; the number of level 1 observations in each group within a level 2 group 
becomes too low for a meaningful analysis. The results are presented as line charts of 
marginal effects. The groups are based on the observations split according to the 
following variables: content exposure, party ID, gender, knowledge about EU, interest 
in politics, interest in campaign, habitual voting, feeling European, evaluating EU 
membership as a good thing, satisfaction with democracy in one’s country, engagement 
in campaign, and age. 
                                                 
10 Although there are some common rules, the EP elections are run under different electoral systems in most 
countries, and the best way to compare the systems is using the degree of proportionality of the electoral system. The 
measure is described in the appendix. 
11 Electoral threshold is also an explanatory variable often used to explain voter turnout. The electoral thresholds 
range between 0 and 5% across all EU member states (Oelbermann et al. 2010). 
12 The average for the three newspapers and two television channels in each country examined in the content analysis 
of the Media Study. 
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The media effects are also compared between groups of countries based on 
several indicators. First, being one of the main aims of this study, media effects are 
compared between Western EU member states and the CEE, i.e. post-Communist, 
countries. The literature suggests that, due to their history and their current political 
situation (which depends greatly on the post-Communist legacy) the post-Communist 
countries display different voter behavior, likely to be reflected in media effects patterns 
too. The overall turnout and news coverage statistics set out earlier in this chapter also 
show that these countries exhibit different characteristics. The analyses later in this 
study reveals that the media effects do indeed differ between these two groups 
according to the expectations: they are much weaker and not statistically significant in 
the case of CEE countries.  
Furthermore, the countries are split into groups based on their average turnout 
and the overall visibility of EU news, in order to examine possible differences in the 
media effects among them. Following the hypothesis in this study, respondents in 
countries with higher visibility of EU news are likely to be exposed to more news about 
the EU and, thus, are more likely to be influenced by the news in their decision to vote 
in the EP elections. The aim of grouping countries according to their official turnout is 
to see how large a role media play in countries with diverse levels of turnout - assuming 
that it matters more in countries with lower levels of turnout, as the media there have 
more space to exert influence over voters. These analyses are shown in Chapters 5 and 
6.        
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3.5. Method 
 
 
 
To explain the variation in participation in the European elections within and 
across the EU countries, multi-level random-intercept logit analysis is used here. The 
dependent variable is a discrete variable, taking on only two values; thus the logit link is 
appropriate. The data used in this study contain approximately 1000 observations for 
each of the 28 contexts13. Therefore, it is a multi-level structure: we have citizens 
belonging to their respective countries, yet at the same time they all belong to the 
European Union, and all either participate or do not participate in the EP election. Thus, 
in the language of multi-level modelling, we see citizens nested within countries and the 
countries belonging to the larger context of the EU. Furthermore, there is significant 
variance of the dependent variable to be explained both between individual respondents 
within a country (level 1 variance, i.e. inter-class correlation) as well as between the 
countries (level 2 variance, i.e. variance of random intercept). I first check for 
heterogeneity which enables me to see if there are any differences in the values of 
dependent variable specific to countries, not captured by the explanatory variables on 
the individual level (Boomgaarden, Vliegenthart, de Vreese, and Schuck, 2010: 513). 
Multilevel-structured data need to be modelled in a special way. The standard 
regression works on the assumption that there is no serial correlation between the errors 
as the sample is drawn independently. This is not the case, however, for multilevel-
structured data because individuals within one country are more similar than individuals 
between two or more countries. Modelling such a multi-level structure using standard 
regression and neglecting the hierarchical structure could underestimate the standard 
errors, exaggerate the coefficients, produce type I errors or false positives, and lead to 
spurious inferences (Gallego, 2010; Hox 2010; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008; 
Steenbergen and Jones, 2002).  
Multilevel modelling allows for taking account of variations at both individual 
and aggregate level, and thus offers a unique opportunity to capture as many factors 
influencing turnout as possible. Furthermore, it makes the correct assumptions with this 
                                                 
13 With the exception of Belgian Flanders and Wallonia where approximately 500 observations in each region make 
up the 1000 for the whole Belgium.   
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kind of data in that it is expected that the observations within one context, i.e. country, 
to be more similar to one another as opposed to observations from other contexts. 
Cross-level studies can be weakened by ecological fallacy, which is making 
assumptions about individuals based on aggregate data. Conclusions that may be correct 
for a nation or a region as a whole unit do not work always work for each and every 
individual. Multilevel modelling is an ideal tool that tackles many statistical problems 
and allows using explanatory variables on both levels and examine their effects on 
observations at the appropriate level (Hox, 2010; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008; 
Steenbergen and Jones, 2002).  
Multi-level models can be run using random effects or fixed effects; in a random 
effects model, the random intercepts are independent across the groups and independent 
of the level residuals, while in a fixed effects model they are actually related (Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008). In simple terms, random effects tend to be used when the 
aim of the analysis is to examine the whole sample, i.e. in this case all citizens across all 
countries, while fixed effects are helpful when the actual individual groups within the 
whole sample are of interest (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008).  
To determine whether random effects or fixed effects methods should be used in 
the analysis, the Hausman endogeneity test is generally used, as it compares the two 
alternative estimators and identifies which one “…is efficient […] if the model is true, 
but inconsistent when the model is mis-specified.” (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008: 
122).  
 Given that my interest in this study is to examine the turnout of all citizens 
across all EU countries, rather than studying the differences between individual 
countries, using the random-effects model would seem to be an appropriate fit. To 
confirm this assumption, I ran the Hausman test in Stata. I ran two separate regressions: 
one with fixed effects and one with random effects. Under the null hypothesis, results 
from both of random effects and fixed effects are consistent, but random effects are 
more efficient than fixed effects. Under the alternative hypothesis random effects is 
inconsistent, but the fixed effects is consistent (Hausman, 1978). The coefficients I find 
from random effects and fixed effects regressions are very similar, and this similarity is 
confirmed in the Hausman test results. The Hausman test results are in favor of using 
random effects, because we cannot reject the null hypothesis due to a p-value of 0.7. 
This is provides me with justification for using a random effects model i.e. it is not only 
consistent but also more efficient than a fixed effects model. 
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The full multilevel model used in the analysis is following: 
 
 
Logit(epvote)ij = γ00 + γ10Content exposurei + γ20Campaign exposurei + γ30Campaign 
interesti + γ40Politics interesti + γ50Habitual votei + γ60Party IDi + γ70cEU membership 
evaluationi + γ80Democracy_satisfactioni + γ90Europeanessi + γ100EU knowledgei + 
γ110Occupationi + γ120Social classi + γ130Rural-urban livingi + γ140Living standardi + 
γ150Malei + γ160Agei + γ170Educationi + γ180Still_studyi + β01Compulsory_votej + 
β02Next_electionj + β03Proportionalityj + β04Tresholdj + β05Numbers of MEPsj + 
β06Accessionj + β07Post-Communistj + β08Country_visibility_EUnewsj + σ0j +σ1jxij 
 
 
 
The content exposure is the one media variable that changes in the models based 
on whether the visibility or the tone of EU news is examined and whether all news 
outlets are included or only specific media types.   
Multilevel models are used in the main analyses in this study where all 
observations are included in the analysis. Where groups of observations, based on 
individual and country characteristics, are examined, a simple logit model is used, 
because when individuals are split into the groups the number of level 1 observations in 
each group within a level 2 group becomes too low for a meaningful analysis, and the 
groups within a variable often include different number of observations. Additionally, 
different numbers of observations from each country are included in the groups which 
would skew the standard errors and the level 2 variance indicator.  
The following two chapters present the data analysis and results. Chapter 4 
examines the first research question, taking account of the visibility of EU news: did 
more frequent exposure to media outlets with higher visibility of EU news increase 
voter participation in the 2009 EP elections? Chapter 5 then looks into the importance 
of tone of the EU to examine the second research question: did more frequent exposure 
to media outlets with more EU news with positive or negative tone increase voter 
participation in the 2009 EP elections? 
Both chapters are structured in the following way: first, multilevel models 
including content exposure to all media outlets are presented. Second, effects of media 
exposure are compared among groups of observations split by several individual level 
64 
 
variables. Third, the effects of exposure to different media types is examined using 
multilevel models, including comparisons between newspapers and television, quality 
and tabloid newspapers, and commercial and public television. Fourth, the media effects 
are compared across groups of countries. These groups are based on whether a country 
is post-Communist, the official turnout, and the proportion of EU news in the country’s 
media.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
CONTEXT OF THE 2009 EP ELECTIONS 
 
 
 
 
In the previous chapters, I first presented the existing research in the fields of 
voter turnout, EP elections and media effects. I then described the datasets and variables 
that I use to show that higher exposure to more news about the EU leads to higher 
participation in the EP elections. In this chapter, I discuss the background of the 2009 
EP elections, including the low intensity campaign and the declining turnout trend. I 
also describe in details the news coverage of the elections across the EU member states, 
looking at the visibility and tone of news about the EU and the EP as well as at the 
topics and actors presented in the media. I link the findings to the results in the latter 
chapters. I end this chapter with a detailed analysis of my main variable of interest, the 
content exposure, calculated using people’s exposure to a particular media outlet and 
the news content in this outlet. In the following chapter I then analyze the effects of 
content exposure on respondents’ likelihood to vote in the 2009 EP elections.  
The EP elections represent one of the largest democratic events in the world. In 
2009, there were over 380 million registered voters; fewer than 170 million of them 
actually cast their vote. Candidates from more than 300 political parties competed for 
736 seats in the EP; 168 national parties were represented in the EP following the 
elections, aligned in EU-wide party groupings. Despite this large nature, the 2009 EP 
election displayed the same characteristics as Reif and Schmitt defined in 1980 under 
the term ‘second order elections’; namely, low voter turnout compared to national 
elections, great gains for small newer parties and losses for governing parties, and 
campaigning based on national issues (Trechsel, 2009). Similarly, as shown for 
previous EP elections, the national news media publish very few stories about the 
campaign and the election itself.  
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Before I proceed to outlining the details of the voter turnout, EP election 
campaign and its media coverage, I will first explain the EU member states groups that I 
refer to throughout this thesis. Over the past decade, a comparison between the “old”, 
i.e. the founding member states and those joining the EU prior to 2004, and the “new” 
EU members, i.e. those joining in and after 2004, was often carried out. I, however, 
distinguish between “Western European (WE)” and “Central and Eastern European 
(CEE)” / “post-Communist” EU member states which is a similar grouping with the 
exception of Cyprus and Malta, two “new” member states, assigned to the “Western” 
group. I believe that this is a more appropriate grouping as the countries in the CEE 
group share similar characteristics, arising from their post-Communist past, and  Cyprus 
and Malta fit better in the group along with the Western member states (Rose, 2004). 
Therefore, for the purposes of this study, the following countries are considered 
“Western”: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, United Kingdom, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Austria, Finland, 
Cyprus, and Malta; in 2014 this also includes Croatia. The post-Communist countries 
include the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia; from 2009 also Bulgaria and Romania. 
 
 
 
4.1. Campaign 
 
 
 
The elections took place across the EU over four days between 4 and 7 June 
2009 as the member states followed their usual voting schedule. For example, people in 
the UK voted on Thursday, while in the Czech Republic they could cast their votes over 
two days on Friday and Saturday. Seven countries held other elections, either national 
or local, at the same time, and several others held them within a year before or after 
June 2009. The timing of other national or local elections, i.e. the positioning of the EP 
election in a country’s electoral cycle, has a great impact on the extent of interest in it 
for both voters and candidates, including the degree and style of campaigning, as well 
as voter turnout. Generally, if the EP and national, or local, elections are held on the 
same day, the campaigning tends to focus more or national or local issues but the 
turnout in the EP elections is likely to be higher. However, if the EP elections are held 
within a short time of the national election, campaigning would still concentrate on 
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national issues but voter turnout is likely to be lower due to voter fatigue. This seemed 
to be the case in the CEE countries in the 2004 EP elections, and voter fatigue was 
likely to be blamed for low turnout in a number of countries in the 2009 EP elections as 
well. 
The 2009 EP elections took place amid the peak of the world economic crisis. 
This seemed to reinforce the second-order nature of the elections, leading to loss of 
votes for governing parties who were likely being ‘punished’ by the electorate. 
Additionally, center-right parties performed better than center-left parties compared to 
previous elections, and there was a rise in anti-EU and extreme right parties, in, for 
example, the UK, Netherlands, and Bulgaria. This could have signified voters’ 
disillusionment with how the EU and their respective national governments had dealt 
with the economic crisis (Trechsel, 2009). It nevertheless did not motivate the citizens 
enough to turn up to the elections and express their opinions in large numbers.  
In previous election campaigns run by the EP, EU citizens were encouraged to 
vote because it was ‘good’ for the EU. Aware of the declining turnout and people’s 
interest in the EU, the EP’s campaign in the 2009 elections was different; instead, it 
aimed to persuade its citizens that voting in the EP election was in their own interest. 
This EU-wide campaign was delivered by a professional marketing company and 
communicated in various forms, including television and radio advertisements, 
billboards, 3-D installations in public areas or EU branding at Brussels airport. All 
activities were created to raise awareness of just how much the EU and the decisions 
made by the EP affected people’s everyday lives, and involved a variety of topics 
ranging from consumer rights to financial markets. The campaign was also presented 
widely on social media where it included, for example, a series of comic videos 
delivering a message that having no time is not an acceptable reason for not voting 
(Meyer, 2009). 
While this was unarguably a grand campaign, it remains disputable how much 
impact on voter participation it actually had. The media content data analyzed later in 
this chapter does not suggest that the news media covered a great deal of the campaign. 
Media, however, did not seem to pick up on much of the campaigning done by national 
parties either, although this is likely to be due to the low intensity and visibility of their 
campaigns.  
As the second-order election theory suggests, and the reality does indeed show, 
EP elections campaigns by national political parties are less intense and funded by 
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fewer financial resources compared to national elections. Yet they are based around the 
same national issues. While most parties running in the EP elections compiled EU-
related manifestos, the EU issues from the manifestos were rarely mentioned in the 
campaigning. It is believed that parties structure their campaigns in this fashion because 
they are aware that citizens lack knowledge of, and interest in, EU matters. It is 
therefore seen as more effective to stress national issues that people are familiar with 
rather than potentially alienate them talking about the EU. As each country concentrates 
on its own respective national issues, the campaigns appear differently across the 
individual member states. This is further reinforced by each country’s own campaigning 
rules that often put a cap on campaign spending or regulate television advertising 
(Gagatek, 2009).  
Analysis of news content later in this chapter explores in more detail how and 
whether media took part in and promoted the campaigning. It will demonstrate the 
differences across individual member states and will show the clear division between 
Western EU and Central and Easter EU member states. First, however, I will analyze 
voter turnout in the 2009 EP elections and look at how it has changed since the first EP 
elections in 1979.    
 
 
 
4.2. Turnout 
 
 
 
With the above picture of the 2009 EP elections campaigns in mind, I will now 
explore voter turnout, the dependent variable in this study. As there is “less at stake” at 
the EP elections, the voter turnout tends to be lower than in national or local elections. 
While this is true for most of the countries, EU member states with compulsory voting 
display little difference and keep their participation rates high. Figure 4.1 clearly shows 
the wide range of turnout from the lowest 19.6% in Slovakia to the highest 90.4% in 
Belgium and 90.8% in Luxembourg, both of the latter two countries have compulsory 
voting. The map also taps into the differences between the CEE and WE member states, 
with the eastern part of the map shaded in lighter colors than the western part, hinting 
that the turnout in the CEE countries is on average lower.  
Such varied levels of voter turnout in the EP elections may reflect the usual 
turnout in a country during other elections, but they also signify diverse attitudes toward 
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the EU. As my analyses in the following chapters show, majority of the variables used 
in studies on turnout in national elections also have statistically significant impact in the 
model explaining turnout in the EP elections. And as also shown in other studies, 
variables capturing citizens’ EU attitudes rarely have a significant impact on 
participation in the EP elections. 
Table 4.1 shows the turnout percentages for each country as well as the averages 
for the whole EU and the two groups of the Western and CEE EU member states. The 
average turnout across the whole EU is 43%, while the average turnout for the 10 CEE 
countries is 28.3%, and for the Western EU member states 47%. This difference of just 
below 20% is the main drive behind this study. Although voters in the whole EU casted 
their voters in the same elections, these figures suggest that different political and 
cultural processes are in place in these two groups of countries. I will investigate this 
further in the following chapters.  
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Source: European Parliament 2009; 
PIREDEU Voter Study. Author’s own 
compilation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: European Parliament 2009; PIREDEU Voter Study. Author’s own compilation.  
 
 
 
 
Country Turnout 
Self-
reported 
turnout 
AT 46.0% 79% 
BE 90.4% 93% 
BG 39.0% 64% 
CY 59.4% 83% 
CZ 28.2% 51% 
DE 43.3% 78% 
EE 43.9% 67% 
FI 40.3% 70% 
FR 40.6% 69% 
DK 59.5% 90% 
EL 52.6% 76% 
HU 36.3% 58% 
IE 58.6% 85% 
IT 65.1% 88% 
LV 53.7% 73% 
LT 21.0% 44% 
LU 90.8% 86% 
MT 78.8% 90% 
NL 36.8% 70% 
PL 24.5% 46% 
PT 36.8% 67% 
RO 27.7% 55% 
SK 19.6% 47% 
SI 28.3% 66% 
ES 44.9% 71% 
SE 45.5% 82% 
UK 34.7% 59% 
EU 27 43.0% 70.6% 
WE 47.0% 78.7% 
CEE 28.3% 56.9% 
Table 4.1: Official and self-
reported turnout in the 2009 EP 
elections, by country 
Figure 4.1: Official turnout in the 2009 EP 
elections, by country – map 
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Additionally, Table 4.1 shows both the official turnout, as published on the EP 
website, and the self-reported turnout based on the election survey data used in this 
study. As outlined in the previous chapter, the gap between the self-reported and official 
turnout is a well-known phenomenon. This is believed to be due to two main reasons. 
First, although all effort is made to choose a representative sample of respondents for 
the surveys to avoid selection bias, people interested and involved in politics and their 
community are more likely to respond to election survey. At the same time, these are 
the people that are already more likely to vote in an election, consequently boosting the 
turnout as reported in the surveys.  
Secondly, responses in, not only, election surveys tend to be driven by social 
desirability. People often feel that they should be voting because it is their social duty, 
and therefore they would often say that they voted when in fact they had not. 
Researchers and survey designers put much effort into the development of survey 
questions that would ease this pressure and make non-voting seem as the normal thing 
that most people do. Nevertheless, overreporting of turnout in electoral surveys remains 
a widely present and, recently, well-researched phenomenon.  
The average self-reported turnout for the whole EU is 70.6% and for the 
Western countries it is 78.7% and 56.9% for the CEE countries. The 20%-gap between 
these two country groups remains intact, and, for most countries, the figures suggest a 
link between the official and self-reported turnout. As can be seen in the table, the 
overreporting varies across the individual countries. While the official turnout is higher 
in the WE countries, respondents in these countries also seem to overreport turnout to a 
higher degree. On average, WE citizens overreport their turnout by 3.1% more than 
respondents in CEE countries.  
It is important to keep this overview in mind when interpreting the results in this 
study. The extent to which both self-reported turnout and the self-reported exposure to 
media are exaggerated varies across countries. These variations could consequently be 
reflected in the effects found in studies when the results found may not be only the 
outcome of the differences across countries, but also the consequence of the different 
extents of turnout and exposure overreporting. This issue is further discussed at the 
beginning of Chapter 3.  
The picture of turnout in the 2009 EP elections raises several questions: has the 
turnout in the EP elections always been so low? Has the gap between the Western and 
the CEE EU member states changed between the 2004 and 2009 elections? What was 
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the situation like in the latest elections in 2014? Figure 4.2 offers answers to all these 
questions as it shows the turnout in the EP elections from their beginning in 1979 until 
the latest election in 2014. While some stress that the 2014 saw the lowest turnout in the 
history of EP elections, it is necessary to see the whole picture and the actual changes in 
the turnout rates over the years.  
The overall turnout in the EP elections has been declining ever since they first 
took place. The rate of decline was slight at first but became steep from 1994 to 2004, 
slowing down again in the past decade. The decline in turnout between 2004 and 2009 
was just 2.5% and this further diminished in 2014 when the turnout fell just by 
negligible 0.36% compared to the previous EP elections. While this certainly seems as a 
good sign, at this moment it can only be speculated about the reasons for this stability. 
The average EP turnout has stayed under 50% for the last three elections, which could 
suggest that it simply reached the lowest possible values because there is a certain 
proportion of habitual voters in every country who always vote in any election, any 
situation. Furthermore, there are several countries in which respondent comply with 
compulsory voting, and this also boosts the overall turnout rates. Researchers and 
politicians will for sure be anxious to see how this situation develops in the 2019 EP 
elections.  
The above mentioned two groups of countries can be tracked from the 2004 
elections, although their composition changed slightly. The Western EU group stayed 
the same in 2004 and 2009, formed by the “old” EU members and Cyprus and Malta 
that joined the EU in 2004. In 2014, Croatia was also part of this group. The CEE group 
was formed by the eight post-Communist countries that joined the EU in 2004 and was 
joined by Bulgaria and Romania in the following two elections. 
The turnout gap between the two groups is obvious from the first look at the 
graph. What is also evident, however, is the slight 2%-increase in turnout in the CEE 
countries between 2004 and 2009. This is on the contrary to the first election boost 
theory, mentioned earlier in the literature chapter, suggesting that when the EP election 
takes place for the first time in a country, the turnout is likely to be high due to the 
excitement and novelty. One would expect the CEE citizens to be eager to exercise their 
hard-earned EU voting rights. However, the low turnout in the first EP election in 2004 
is likely to be the result of election fatigue as the  2004 EP elections followed too 
shortly after the EU accession referenda held in the CEE countries throughout 2003. In 
the months prior to joining the EU on 1 May 2004, citizens, political elites and media in 
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these countries were oversaturated with information about the EU. Consequently, once 
they became a part of the EU just days before the 2004 EP elections, these countries 
reached their goals and had no longer the need to occupy themselves with the matters of 
the EU, such as the elections.  
Nevertheless the turnout remains very low in the CEE countries compared to 
their Western counterparts. While a number of possible explanations for this 
phenomenon have been put forward and are outlined at the end of Chapter 2, my aim in 
this study is to show the extent of influence national media in the CEE countries have 
over the low participation rates.   
The declining turnout in the EP elections has enormous impact on the legitimacy 
of the EU. The fact that just above 40% of EU citizens elect their representatives in the 
EP shed a negative light on EU legitimacy; the direct elections to the EP were started to 
overcome the output, i.e. institutional, legitimacy, but with the lack of citizens’ 
participation in the elections, they lose their main aim. Furthermore, citizens of CEE 
countries are clearly underrepresented in the elections which further deepens the 
legitimacy crisis in their direction. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Official turnout in the 2009 EP elections - trend 
 
Source: European Parliament 2014. Author’s own compilation.  
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4.3. Visibility of News about the EU 
 
 
Visibility of news about a specific topic is defined as the proportion of news 
referring to that topic out of all news in the analyzed media outlets (Boomgaarden et al., 
2013; Çarkoğlu, Baruh and Yıldırım, 2014; De Vreese et al. 2006; Peter et al. 2004; 
Schuck et al. 2011). Detailed information about the coding process for the media 
content data used here are provided in Chapter 3.  
One could suggest that assessing the size of the EU news story would be more 
suitable. Measuring the proportion of a page that the story takes up in a newspaper or 
the length of the news item on television broadcast would, however, present a measure 
of the prominence rather than visibility. Visibility encompasses the number of mentions 
about the EU within a media outlet, while prominence covers the importance that the 
journalists and editors assign to particular stories. In this study, I am interested in the 
number of stories reported about the EU, not their depth, so I utilize the visibility 
aspect. Additionally, the size of news stories is greatly dependent upon the journalistic 
culture and tradition of a country as well as the actual size of a newspaper and length of 
a television newscast. These aspects often vary between countries. Therefore, such 
measure would not be suitable for the cross-country comparisons that I present in this 
chapter.  Later in this chapter I nevertheless consider this measure briefly to show the 
variation in sizes of a typical news story and a typical EU news story in newspapers and 
on television. Furthermore, while considering circulation and viewership figures may be 
helpful for studies covering one country, it is not beneficial in a study, such as this one, 
where news in various media types is analyzed across 28 political and media systems. 
Including circulation figures would take the focus away from the actual visibility of the 
news by looking at the market share of the individual news outlets, which is again 
dependent on the actual media system and regulations in a country.  
Utilizing visibility as the proportion of news referring to the EU or the EP 
among all news coded, the average visibility of EU news across the EU is nearly 36%, 
but the variations between countries are great (see Figure 4.3 and Table 4.2). The 
highest visibility of EU news is found in Greece and Malta, at 62% and 58% 
respectively, followed by Luxembourg and Cyprus with the proportion of EU news 
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among all examined news just under 50%. Italy is at the bottom of the table with 14.3%, 
followed by Czech Republic and Romania with 15.5% and 18.6% respectively.  
The overall visibility of EU news in the CEE countries is 30.6%, and in the 
Western EU member states it is 38.3%. Although the pattern of EU news visibility 
across countries is not the same as the turnout pattern, the great differences between 
countries nevertheless deserve attention. These differences in the visibility are reflected 
in the analysis when the impact of exposure to the news in question is examined. As I 
hypothesize, diverse country levels of EU news visibility lead to varying media effects. 
This study does not examine the factors affecting the varying EU news coverage 
as was undertaken elsewhere (e.g. Boomgaarden et al., 2010), but utilizes this 
information to determine the effects such news coverage can have on people’s 
likelihood to vote.  
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Figure 4.3: EU news visibility – map   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: PIREDEU Media Study. Author’s own compilation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 
EU news 
visibility 
AT 46.1% 
BE 32.0% 
BG 45.2% 
CY 48.5% 
CZ 15.5% 
DE 22.4% 
EE 26.5% 
FI 24.8% 
FR 44.7% 
DK 44.1% 
EL 62.0% 
HU 31.2% 
IE 31.1% 
IT 14.3% 
LV 33.8% 
LT 23.0% 
LU 49.6% 
MT 58.0% 
NL 28.7% 
PL 43.3% 
PT 36.2% 
RO 18.6% 
SK 30.3% 
SI 38.4% 
ES 40.7% 
SE 44.2% 
UK 29.0% 
EU 27 35.5% 
WE 38.3% 
CEE 30.6% 
Table 4.2: EU news 
visibility 
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Figure 4.4 shows a scatter chart with official turnout on the y-axis and visibility 
of EU news on the x-axis. This chart shows the relationship that is my main concern in 
this study; here, I show the EU news – visibility relationship on a country aggregate 
level, and then I examine this on individual level in the following chapters. The graph 
shows a slight positive pattern, suggesting that countries with higher turnout also have a 
higher visibility of EU news. Most of the countries are somewhere between 30% to 65% 
for turnout and 25% to 50% EU news visibility. Out of the CEE countries with the 
lowest turnout, Poland has relatively high EU news visibility. Italy, on the other hand, 
has relatively high turnout, likely due to the legacy of compulsory voting, but a very 
low visibility of EU news. The other clear outliers are the countries with compulsory 
voting, both parts of Belgium and Luxembourg, and average EU news visibility. 
Greece, on the other hand, has turnout slightly above the average but very high EU 
news visibility, the highest across all EU member states. This is likely to be the result of 
the harsh impact of financial crisis on Greece and wide discussion regarding EU’s role 
in the recovery. Finally, due to its peculiar, polarized party system and intense 
competition between political parties, Malta scores highly on both turnout and EU news 
visibility axes.  
When analyzing the results of the multilevel and marginal effects models in the 
following chapters, the characteristics of these outliers need to be considered as their 
extreme values of either variable can have an impact on the size of the content exposure 
variable. Similarly, due to the low visibility of EU news as well as voter turnout, the 
citizens in those countries on the bottom left end of the graphs are likely to have lower 
levels of content exposure and possibly also weaker media effects. While I do not 
examine variations in media effects across individual countries, these differences are 
likely to be reflected in the analysis of WE and CEE country groups as the countries in 
the bottom left end are all CEE, while those outliers in the top right end are all WE 
countries.  
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Figure 4.4: 2009 EP elections EU news visibility and turnout 
 
 
Source: European Parliament 2009; PIREDEU Media Study. Author’s own 
compilation.  
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4.4. Tone of the EU News 
 
 
 
Tone of the news is calculated as the proportion of news about the EU that 
evaluates or describes the EU, its representatives or institutions, in a positive or negative 
way.14 The findings here support previous research, in that the majority of news about 
the EU is neutral i.e. not evaluating the EU in any way (see Figure 4.5 and Table 4.3). 
The percentage of positive and negative EU news among all EU news ranges from 1% 
in Estonia to 18.3% in Wallonia. On average, 3.1% of all EU news is positive and 4% 
negative across the EU countries. The maps clearly show the variation across countries 
and the difference between the percentages of positive and negative news.  
As mentioned in the visibility section on previous pages, those countries at the 
two opposite ends of the graphs are likely to show different levels of content exposure 
and, consequently, different sizes and strengths of the media effects. Knowing the actual 
proportions of news with positive and negative tone is crucial for correctly interpreting 
the direction and size of the media effects in the next two chapters.  
Wallonia has the highest proportion of negative news (12.3%) while Malta has 
the highest proportion of positive news (10.3%). Malta is generally very pro-EU and its 
two main parties agree on EU support. The lack of negative emotions toward the EU 
from the political elites was likely the reason for such a high proportion of EU news 
with positive tone. Austria, Sweden, and Finland also have a high percentage of 
negative EU news, at 10.4%, 9.5% and 8.2% respectively. In the 2004 EP elections, the 
three latter countries saw a boost in the popularity far-right and anti-EU parties which is 
likely to be related to the high proportion of negative news.  
A high proportion of positive EU news is found in Wallonia and France, at 6.3% 
and 5.9% respectively, although this is just over half of the positive news seen in Malta. 
On the other hand, Germany, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Estonia have the lowest 
percentage of negative EU news, all less than 1%, while Estonia, Slovakia, and the UK 
have the lowest proportion of positive EU news, 0.2% in Estonia, and 0.9% in Slovakia 
and the UK.  
                                                 
14 See Chapter 3 for more details on the coding procedure. 
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These low percentages of news do in some cases translate into just tens of 
newspaper or television stories. Consequently, the effects on participation in the 
elections caused by exposure to such small numbers of stories can be greatly 
exaggerated as is seen in the analyses in the following chapters. These results need to be 
treated with caution because there are likely to be other factors playing alongside the 
exposure to the positive EU news.  
There is not a clear relationship between the proportion of EU news, out of all 
coded news, and the proportion of positive or negative EU news, which is measured out 
of all news about the EU. Slovakia has the lowest turnout and percentage of positive 
and negative EU news, but its overall visibility of EU news is close to the EU average. 
Estonia, on the other hand, has turnout higher than the EU average but very low 
visibility of EU news and news with a tone. Yet, Austria and Sweden have a very high 
proportion of negative EU news, quite high EU news visibility, and turnout higher than 
the EU average. These few examples suggest that if there is a relationship between the 
EU news coverage and voter turnout, it is not straight-forward. The proportion of 
positive and negative EU news will be used in the models to determine the effects of 
people’s exposure to such content; however, the percentages are very low and thus 
likely to have little impact on the media-turnout relationship.  
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Source: PIREDEU Media Study. Author’s own compilation.  
 
Country 
Positive 
EU news 
Negative 
EU news 
AT 3.1% 10.4% 
BE 3.7% 7.4% 
BG 2.1% 1.4% 
CY 2.1% 2.5% 
CZ 2.3% 4.8% 
DE 4.8% 0.5% 
DK 2.7% 5.3% 
EE 0.2% 0.9% 
EL 1.7% 5.5% 
ES 2.2% 2.9% 
FI 2.3% 8.2% 
FR 5.9% 6.1% 
HU 2.4% 1.9% 
IE 2.6% 1.5% 
IT 1.3% 3.6% 
LT 2.5% 0.7% 
LU 2.2% 3.8% 
LV 3.9% 2.4% 
MT 10.3% 2.0% 
NL 3.0% 5.6% 
PL 4.2% 3.4% 
PT 5.5% 4.0% 
RO 3.2% 1.9% 
SE 4.3% 9.5% 
SI 1.2% 3.1% 
SK 0.9% 0.8% 
UK 0.9% 5.7% 
EU 27 3.1% 4.0% 
WE 3.5% 5.1% 
CEE 2.3% 2.1% 
Positive EU news 
Negative EU news 
Figure 4.5: EU news with positive and 
negative tone – map 
Table 4.3: EU news with 
positive and negative tone 
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The following two figures give an insight into the aggregate-level relationship 
between the voter turnout in the 2009 EP elections and the EU news with positive or 
negative tone. This relationship is analyzed on individual level in the following 
chapters, but these two figures suggest that if there is some relationship, it is a very 
weak one. Figures 4.6 and 4.7 below show, respectively, turnout relative to the visibility 
of positive and negative EU news. While the majority of countries find themselves 
somewhere between 30% to 60% on the turnout axis, and between 1% to 5% on the 
positive EU news axis, among the countries with the highest turnout Malta stands out 
with the highest proportion of positive EU news. The scatter chart showing turnout and 
the visibility of negative EU news offers a slightly more diverse picture. Despite highest 
turnout, Wallonia stands out with the highest proportion of negative EU news, followed 
by Austria, Sweden, and Finland. 
 
Figure 4.6: EU news with positive tone and 2009 EP elections turnout 
 
Source: European Parliament 2009; PIREDEU Media Study. Author’s own 
compilation.  
LU BE-F BE-W 
MT 
IT 
DK CY 
IE 
WE 
LV EL 
AT SE ES EE DE EU 27 
FR 
FI BG 
PT NL 
HU UK 
CEE SI 
CZ 
RO 
PL 
LT SK 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11%
T
ur
no
ut
 
Positive EU news   
83 
 
 
Figure 4.7: EU news with negative tone and 2009 EP elections turnout 
 
 
Source: European Parliament 2009; PIREDEU Media Study. Author’s own 
compilation 
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4.5. Visibility of News about the EU in Different Media Types 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8 shows the overall visibility of EU news and of positive and negative 
EU news across media types. This is beneficial when the diverse effects of exposure to 
EU news in different media types are examined in the following two chapters. As 
expected and shown in other studies, newspapers include more than three times as much 
EU news than television, 49% compared to 15.6%, and quality newspapers have the 
highest visibility of EU news, at 52.6%. When looking at television, as expected 
newscasts on public television contain more EU news than newscasts on commercial 
television (17.6% compared to 13.1%).  
This large gap can well be the result of the different scope of the two media 
types; as my professor in an undergraduate journalism course once said, all news stories 
from the main television newscasts could fit on less than a quarter of the front page of a 
newspaper. Given the limited time and space, those deciding about what goes into a 
newscast want to ensure that the content is appealing to their viewers and, 
unfortunately, news about the EU rarely falls into this category. The low visibility of 
EU news on television is likely to be behind the lack of statistically significant media 
effects when content exposure on television is examined. 
The amount of EU news with a positive or a negative tone is low overall across 
all media outlets and varies little across all media types (3% to 4%). Both newspaper 
types include 2.9% of positive EU news and 4% of negative EU news, while there is 
3.5% of positive and 4% of negative EU news on public television, and 2.5% of positive 
and 3.4% of negative EU news on commercial television, suggesting that EU news on 
public television is more opinionated than news on commercial station. Nevertheless, 
these differences are very small.  
As I show in Chapter 6, the effects of positive and negative content exposure 
vary greatly when examined for individual media types. For example, both positive and 
negative content exposure to tabloids has a negative effect on one’s likelihood to vote, 
while both of these variables have positive effects when examined for quality 
newspapers only. Such results seem to be the outcome of the different nature of the 
stories presented across the various media types, rather than just the outcome of the low 
numbers of positive or negative EU news. 
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Figure 4.8: EU news visibility and tone across media types (EU average) 
 
Source: PIREDEU Media Study. Author’s own compilation.  
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Of course, the proportions of all EU news as well as positive and negative EU 
news vary across media types, and these further differ between the individual EU 
member states. Figure 4.9 and Table 4.4 present the visibility of EU news in different 
types of newspapers across the EU member states; Figure 4.10 and Table 4.5 then 
present the same measure for the various television types. The shading of all six maps is 
based on the same range, and the set of maps clearly shows not only the variations 
between different media types but also the cross-country differences.  
Comparing the newspapers and television channels between the WE and the 
CEE countries, media outlets in the latter group include less EU news across all 
categories. The difference is especially great for newspapers with 53.2% EU news in 
newspapers in WE countries and 41.3% in the CEE countries but falls to just few 
percentage gap for tabloid newspapers and all television outlets. There are, however, 
great differences across individual countries. Spain, France and Greece see just around 
70% EU news in their quality newspapers, the highest across the EU. Although tabloid 
newspapers in Spain publish a similar amount of EU news (66.9%), there is no EU news 
in French and Greek tabloid newspapers. Greece scores high on television news as well 
(47.8%), but France is on the lower end with 8.5%, along with the Czech Republic 
(6.8%) and Italy (6.6%).  
These figures and tables present a unique insight into the cross-country and 
cross-media variations in EU news visibility. These are then analyzed on individual 
level in the following two chapters. While I do not examine the effects separately in 
each EU member state, the maps give an insight into how the effects look in the CEE 
countries as compared to the WE countries. The overall EU news visibility is lower in 
the CEE countries on average, and the maps below suggest that, with some exceptions, 
this is the case for every media type.  
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Source: PIREDEU Media Study. Author’s own 
compilation. 
 
Country Newspapers 
Quality 
newspapers 
Tabloid 
newspapers 
AT 64.7% 61.6% 71.0% 
BE-F 53.5% 66.1% 28.3% 
BE-W 41.2% 49.7% 24.0% 
BG 64.5% 67.0% 59.7% 
CY 66.4% 66.4% 0.0% 
CZ 21.4% 27.8% 8.5% 
DE 40.0% 52.9% 14.0% 
DK 64.2% 65.9% 0.0% 
EE 36.4% 35.3% 38.6% 
EL 71.5% 71.5% 0.0% 
ES 68.6% 69.4% 66.9% 
FI 31.8% 38.7% 18.1% 
FR 68.8% 68.8% 0.0% 
HU 43.8% 58.9% 13.8% 
IE 43.9% 51.8% 28.3% 
IT 19.5% 19.6% 19.1% 
LT 31.4% 35.1% 24.1% 
LU 62.8% 67.1% 54.4% 
LV 46.7% 38.0% 63.9% 
MT 72.8% 70.0% 78.4% 
NL 40.4% 41.2% 38.7% 
PL 53.1% 61.2% 37.0% 
PT 43.1% 40.2% 49.0% 
RO 26.3% 31.1% 16.5% 
SE 62.5% 60.1% 67.2% 
SI 48.2% 49.9% 23.5% 
SK 41.1% 61.6% 21.3% 
UK 42.7% 46.0% 36.2% 
EU 27 49.0% 52.6% 32.2% 
WE 53.2% 55.9% 33.0% 
CEE 41.3% 46.6% 30.7% 
Newspapers 
Quality newspapers 
Tabloid newspapers 
Figure 4.9: EU news visibility 
across newspaper types - map 
 
 
Table 4.4: EU news visibility across newspaper 
types 
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Source: PIREDEU Media Study. Author’s own 
compilation.  
Country Television 
Public 
television 
Commercial 
television 
AT 18.3% 21.0% 15.6% 
BE-F 10.1% 12.9% 7.2% 
BE-W 7.9% 11.7% 4.2% 
BG 16.2% 16.8% 15.7% 
CY 21.5% 24.1% 18.9% 
CZ 6.8% 9.1% 4.4% 
DE 10.8% 11.8% 8.8% 
DK 13.9% 18.3% 9.5% 
EE 11.5% 17.5% 5.6% 
EL 47.8% 50.3% 45.3% 
ES 12.8% 15.5% 7.5% 
FI 14.3% 13.7% 14.9% 
FR 8.5% 8.2% 8.8% 
HU 12.3% 17.7% 6.8% 
IE 12.0% 13.3% 10.6% 
IT 6.6% 7.4% 5.8% 
LT 10.3% 13.7% 6.9% 
LU 9.8% 9.8% 0.0% 
LV 14.4% 17.1% 11.7% 
MT 35.8% 27.6% 43.9% 
NL 11.2% 15.6% 6.8% 
PL 28.6% 29.4% 27.8% 
PT 25.9% 25.1% 26.8% 
RO 7.1% 10.1% 4.1% 
SE 16.9% 22.3% 11.5% 
SI 23.8% 26.7% 20.9% 
SK 14.2% 16.1% 12.3% 
UK 8.3% 10.9% 5.8% 
EU 27 15.6% 17.6% 13.1% 
WE 16.2% 17.7% 14.0% 
CEE 14.5% 17.4% 11.6% 
Public television 
Television 
Commercial 
television 
Table 4.5: EU news visibility across television 
types 
Figure 4.10: EU news visibility 
across television types - map 
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The following several figures and tables present an alternative measure to the 
EU news visibility, the prominence of the EU news. This is measured as the average 
size of a news story in newspapers and as the average length of a news story on 
television newscast. While these measures are not directly comparable between the two 
media types, the variations across the EU can be examined for each of them. Such 
analysis offers an insight into a different dimension of EU news visibility. 
For each newspaper story, the coders were asked to specify the proportion of a 
page that the story covers. As is shown on Figure 4.11, around 68% of all EU 
newspaper stories cover less than a quarter of a page, 20% cover between a quarter and 
a half, and just 7% and 5% of EU newspaper stories were between a half and three 
quarters and over three quarters of a page, respectively. These proportions are nearly 
identical for the WE and CEE countries, but there are some significant differences 
across the individual countries. Germany and the Netherlands have the highest 
proportions of stories taking up just less than a quarter of a page with 82% and 90%, 
respectively. On the other hand, Sweden and the Flanders part of Belgium have the 
highest proportions of news larger than three quarters of a page, while the highest 
figures of newspaper EU stories larger than a half of a page are found in Denmark 
(24%), Estonia (25%), Spain (26%), Latvia (22%) and Sweden (26%). 
The little space devoted to the EU news goes in line with the claims mentioned 
earlier, stressing that the national media fail to make the EU news visible and 
prominent. The journalistic style may also be at fault here as journalists in some 
countries may simply write shorter news. Furthermore, the actual sizes of the 
newspapers themselves vary between countries; for example, the newspapers published 
in the Czech Republic have a smaller format than those published in the UK, so this 
needs to be considered when looking at the cross-country variations. 
Utilizing the same measure, Figure 4.12 and Table 4.6 present the average size 
of an EU news story across the EU. This is expressed as a proportion of a page and 
varies just between 0.3 and 0.5, bringing the average of the whole EU, as well as of the 
two groups, to 0.4. As suggested in the previous figure, the average size of an EU 
newspaper story is half a page in Sweden, Flanders and Spain, but just a third in the 
Netherlands and Slovenia. 
Table 4.6 points to an interesting feature: EU stories in WE newspapers are on 
average one tenth larger than stories not about the EU; this difference is just one 
twentieth, or 5%, for the CEE countries. Nevertheless, Figure 4.13 shows a slight, 
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positive relationship between the average size of non-EU stories in newspapers and EU 
stories. Figure 4.13 confirms my expectations in that the size of the EU newspaper 
stories relates greatly to the actual characteristics of the newspaper and the journalistic 
culture in a country and, consequently, is not a suitable measure for the visibility of EU 
news. 
 
 
Figure 4.11: Size of EU newspaper stories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: PIREDEU Media Study. Author’s own compilation.  
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Country Average 
size of EU 
story 
Average 
size of non-
EU story 
AT 0.43 0.34 
BE-F 0.50 0.33 
BE-W 0.43 0.33 
BG 0.43 0.31 
CY 0.36 0.28 
CZ 0.38 0.38 
DE 0.34 0.29 
DK 0.46 0.44 
EE 0.39 0.34 
EL 0.47 0.32 
ES 0.50 0.38 
FI 0.36 0.31 
FR 0.40 0.43 
HU 0.38 0.35 
IE 0.38 0.32 
IT 0.43 0.30 
LT 0.43 0.38 
LU 0.44 0.32 
LV 0.47 0.43 
MT 0.43 0.34 
NL 0.30 0.27 
PL 0.42 0.32 
PT 0.43 0.29 
RO 0.37 0.31 
SE 0.51 0.37 
SI 0.31 0.30 
SK 0.42 0.36 
UK 0.43 0.34 
EU 27 0.42 0.33 
WE 0.42 0.32 
CEE 0.40 0.35 
 
 
 
Size of the newspaper story is expressed as a proportion of a page. 
Source: PIREDEU Media Study. Author’s own compilation.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Average size of EU newspaper 
stories - map 
Table 4.6: Average size of EU 
and non-EU newspaper stories 
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Figure 4.13: Average size of non-EU and EU newspaper stories  
 
 
 
Size of the newspaper story is expressed as a proportion of a page. 
 
Source: PIREDEU Media Study. Author’s own compilation.  
 
 
 
 
 
A similar set of tables and figures is presented below for news on television. 
Here, I examine the length of the news story in seconds. Figure 4.14 and Table 4.7 show 
the breakdown by country, with the average EU television story lasting just over two 
minutes (133 seconds). In the WE television newscasts, the average length is two 
minutes and a third (142 seconds), while in the CEE the news stories last just under two 
minutes (114 seconds). As in the case of newspapers, Greece and Sweden lead with the 
longest EU news stories of 220 and 189 seconds, respectively. Television newscasts in 
Hungary, Spain and Slovakia have the shortest EU television news, lasting just over 80 
seconds.  
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And as with the size of the newspaper stories, the average EU television story 
takes up more time than non-EU story with a difference of just over half a minute (37 
seconds) across all EU member states, 44 seconds in the WE and 22 seconds in the CEE 
countries. Figure 4.15 shows a very strong, positive relationship between the average 
length of non-EU news and average length of EU news. The figure clearly points to 
Greece, an outlier with the longest television stores, and a group of five countries 
(Sweden, the UK, Denmark, Poland and Portugal) that also have higher than average 
size of both all news and EU television news. This figure once again confirms that the 
average size and length of a news story varies across countries depending on their 
journalistic styles and cultures. Therefore, using this measure to identify the proportion 
of EU news would be highly correlated to the average size of a non-EU news story, and 
it would tell us little about the importance that is placed on the actual issue of the EU.   
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Country 
Average 
length of 
EU story 
Average 
length of 
non-EU 
story 
AT 104 76 
BE-F 120 88 
BE-W 125 112 
BG 96 90 
CY 127 112 
CZ 116 94 
DE 97 79 
DK 167 123 
EE 128 115 
EL 220 151 
ES 88 75 
FI 101 89 
FR 106 81 
HU 82 74 
IE 135 104 
IT 153 104 
LT 113 95 
LU 92 85 
LV 138 104 
MT 133 97 
NL 146 88 
PL 167 132 
PT 146 156 
RO 132 86 
SE 189 99 
SI 106 90 
SK 89 77 
UK 171 114 
EU 27 133 96 
WE 142 98 
CEE 114 92 
 
Length of television story is expressed in seconds. 
 
Source: PIREDEU Media Study. Author’s own compilation.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.14: Average length of EU television 
stories - map 
Table 4.7: Average length of 
EU and non-EU television 
stories 
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Figure 4.15: Average size of non-EU and EU television stories 
 
 
 
Source: PIREDEU Media Study. Author’s own compilation.  
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4.6. Topics and Actors in the News 
 
 
 
4.6.1. Topics in All Analyzed News 
 
 
While I center my study purely around the visibility of EU news, having a look 
into the actual topics in the news can offer yet another point of view on the media 
effects. The following two sections examine the topics first in all the coded news and 
then in the EU news only. The results show that non-political stories prevail across all 
media types, especially in the CEE countries, which can help explain the varying and 
relatively low effects of the combined content exposure.  
Each news story included in the media study was coded for its primary topic, 
with the option to code up to three topics. A topic refers to the major subject of the story 
that would generally take the most space in a newspaper story and the most time in a 
television newscast. To qualify as a topic for the purposes of this study, the subject 
needs “…to be referred to/mentioned at least twice in the article or newscast and not 
just mentioned in passing” (Schuck et al. 2010, 32). Coders used predefined list of 
wide-ranging topics, including detailed topics relating to politics and economics. 
Despite the extensive list of topics, “Any other topic” category made up just over 4% of 
all coded stories and was the number four most used category for the news stories 
across all EU countries. Stories referring to the EU were coded for an additional EU-
related topic, list of which was also provided. Up to five EU-specific topics could be 
coded per story in order of appearance. 
The top ten topics are nearly identical in both groups of countries examined 
here; the one topic that WE countries show in the top ten but not CEE countries (there it 
ranks 13) is Sports, the one topic present in CEE but not in WE is Effects of financial 
crisis on domestic/ EU/ global economy (number 19 in WE) - this scores relatively 
much higher in the CEE (2.5% of all coded news) compared to the WE (1.6%). Sport on 
the other hand. This is why the graphs in Figure 4.16 include 11 categories, to allow for 
the inclusion of top ten topics for both WE and CEE groups.  
While the most common topics are similar in both groups, the proportions of 
individual topics differ greatly. To illustrate this, human interest is the most popular in 
97 
 
the CEE countries averaging 9.5% of all news, but in the WE countries this is just 5.4%. 
The most common topic in all news in the WE countries is EP elections: Electioneering, 
campaigning making up 6.8% while just 3.5% of all news in the CEE countries talk 
about this. The very first look immediately tells us that there indeed are different 
processes, media systems and journalistic cultures operating in the two groups of 
countries: while media in the WE actually publish a substantial amount of news about 
the EP elections during the three weeks before the elections, only 3.5% of news in the 
CEE media outlets are devoted to this topic. This would suggest that the WE national 
media do realize their responsibility to inform citizens about the EP elections and 
campaign, but media in the CEE fall behind.  
 
Figure 4.16: Main topic in all news stories, top 11 
 
Source: PIREDEU Media Study. Author’s own compilation.  
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Figure 4.17 and Table 4.8 show the top 3 topics in the EU across the individual 
countries, pointing to additional differences on this level. The three maps are shaded 
within the same range and provide further evidence for the WE – CEE split for the two 
most common topics. The highest proportions of news including a human interest topic 
are found in the CEE countries, namely Romania (16.6%), Estonia (15%), and the 
Czech Republic (14.9%), while the lowest levels can be seen in Luxembourg (1.8%) 
and Denmark (2.2%). As I have shown earlier in this chapter when examining the EU 
news visibility, Malta and Greece have the highest proportion of news discussing 
European Elections: Electioneering, campaigning: 15.4% and 14.2%, respectively. 
Interestingly, the crime story topic is presented relatively similarly across most 
countries, with the highest proportion seen in the Czech Republic (13%) and the lowest 
in Luxembourg (0.7%).  
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Source: PIREDEU Media Study. Author’s own 
compilation.  
 
 
Country  Human 
interest 
(soft news) 
European 
Elections: 
Electioneering, 
campaigning 
Crime 
story 
AT 4.4% 7.4% 4.3% 
BE 8.9% 1.1% 4.8% 
BG 5.7% 4.5% 3.7% 
CY 3.1% 11.0% 1.9% 
CZ 14.9% 4.6% 13.0% 
DE 2.2% 3.4% 4.8% 
DK 5.5% 1.1% 3.0% 
EE 15.0% 2.2% 5.6% 
EL 2.7% 14.2% 1.6% 
ES 4.5% 11.5% 6.8% 
FI 11.6% 2.7% 6.4% 
FR 6.8% 6.9% 5.5% 
HU 7.6% 5.9% 7.0% 
IE 9.4% 5.3% 9.2% 
IT 7.1% 1.9% 9.3% 
LT 7.3% 0.4% 10.2% 
LU 1.8% 1.0% 0.7% 
LV 9.4% 0.4% 4.1% 
MT 4.7% 15.4% 3.4% 
NL 5.4% 1.6% 3.9% 
PL 6.5% 6.3% 4.3% 
PT 5.4% 11.2% 7.4% 
RO 16.6% 1.2% 5.3% 
SE 4.3% 4.5% 4.0% 
SI 3.7% 3.7% 4.0% 
SK 12.6% 3.7% 4.5% 
UK 8.5% 1.1% 5.0% 
EU 27 6.70% 5.80% 4.90% 
WE 5.40% 6.80% 4.60% 
CEE 9.50% 3.50% 5.80% 
Human interest 
Crime story 
EP Elections: 
Electioneering, 
campaigning 
Figure 4.17: Main topic in all 
news stories, top 3 – map 
Table 4.8: Main topic in all news stories, top 3 
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4.6.2. Topics in News about the EU 
 
 
The news stories that mentioned the EU or the EP were further coded for EU-
specific topics. These topics are more relevant to this study. They may help us better 
understand the reasons for why people are or are not affected by exposure to EU news 
and why these effects differ between the WE and CEE countries.  
Figure 4.18 presents 13 most common EU topics across the EU. I include 13 
topics to enable for inclusion of top ten topics from each WE and CEE group of 
countries; these two groups have seven topics in common in the top then, but each 
group’s top ten includes three topics that the other group does not. Vote advice, Voter 
turnout, and Enlargement of EU with Turkey were the three topics included in the WE 
countries’ ten most common topics but were ranked lower among the CEE countries. 
Especially interesting is the topic regarding enlargement with Turkey as it is present in 
2% of EU news in the WE countries, but only in 0.4% of EU stories in the CEE 
countries. This could be interpreted as confirming what has been brought up in the 
literature review earlier: the elites and citizens in the CEE countries feel that they play a 
lesser role in the EU, following on what is imposed on them, and are not interested in 
issues such as further enlargement because they probably do not believe that it has a 
direct impact on them.   
Conversely, the three topics included in the CEE countries’ top ten but not 
shown in the WE group’s top list are EU external relations and European neighborhood 
policy, EU budget and EU-level politicians’ personal features. The last topic is expected 
to appear on the list based on the analysis of the main topics on the previous pages: 
media in CEE countries publish a high proportion of soft news and this is what a story 
about politicians’ personal features is. A more challenging occurrence to explain is that 
news about EU budget are relatively common in the CEE countries with 2.7% 
occurrence, but in the WE countries, just 1.2% of EU news were about the budget.  
Another interesting feature of Figure 4.18 is that although both groups yield 
Electioneering and campaigning as the most common EU topic, the percentages differ 
greatly with 20.2% in the WE and 13.2% in the CEE countries. This can be seen as 
reflecting the lack of EU campaigning in the CEE countries, a feature discussed earlier 
in this chapter.   
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Figure 4.18: Main EU topic in EU news stories, top 13 
 
 
Source: PIREDEU Media Study. Author’s own compilation.  
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Figure 4.19 and Table 4.9 present country-level details for the three most 
common topics. Several countries clearly stand out with the darkest colors and highest 
proportions of the topic on Electioneering and campaigning: Malta (38.1%), Portugal 
(35.7%), Spain and, surprisingly a CEE country, the Czech Republic (both 31.7%). 
These numbers give us an idea about the intensity of the election campaigns and 
media’s coverage of them in these countries.   
Coders were able to choose from a long list of predefined topics; yet, relatively 
large proportions of EU news are classified as not applicable: 13.2% across the EU, 
14.2% in the WE and 10.3% in the CEE EU member states, with great differences 
across the individual member states. To be classified as a topic, the particular issue had 
to be mention at least twice in the story. It is highly probable that in these 13.2% of 
cases the EU was mentioned in the news story only once; consequently, although such a 
story would be classified as an EU story, it could not have assigned an EU topic. This 
again demonstrates that even when a news story talks about an EU issue, it is often done 
so in the background of a national issue.  
The proportions of news about EP elections in general are on average lower than 
for the previous two topics and vary from 4.5% in Hungary and 4.6% in the UK to  
18% in Spain and 15% in Estonia. The figures described in these few pages give us a 
clear overview of the relative proportions of the most common EU-specific topics 
across the EU countries. This then also helps us explain and understand the varying 
effects of exposure to these news on voter turnout as well as the lack of these effects in 
the CEE countries.  
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Source: PIREDEU Media Study. Author’s own  
   compilation.  
 
Country 
Electioneering, 
campaigning 
Not 
applicable 
European 
Elections 
in general 
AT 18.3% 9.5% 5.8% 
BE 5.2% 28.2% 10.8% 
BG 10.3% 14.8% 13.5% 
CY 21.5% 28.1% 5.7% 
CZ 31.7% 7.0% 7.0% 
DE 10.1% 37.8% 5.2% 
DK 5.2% 2.5% 13.2% 
EE 12.8% 16.3% 15.0% 
EL 29.5% 8.9% 7.8% 
ES 31.7% 3.7% 18.0% 
FI 13.4% 6.8% 8.9% 
FR 20.7% 2.7% 11.8% 
HU 19.1% 3.5% 4.5% 
IE 17.0% 26.7% 4.8% 
IT 12.9% 40.2% 7.2% 
LT 2.9% 11.9% 10.5% 
LU 3.3% 11.2% 13.3% 
LV 5.3% 0.9% 4.7% 
MT 38.1% 3.1% 13.2% 
NL 7.8% 4.6% 10.5% 
PL 18.6% 1.8% 13.6% 
PT 35.7% 1.9% 9.1% 
RO 8.7% 25.9% 9.7% 
SE 15.3% 13.7% 7.7% 
SI 10.0% 7.6% 7.0% 
SK 18.5% 27.8% 14.3% 
UK 6.3% 35.8% 4.6% 
EU 27 18.40% 13.20% 9.60% 
WE 20.20% 14.20% 9.40% 
CEE 13.20% 10.30% 10.20% 
Electioneering, 
campaigning 
Not applicable 
EP Elections 
in general 
Figure 4.19: Main EU topic in 
EU news stories, top 3 - map 
Table 4.9: Main EU topic in EU news stories, 
top 3 
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4.6.3. Actors in News about the EU 
 
 
While a topic of a story, whether general or EU-related, gives us the idea of the 
subject discussed in the story, it does not necessarily specify who is being talked about 
in the story. This is important because, as shown in previous sections, people like news 
stories about people, so it matters to a great extent what people the news talks about. 
Such information again helps us better interpret the results in the following chapters.  
Each news story that referred to the EU was also coded for the main actors, i.e. 
who the main person or institution in the story is. Coders could choose from several 
groups of predefined, specific actors including EU political and non-political actors, 
worldwide actors and country-specific actors, including political elites and parties. 
Figure 4.20 shows a clear pattern across all EU countries with 15.6% of news devoted 
to EU political actors, 4.6% to EU non-political actors, just 1% to worldwide actors, and  
nearly 79% of all news mentioned country- specific actors, grouped under ‘Other’ in 
this figure. These figures do not differ between the WE and CEE countries. These 
findings further support the claim that not only the EU news visibility is low, when 
there is news about the EU, it is likely to be framed within a national issue or to feature 
a national actor.  
 
Figure 4.20: Main actors in EU news stories 
 
 
Source: PIREDEU Media Study. Author’s own compilation.  
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
EU political
EU non-political
Worldwide
Other
EU27 WE CEE
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4.7. Exposure to Media 
 
 
4.7.1. Exposure Only 
 
 
On previous pages I described the content of the news in the weeks leading to 
the 2009 EP elections. The news content from the media study makes up one part of the 
content exposure measure, the main variable of interest in this study, whose impact on 
voter turnout I examine in the next two chapters. The second component of the content 
exposure variables is the respondents’ reported exposure to individual news outlets 
examined in the media study. I discussed the possible issues with this measure, selective 
exposure and overreporting of the measure, at the beginning of Chapter 3.  
The EES survey asked, “In a typical week, how many days do you follow the 
following news programs?” and “How many days do you read the following 
newspapers?” The list then included the names of the newspapers and television 
newscasts coded in the media study. Figure 4.21 and Table 4.10 show respondents’ 
average exposure to all relevant newspapers and television newscasts. It is an aggregate 
of exposure to each outlet, calculated as a weekly proportion: for each news outlet, the 
reported number of days of exposure was divided by the possible maximum of 7 days 
and an average for all news outlets was then calculated. 
There are clear differences in the media exposure across countries. The EU 
average exposure is less than two days a week but there is a difference between the WE 
and CEE countries with the average exposure of 1.64 and 1.89 days.  This is also clear 
from the shaded map, and, thinking back to the EU news visibility earlier in this chapter 
and keeping in mind the content exposure measure, it is clear that it is the news media 
content, i.e. the lack of EU news, where these countries fall behind as the exposure to 
media is relatively high there.  
The highest exposure to media is found in Estonia, Slovakia, Finland, and the 
Czech Republic, with just over two days a week, while the lowest levels of exposure are 
in France, the UK, Greece, and Spain, with less than one and a quarter of a day per 
week. These values are important as they make up, along with the news content, the 
main variable of interest. It is also important to note the large size of standard 
deviations, signifying large differences across the respondents within a country. While 
Estonia and Malta have a standard deviation just under a day and a half, in France and 
the UK this is less than one day.  
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Average exposure is expressed as number of days. 
 
Source: PIREDEU Voter Study. Author’s own compilation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Exposure 
Standard 
error 
AT 1.55 0.034 
BE-F 1.65 0.047 
BE-W 1.55 0.055 
BG 1.95 0.038 
CY 1.92 0.041 
CZ 2.13 0.037 
DE 1.38 0.032 
DK 1.74 0.033 
EE 2.24 0.047 
EL 1.25 0.032 
ES 1.27 0.034 
FI 2.14 0.038 
FR 1.14 0.027 
HU 1.62 0.035 
IE 1.78 0.034 
IT 1.86 0.036 
LT 1.84 0.036 
LU 1.76 0.036 
LV 1.69 0.039 
MT 2.09 0.044 
NL 1.74 0.033 
PL 1.62 0.032 
PT 1.73 0.038 
RO 1.56 0.037 
SE 1.73 0.038 
SI 2.04 0.035 
SK 2.18 0.041 
UK 1.14 0.029 
EU 27 1.73 0.007 
WE 1.64 0.009 
CEE 1.89 0.012 
Figure 4.21: Respondents’ average exposure to 
all media outlets - map 
Table 4.10: Respondents’ average 
exposure to all media outlets 
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4.7.2. Content exposure 
 
 
On the previous pages, I presented the details of the variables that make up the 
content exposure variable, my main variable of interest: the news content and people’s 
exposure to the news. As described in Chapter 3 and shown clearly in Figure 3.1, the 
content exposure measure is based on respondent’ exposure to a particular news outlet 
and the EU news visibility in that content. This way I created a very accurate measure 
of the news content that each respondent was likely to be exposed to. Such a measure is 
relatively unique in the media effects research (Stevens and Banducci, 2013; Stevens 
and Karp, 2012; Stevens et al. 2011) and allows for a more clear examination of the 
media effects. 
Figure 4.22 and Table 4.11 present the overview of the content exposure values 
across the EU member states. The range of values is between 2.24 and 13.8; higher 
values of content exposure mean more exposure to more EU news, and, consequently, 
stronger impact on people’s likelihood to vote. On average, the CEE countries content 
exposure reaches 5.52, but it goes higher in the WE countries to 6.96. Looking at the 
individual countries, the lowest values are found in Romania (2.24) and Italy (2.91), 
while the highest can be seen in Malta (13.8) and Luxembourg (11.06). Based on the 
analysis presented on previous pages, it is clear that the low values for Romania and 
Italy are mainly the result of very low media coverage of the EU affairs, and for 
Romania this is in combination with low levels of exposure to media as well. Italy’s 
exposure is slightly than the EU average. The high values for Malta and Luxembourg 
are caused by both high EU news visibility and great levels of exposure to media.   
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Source: PIREDEU Voter Study and Media Study. Author’s own compilation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 
Content 
exposure 
AT 0.092 
BE 0.046 
BG 0.067 
CY 0.105 
CZ 0.031 
DE 0.030 
DK 0.067 
EE 0.066 
EL 0.097 
ES 0.059 
FI 0.065 
FR 0.030 
HU 0.038 
IE 0.065 
IT 0.028 
LT 0.043 
LU 0.111 
LV 0.050 
MT 0.138 
NL 0.050 
PL 0.077 
PT 0.075 
RO 0.022 
SE 0.097 
SI 0.094 
SK 0.064 
UK 0.029 
EU 27 0.064 
WE 0.070 
CEE 0.055 
Figure 4.22: Content exposure – map Table 4.11: Content exposure 
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As described in Chapter 3, in addition to content exposure, I also utilize 
measures of positive and negative content exposure where the proportion of positive or 
negative news about the EU is applied instead if the visibility-only measure. In the rest 
of this section I present the overview of the descriptive statistics for these variables.  
Table 4.12 shows the characteristics of the three main media variables (all news 
outlets included). The minimum possible value for each variable is 0, the maximum is 1. 
Due to the lower content of news with positive or negative tone, the mean, median, 
standard deviation (SD), and variance values are much smaller for the exposure to 
positive and negative EU news than exposure to all EU news. All three variables exhibit 
statistically significant lack of normality and are positively skewed. The kurtosis for the 
positive and negative content exposure is higher than 10 which suggests there is a 
greater concentration of observations in one part of the distribution (kurtosis for normal 
distribution is 3). The following histograms show that this is around the value of 0 
where the majority of observations fall, as most EU news contains neither positive nor 
negative tone.  
The skewness test was run in Stata, showing that, based on the skewness, the 
probability that each of these variables is normal is 0.00 and based on kurtosis, the 
probability is also 0.00. The joint test shows Pr<0.001 and further confirms that there is 
statistically significant lack of normality for the three media variables. The same results 
were obtained for the variables capturing EU news content in the specific media types, 
and are now shown here.     
 
Table 4.12: Statistics for the content exposure variables 
 
  Content 
exposure 
Positive content 
exposure 
Negative content 
exposure 
Mean 0.064 0.007 0.010 
Median 0.042 0.005 0.006 
Standard deviation 0.067 0.009 0.012 
Standard error 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Lower confidence interval 0.063 0.007 0.009 
Upper confidence interval 0.065 0.007 0.010 
Variance 0.005 0.000 0.000 
Skewness 1.970 3.260 2.521 
Kurtosis 8.842 21.41 11.548 
 
 
110 
 
Figure 4.23 shows the distribution of content exposure and positive and negative 
content exposure. It is clear that the majority of observations are concentrated around 0, 
especially in the case where tone of the news is considered, as here 0 stands both for 
respondents with no exposure to any news outlet analyzed, as well as for those exposed 
to news outlets with no EU news, including positive or negative tone toward the EU.  
For content exposure, the number of observations with 0 values is also high; 
since there was at least some EU news in each media outlet this means that many 
respondents were not exposed to any news outlet examined here. Although the values 
for this variables range between 0 and 1, nearly all observations are concentrated 
between 0 and 0.3. Higher coefficients signify exceptionally frequent exposure to media 
with very high visibility of EU news.  
The picture is similar for the positive content exposure, where the range is 
between 0 and 0.1 but the majority of observations fall between 0 and 0.05, and, for the 
negative content exposure, the range is between 0 and 0.12, with most of the 
observations between 0 and 0.02. The respondents included in the content exposure are 
the same as those used in the measures for positive and negative content exposure; it is 
the content that is changing, i.e. very low proportions of EU news contain positive or 
negative tone toward the EU. Therefore, the concentration of observations 0 is likely to 
be caused by the lack of positive and negative news in the figures for the positive and 
negative content exposure, rather than by respondents’ lack of exposure to the news 
examined in this study.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
111 
 
Figure 4.23: Distribution of Content Exposure 
 
 
 
 
Source: PIREDEU Voter Study and Media Study. Author’s own compilation.  
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Charts in Figure 4.24 outline the distribution of content exposure to EU news for 
each media type. The patterns are similar to that for all media, but here we can see 
where the exceptions with high values come from. For both types of newspapers, the 
values reach up to 0.8, while for television channels this value is 0.5.  
 
 
Figure 4.24: Distribution of content exposure to EU news across media types 
 
 
 
The ranges on both x and y axes vary between the graphs. 
Source: PIREDEU Voter Study and Media Study. Author’s own compilation.  
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Figure 4.25 then shows countries’ content exposure in relation to turnout. The 
pattern is very similar to the scatter chart with turnout and visibility of EU news (Figure 
4.4). There seems to be a positive trend; while most countries are found within turnout 
of 30% to 60 % and content exposure values of 0.02 to 0.1, Malta, Luxembourg, and 
Cyprus stand out with the highest values for the content exposure and a high turnout as 
well. Poland and Slovenia have relatively high content exposure to EU news but have 
among the lowest turnouts. Countries such as Romania, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, 
and the UK are low for both measures. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.25: Content exposure and 2009 EP elections turnout 
 
 
 
Source: PIREDEU Voter Study and Media Study. Author’s own compilation.  
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4.8. Summary 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I presented the overview of the context of the 2009 EP elections, 
looking at voter turnout, visibility and tone of EU news as well as the topics and actors 
in the news. I examined the downward trend in the EP elections turnout from 1979 up to 
2014, pointing to the 20% turnout gap between WE and CEE countries in the latest 
three elections. Explaining this turnout gap is one of my main motivations behind this 
study. I am to show that more frequent exposure to more news about the EU leads to 
higher likelihood in participation in the 2009 EP elections.  
The figures showing proportions of EU news across the EU member states show 
clear differences between the individual states as well as between the groups of WE and 
CEE member states; there was 38.3% of EU news in the WE countries, and 30.6% in 
the CEE. The variations between the two groups present a further motivation behind 
this study. The visibility of EU news in each media outlet examined here also makes up 
half of the main content exposure measure; therefore, the variations in the EU news 
visibility across the EU is reflected in the media effects results.  
The majority of the news about the EU is neutral, i.e. the stories do not evaluate the 
EU in a specific way. On average, just 3% of EU news have a positive tone toward the 
EU and 4% show negative evaluations. In many countries, these small percentages 
translate into just several tens of stories with some tone, and there are great outliers on 
both ends of the spectrum. This is important when the effects of exposure to the positive 
and negative EU news are examined as these outliers boost to the effects to great sizes.  
As shown in other studies, the EU news visibility and the tone of the news also 
differ across media types: newspapers have higher proportion of EU news than 
television, 49% compared to 15.6%. The visibility of EU news in quality newspapers 
reaches 52.6%. In the following two chapters I examine effects of exposure to EU news 
across the different media types, so it is necessary to be aware of these differences in 
news coverage as they have an impact on the size of the media effects. 
To see the EU news content from a different perspective, I examined the topics that 
were discussed in the news. The most common topic across all news analyzed was 
‘human interest’ shown in 5.4% of stories in the WE countries and in 9.5% of stories in 
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the CEE countries. The most popular EU-related topics across all the news coded was 
about the campaigning in the EP elections and its coverage received 6.8% of news in 
the WE countries and 3.5% in the CEE countries. The relatively small proportions of 
both these topics imply that there were many diverse topics across all the news, so 
people were likely to be exposed to a great mix of news. This could consequently 
suppress the effects of exposure to EU news.    
I also examined the EU-specific topics that were coded only for the news that 
actually mentioned the EU. The most common topic there is the same one as mentioned 
in the previous paragraphs, news about the EP election campaigning, found in 20.2% of 
EU news in the WE countries and in 13.2% in the CEE countries. These percentages are 
higher than those for topics in all coded news shown above because the base for the EU-
specific topics includes only the stories about the EU, i.e. those 38.3% of news in the 
WE and 30.6% of news in the CEE countries.  
It is necessary to point to the relatively high proportion of EU news with ‘not 
applicable’ EU topic, 14.2% in the WE and 10.3% in the CEE. To classify as a topic, 
that particular subject had to be mentioned at least twice in the news story. This means 
that more than a tenth of EU news across the EU does not have a clear topic but 
possibly mentions a variety of subjects. It is also likely that although these stories do 
mention the EU, they are in fact about a non-EU topic, just mentioning the EU or its 
institutions in passing. This may mean that people are not be getting a clear message 
from the media, which can in turn lower the potential effects of exposure to EU news. 
Towards the end of the chapter, I looked into the exposure to media, in particular 
exposure to the five news outlets examined in this study. This is the second half making 
up the content exposure measure, along with the EU news visibility. On average, 
respondents in the WE countries reported they are exposed to the five news outlets 1.6 
days per week, while those in the CEE member states reported slightly higher exposure 
of 1.9 days. While it is possible that citizens in the CEE countries are exposed more 
often to the media, it is also likely that the rate of overreporting of this self-reported 
exposure is higher in the CEE countries, i.e. people there feel more obliged to say that 
they are exposed to media when in fact they are not. Overreporting of the exposure 
measure is a well-known issue of survey media effects research, and it needs to be 
considered when I analyze the results in the following two chapters.   
At the end of this chapter, I described the content exposure variable, my main 
variable of interest in this study. It is calculated from people’s exposure to a particular 
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media outlet, expressed as a proportion of a week, and the EU news content in this 
outlet, expressed as a proportion of news about the EU. Consequently, content exposure 
ranges between 0 and 1, and the mean is 0.064. The variable is not normally distributed, 
and there is a high concentration of the observations around 0. I also utilize positive 
content exposure and negative content exposure, i.e. exposure to positive and to 
negative EU news. These two variables, while also ranging between 0 and 1, have 
means of 0.007 and 0.010, respectively. They are even further skewed, with the 
majority of observations concentrated around 0. The low values of these three variables 
are caused by respondents’ low exposure to the news outlets and the outlets’ low 
content of EU news, as well as the very low proportion of the positive and negative EU 
news. In the next two chapters I analyze the effects of these content exposure variables 
on respondents’ likelihood to vote in the 2009 EP elections. The results reflect the 
specific characteristics of each of these measures. 
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CHAPTER 5  
 
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS: VISIBILITY OF EU NEWS  
 
 
 
 
Including more news about the EU and the EP elections in the national media could 
help ease the EU legitimacy crisis because EU citizens would be able to learn more 
about the EU and then would be more likely to voter in the EP elections. Up to this 
point, I have been building the reasoning behind my main argument that a higher 
exposure to more news about the EU, i.e. the content exposure, is likely to boost voter 
turnout, but that this is going to be the case only for Western EU countries, not in the 
CEE member states. Following the introduction, I discussed the problem of EU 
legitimacy and the communications deficit, and outlined how easily available 
information in the media can help improve the situation. I then discussed the existing 
literature on voter turnout, outlining the factors known to have an impact on voter 
turnout and also presenting the special characteristics of the EP second-order elections, 
such as low saliency of the election campaign and the persistent low levels of turnout. I 
outlined the various findings in the media effects literature pointing to the lack of 
consensus on whether and to what extent exposure to media has an impact on people’s 
beliefs and political behavior. I also discussed that the lack of national news coverage of 
the EP elections is linked to both low saliency of the EP election campaign and the low 
levels of voter turnout. At the end of the literature review I explained that the post-
Communist legacies in the CEE countries, including unstable governments, volatile 
party systems, corruption among politicians, and citizens’ distrust of politicians and 
media, relate to the lower levels of voter turnout as well as to the poorer chances of 
media having an impact on citizens’ likelihood to vote.    
In Chapter 3, presented the main issues in survey-based media effects studies, 
the selective exposure and overrepoting of media exposure, and I explained how I 
aimed to avoid these in this thesis. I then presented the datasets I used to provide 
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empirical evidence for my arguments and described the individual variables utilized in 
my model. Finally, in the previous chapter I outlined the context of the 2009 EP 
elections. I mentioned the low salience of the election campaign with the world 
financial crisis at the forefront and discussed the downward trend of voter turnout over 
the last few decades. I also described in detail the media coverage of the EP elections: 
the lack of visibility of EU news with its great variations across EU member states and 
different media types, and the prevalence of news without any tone toward the EU as 
opposed to news that positively or negatively evaluate the EU. Furthermore, I showed 
that human interest and crime stories are the most common, with just one EU-related 
topic appearing among the ten most common topics in all the news analyzed. General 
news about the EP elections and news on electioneering and campaigning were among 
the most common EU topics, with a substantial proportion of news being classified as 
not including any predefined EU topic. At the end of the previous chapter, I presented 
the descriptive statistics of my main variable of interest, content exposure. Content 
exposure is calculated using respondents’ exposure to a specific media outlet and the 
actual content of that outlet, obtaining a unique measure of each respondent’s average 
EU content exposure15.               
I will now analyze the effects of the content exposure variables on voter turnout 
in the 2009 EP elections. Using empirical evidence, in this chapter I inspect whether 
more frequent exposure to media outlets with higher visibility of EU news increases 
voter participation in the 2009 EP elections. In the following Chapter 6, I then examine 
the role of tone of the EU news in this relationship. 
Based on the cognitive mobilization theory of media effects and the rational 
choice and mobilization theories of voter turnout, I expect exposure to EU news in the 
media to boost people’s knowledge about the EU, help them see the EP elections being 
relevant to their everyday lives, and consequently increase their chances of voting. I am 
especially interested in the different patterns of media effects in the Western and the 
CEE EU member states. The very low turnout in the latter group along with their unique 
characteristics indicate that also media effects may show different patterns there 
compared to the Western EU countries. The post-communist legacy of lack of trust to 
media and to politicians, of party identification and political participation all lead to the 
assumption that media effects are weaker in the CEE countries. The size of the effects 
                                                 
15 Please see figure 3.1 for a detailed explanation of this measure. 
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will nevertheless be affected by the visibility of the EU news in the media; low visibility 
would lead to practically non-existent effects while higher visibility could boost the 
effects. 
The data analysis provides evidence supporting my claim: greater exposure to 
news about the EU increased the likelihood of an EU citizen voting in the EP election, 
but when comparing the media effects between countries of Western Europe and CEE, 
they were not found to be present in the latter group. The differences in the effects of 
exposure to various media outlets also support findings from existing research, namely 
that exposure to newspapers had a stronger impact than to television, and that quality 
newspapers, along with public television channels, had a stronger impact than tabloid 
newspapers or commercial television channels.    
This chapter is organized in the following way: first, multilevel models, 
including content exposure to all media outlets, are presented; second, the media effects 
are compared across groups of countries. These groups are based upon whether a 
country is post-Communist, official turnout, and the proportion of EU news in the 
country’s media. Third, effects of media exposure are compared among groups of 
observations, split by numerous variables such as age, knowledge about the EU, interest 
in politics, etc. Fourth, the effects of exposure to different media types are examined 
using multilevel models, including comparisons between newspapers and television, 
quality and tabloid newspapers, and commercial and public television. 
 
 
 
5.1. Multilevel Model, All Media 
 
 
 
Table 5.1 shows the results as odds ratios for three multilevel models, examining 
the effects of content exposure: random intercept model, model including only 
individual level variables, and a full model including country level variables. Variables 
that were not statistically significant do not feature in the table but are shown in the 
model in the previous chapter.  
The first random intercept model (i.e. model with only the dependent variable) 
shows the degree of variance to be explained at both levels. At level 1, the individual 
variance (the intra-class correlation) rho is 16%, while the level 2 variance, or the 
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variance of random intercept (calculated as sigma_u^2), is 79.3%. The explanatory 
variables in the following models decrease this variance.  
The second model contains only individual level variables. Before examining the 
effects of individual variables, the variance offers an important insight on the 
explanatory power of this model. Interestingly, both individual level variance and level 
2 variance remained unchanged compared to the random intercept model signifying 
that, despite many variables being statistically significant, individual level variables 
alone do not explain any variance in this model. To put into context, this means that 
respondents’ characteristics, such as interest in politics, engagement in campaign or age, 
do not explain whether they would or would not vote in the EP elections. Nevertheless, 
the fact that many of the explanatory variables do show statistically significant effects 
implies that they do matter in the equation and do influence one’s decision to vote but 
do not fully explain the differences in the likelihood to vote among respondents. 
The dependent variable of interest to this paper, the content exposure, has a 
statistically significant effect at 0.1% level, increasing one’s odds of voting by a factor 
of 4.1. This suggests that with a unit increase in content exposure, i.e. the combination 
of EU news content and respondent’s exposure to it, the odds of voting increase four 
times. Compared to the other explanatory variables, this is the strongest impact. 
Exposure to campaign, a variable closely related to the above mentioned media 
variable, also has a strong impact on the likelihood of voting, increasing the odds of 
voting by 135%, or a factor of 2.35, thus providing further evidence to support my 
hypothesis.  
Similarly, interest in the election campaign and, to a lesser extent, habitual 
voting, signifying whether the respondent voted in the previous national election, also 
greatly increased the odds of voting by a factor of 2 (104%) and by 57%, respectively. 
Additionally, being close to a political party increased the odds of voting by 29%, 
evaluating EU membership as positive by 17.6%, and satisfaction with democracy in 
one’s country by 10%. All the variables depicting an individual’s political attitudes have 
effects statistically significant at the 0.1% level.     
The demographic variables also have statistically significant effects although 
they are much weaker, suggesting that, despite the findings of research on voter turnout 
in national elections, these do not play a large role in determining whether one votes in 
the EP elections. Gender does not have a statistically significant effect either, while 
older age slightly increased one’s odds of voting by 2%, and higher education by 1.4% - 
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both statistically significant at the 0.1% level. On the other hand, being in tertiary 
education decreased the likelihood of voting by 64%, making it a stronger indicator than 
age, as it is reasonable to assume that it is mainly younger people who are still in 
education.     
In addition to the individual level variables, the full model also includes country 
level variables such as compulsory voting, proportionality of electoral system, whether 
a country is post-Communist, and aggregate level of EU news in the country’s media. 
Both variance indicators decreased greatly in this model with the individual variance 
falling to just 5.2% and the level 2 variance to 42.4%. 
The strength and statistical significance of the individual level variables are very 
similar to the previous model; therefore I will now look only at the country level 
variables. Compulsory voting - traditionally a robust determinant of voter turnout - is 
also strong in this model, increasing the odds of voting for citizens in countries with 
compulsory vote almost three times. The variable used in studies on EP elections 
depicting the time until next national election also has a statistically significant effect 
here: as the next national election is farther away, one’s odds of voting increase by 20%. 
The other country level variables deemed to be important here, including the post-
Communist dummy, year of accession to the EU, and country level aggregate 
proportion of EU news in the media, do not have statistically significant effects. 
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Table 5.1: Multilevel model, content exposure 
 
 
Random intercept 
model 
Individual level 
model 
Full model 
Media variables       
Content exposure   4.102 4.027 
     (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Political variables       
Exposure to campaign   2.351 2.357 
   (0.128)*** (0.128)*** 
Interest in campaign   2.039 2.041 
   (0.046)*** (0.046)*** 
Interest in politics   1.087 1.086 
   (0.024)*** (0.024)*** 
Habitual vote   1.572 1.569 
   (0.057)*** (0.057)*** 
Party ID   1.291 1.29 
   (0.045)*** (0.045)*** 
Evaluating EU 
membership as good 
  1.176 1.174 
  (0.022)*** (0.022)*** 
Satisfaction with 
democracy in country 
  1.1 1.097 
  (0.023)*** (0.023)*** 
Demographic variables       
Gender (male=1)   0.941 0.941 
   -0.031 -0.031 
Age   1.021 1.021 
   (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Education (in years)   1.014 1.014 
   (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
Still studying (dummy)   0.363 0.368 
   (0.102)*** (0.103)*** 
Contextual variables       
CEE     0.572 
     -0.194 
Year of accession     0.987 
     -0.008 
Compulsory vote     2.738 
     (0.790)*** 
Time till next national 
election 
    1.215 
    (0.090)** 
Country level visibility 
of EU news 
    0.996 
    -0.009 
Observations 27069 27069 27069 
L2 observations 28 28 28 
Log likelihood -15130 -12433.331 -12415.909 
lnsig2u -0.464 -0.448 -1.715 
SE (lnsig2u) (0.272) (0.274) (0.281) 
Sigma_u 0.793 0.799 0.4243 
SE (sigma_u) (0.108) (0.274) (0.0596) 
rho 0.16 0.163 0.0519 
SE (rho) (0.0367) (0.0374) (0.138) 
Standard errors in parentheses   
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Media effects studies often use either media exposure or the news content to 
determine the effects. A combination of the two is rarely used, but this leads to 
numerous problems. In survey research, it is often only known how often a respondent 
was exposed to a particular medium, but it is not known what kind of message the 
person was actually exposed to. Conversely, the content of the news or the message is 
often utilized in aggregate studies, but such a measure does not enable the researchers to 
see whether the respondents were actually exposed to that message. Using a combined 
content and exposure measure enables us to get the complete picture.  
My analyses in this study confirm the significance of the combined measure of 
news content and respondents’ exposure to it. The combined content exposure measure 
presents relatively strong, statistically significant effect on respondents’ likelihood to 
vote (Table 5.1). I ran the same model specification but this time using exposure only 
instead of the combined content exposure, and the exposure measure did not reach 
levels of statistical significant (Table 5.2). In this analysis, the exposure measure is 
respondents’ average exposure to the five outlets examined in this study and is 
expressed as a proportion of a week. It is essentially the exposure part of the content 
exposure measure. While the effects of other variables are similar to the original model 
with content exposure, exposure to media, on its own, does not have an effect on one’s 
likelihood to vote.  
As mentioned above, aggregated news content is also often used in media effects 
studies. I include such measure, the country-level visibility of EU news, in the 
multilevel models (Table 5.1). Nevertheless, this variable does now have a statistically 
significant effect in any model I ran. These results clearly show that, to correctly 
examine media effects, the analysis needs to account for all aspects that the media 
environment, i.e. needs to include both the content of the news and people’s exposure to 
it.  
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Table 5.2: Multilevel logistic regression model including exposure measure only instead 
of content exposure 
 
Exposure only model 
Media variable   
Mean exposure 1.221 
   (0.131) 
Political variables   
Exposure to campaign 2.418 
 (0.132)*** 
Interest in campaign 2.039 
 (0.046)*** 
Interest in politics 1.091 
 (0.024)*** 
Habitual vote 1.573 
 (0.057)*** 
Party ID 1.289 
 (0.045)*** 
Evaluating EU membership as good 
1.176 
(0.022)*** 
Satisfaction with democracy in 
country 
1.097 
(0.023)*** 
Demographic variables   
Gender (male=1) 0.945 
 (0.031) 
Age 1.021 
 (0.001)*** 
Education (in years) 1.015 
 (0.004)*** 
Still studying (dummy) 0.344 
 (0.096)*** Observations 27,069 
Contextual variables   L2 observations 28 
CEE 0.567 Log likelihood -12423.997 
 (0.191) lnsig2u -1.729 
Year of accession 0.987 SE (lnsig2u) (0.281) 
 (0.008) Sigma_u 0.421 
Compulsory vote 2.728 SE (sigma_u) (0.059) 
 (0.782)*** rho 0.051 
Time till next national election 1.212 SE (rho) (0.014) 
(0.089)**   
Country level visibility of EU news 0.841 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
(0.771) 
 
Exposure is expressed as a proportion of a week a respondent is on average exposed to 
the media outlets examined in this study. 
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5.2. Content Exposure in Western vs. Central and Eastern European Countries 
 
 
The tables on previous pages fail to falsify my expectations that more frequent 
exposure to more news about the EU increases one’s likelihood to vote. The effect is 
relatively large: a unit change in the combined content exposure, which is measured on 
a scale 0 to 1 and combines the percentage of EU news with the proportion of time a 
person was exposed to this news, results in 4-time increase in respondents’ likelihood to 
vote. One of the main goals of this study is to examine differences in the media effects 
on voter turnout between the Western and CEE EU member states. The following set of 
tables and figures examines these differences.  
Due to the lack of existing research on media effects, my expectations were 
based on the assumption that because of the low visibility of EU news in the post-
Communist media, and the lack of trust in the media and politics, the media effects 
would be weaker in CEE countries.  The post-Communist dummy variable is not 
statistically significant in the multilevel model in Table 5.1. This suggests that living in 
a post-Communist country does not alone decrease one’s likelihood of voting but may 
be related to individual or country characteristics connected to the post-Communist 
legacy.  
Table 5.3 presents three logistic regression models (not multilevel) including the 
observations from (1) all EU countries, (2) CEE countries only and (3) WE countries 
only. The goal of this analysis is to examine the media effects, and effects of other 
variables, in the two diverse groups, using the same specifications. While I have 
explained the appropriateness of a multilevel model for the data I use, to run the 
analysis separately for WE and CEE countries, a basic logistic model needs to be used 
as these groups each on their own do not have a sufficient number of observations on 
level 2, i.e. there are only 10 countries in the CEE group. The logistic model (1) for all 
EU member states is run for comparison only, but I want to point to the CEE dummy 
variable there: it is statically significant at 0.1% level, suggesting that those in the CEE 
countries are just half as likely to vote in the EP elections compared to those in the WE 
countries. 
Results in Table 5.3 clearly show the differences between the two groups of 
countries. The main variable of interest, content exposure, does not have a statistically 
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significant effect in the CEE countries, but it does have it in the WE countries, with 
nearly identical size of the effect as in the multilevel model for all countries (Table 5.1). 
This immediately suggests that the decisions on whether to vote in the EP elections for 
the citizens in the CEE countries are not influenced by their exposure to EU news in the 
media. As shown in Chapter 4, this is likely to be due to the low levels of EU news 
visibility in the CEE countries rather than people’s exposure to EU news, which seems 
to be relatively high. On the other hand, although the exposure to media in many CEE 
countries is higher than in the WE countries, we need to keep in mind that this is a self-
reported exposure measure which respondents tend to exaggerate. As I mentioned 
briefly at the beginning of Chapter 3, the fact that both turnout and exposure survey 
measures are likely to be overreported, and at different rates across the countries, could 
in fact be the cause for some of the effects reported here. 
     Examining the political variables in the models (2) and (3), many variables 
have similar effects in both groups. There is a large difference though in the effect of 
exposure to campaign, i.e. how frequently the respondents were exposed to or 
participated in events relating to the EP elections in the weeks prior it, measured as 
often, sometimes or never. A unit increase in the exposure to campaign increases one’s 
chances to vote by a factor of nearly 3 in the CEE countries and a factor of 2 in the WE 
countries. Having voted in the previous national election and being close to a political 
party have slightly stronger effects in the CEE countries. Looking at demographics, the 
effects of education are the only ones to vary between the two groups. The effect of 
education actually does not reach levels of statistical significance in the WE countries, 
but in the CEE countries, each extra year of education increases one’s likelihood to vote 
by 4%. Also, those still in education are 60% less likely to vote than those not studying 
any more.  
Lastly, there are diverse effects of the contextual variables. Time till next 
national election has statistically significant, positive effect only in the WE countries, 
and the year of EU accession has a significant, slightly positive effect in the CEE 
countries but a negative effect in the WE countries. This suggests that in the CEE 
countries, people are more likely to vote as the next national election is farther away, 
but in the WE countries, people are less likely to vote in the EP election when the 
national election is far away. Overall, the results in Table 5.3 confirm diverse effects not 
only of content exposure but also of other variables between the WE and CEE countries, 
thus supporting my expectations. 
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Table 5.3: Logistic regression showing odds ratios. 3 models including (1) all countries, 
(2) CEE countries only and (3) WE countries only 
 
 
EU27 CEE WE 
Media variable (1) (2) (3) 
Content exposure 2.893 1.685 4.403 
   (0.875)*** (0.896) (1.695)*** 
Political variables       
Exposure to campaign 2.577 2.981 2.036 
 (0.135)*** (0.242)*** (0.143)*** 
Interest in campaign 2.049 1.879 2.186 
 (0.045)*** (0.062)*** (0.067)*** 
Interest in politics 1.073 1.089 1.077 
 (0.023)** (0.038)* (0.031)* 
Habitual vote 1.472 1.774 1.380 
 (0.052)*** (0.093)*** (0.068)*** 
Party ID 1.240 1.470 1.116 
 (0.042)*** (0.076)*** (0.051)* 
Evaluating EU membership 
as good 
1.144 1.168 1.135 
(0.021)*** (0.032)*** (0.028)*** 
Satisfaction with democracy 
in country 
1.055 1.072 1.105 
(0.021)** (0.034)* (0.030)*** 
Demographic variables       
Gender (male=1) 0.927 0.945 0.944 
 (0.030)* (0.046) (0.041) 
Age 1.020 1.018 1.022 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Education (in years) 1.011 1.043 1.003 
 (0.003)** (0.007)*** (0.004) 
Still studying (dummy) 0.434 0.040 0.797 
 (0.116)** (0.022)*** (0.246) 
Contextual variables       
CEE 0.575    
 (0.038)***    
Year of accession 0.989 1.101 0.988 
 (0.002)*** (0.027)*** (0.002)*** 
Compulsory vote 2.245  2.676 
 (0.145)***  (0.197)*** 
Time till next national 
election 
1.133 0.938 1.277 
(0.016)*** (0.031) (0.023)*** 
Country level visibility of 
EU news 
1.091 1.569 0.613 
(0.199) (0.502) (0.154) 
Observations 27,069 10,054 17,015 
Log likelihood -12707.838 -5333.524 -7135.821 
Pseudo R2 0.225 0.224 0.191 
 
Standard errors  
in parentheses.  
*** p<0.001 
** p<0.01 
* p<0.05 
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5.3. Marginal Effects for Groups of Observations 
 
 
 
Next, the analysis was run for groups of observations based on their values for 
several characteristics. For example, keeping all other variables at their means, the size 
of the media effects (content exposure) is examined for voters with low, medium, and 
high levels of content exposure or for those with low, medium, and high levels of 
knowledge about the EU. This allows for closer examination of the role that different 
variables play in relation to media effects. The following charts display the marginal 
effects, obtained with the margins command in Stata, of the content exposure on voting 
in the EP elections for various groups of individuals. The groups were formed according 
to the values for a number of explanatory variables, including party ID, knowledge 
about the EU, or interest in politics. The light grey lines in the graphs then show the 
95% lower and upper confidence intervals. Where the effects are statistically 
significant, stars (*) are shown next to the group name within the chart, following the 
usual rules where *** for p<0.001, ** for p<0.01, and * p<0.05. 
Compared to the previous table showing the results of multilevel analyses, the 
charts below show the marginal effects based on the logit model. The multilevel model 
is not used here because when individuals are split into the groups, the number of level 
1 observations in each group within a level 2 group becomes too low for a meaningful 
analysis and the three groups within a variable often include different number of 
observations. Additionally, different numbers of observations from each country are 
included in the three groups, which would skew the standard errors and the level 2 
variance indicator. 
The first chart (Figure 5.1) shows the varying marginal effects of the content 
exposure on voting in the EP elections for individuals grouped according to the same 
variable, namely content exposure. This analysis aims to show whether high levels of 
exposure to news about the EU are crucial for this variable to impact one’s likelihood to 
vote. And, indeed, it is only for the group with the highest level of content exposure that 
the marginal effect is significant, at the 5% level. Keeping other explanatory variables at 
their mean, the predicted benefit for individuals in the group with the highest level of 
content exposure is 14.9%, suggesting a nearly 15% increase in one’s likelihood to vote 
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with one unit increase in the content exposure. Despite the effect not being large, the 
fact that it is statistically significant for only the group with the highest levels of content 
exposure supports my hypothesis that suggests that the more frequently people are 
exposed to news about the EU, the more likely they are to vote in the EP elections.  
 
 
Figure 5.1: Marginal effects of the content exposure on voting in the EP elections for 
individuals grouped according to the content exposure 
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Figure 5.2 shows the varying marginal effects of the content exposure on voting 
in the EP elections for individuals grouped according to the party ID variable, which is 
a dummy variable describing whether the individual is close to a political party. This is 
a strong determinant of voting participation on its own, but this analysis aims to show 
what role being close to a political party plays in mediating the effect of exposure to EU 
news. For those not close to a political party, the marginal effect of content exposure is 
statistically significant at the 5% level, showing a 23% increase in the probability to 
vote with a unit change in content exposure for those not feeling close to a political 
party. This is an expected result as those respondents who do not identify with a 
political party tend to vote to support their party, but it is those people who do not 
identify with a party that often fail to find reasons to vote, especially in the EP elections.  
 
 
Figure 5.2: Marginal effects of the content exposure on voting in the EP elections for 
individuals grouped according to their party ID 
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Figure 5.3 shows the varying marginal effects of the content exposure on voting 
in the EP elections for men and women. Gender is a variable traditionally included in 
voter participation studies as the gender gap remains an important topic. The results 
show that the marginal effects of content exposure are higher for men than for women 
and are statistically significant - at the 0.1% level - only for men. The results reveal that 
for men, the likelihood of voting increases by 21.1% with a unit of increase in the 
content exposure. 
 
Figure 5.3: Marginal effects of the content exposure on voting in the EP elections for 
individuals grouped according to their gender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
132 
 
Figure 5.4 shows the varying marginal effects of the content exposure on voting 
in the EP elections for individuals grouped according to their knowledge about the EU. 
Knowledge is an interesting and important variable in relation to the media effects, as 
the effect of exposure to media on knowledge is often examined and it is also frequently 
considered as a mediator of media effects. In this case, knowledge is based on 
respondents’ answers to seven questions about the EU. This analysis aims to show what 
role different levels of knowledge about the EU play in determining whether one voted 
in the election. The findings provide an interesting insight into this topic. For those with 
the lowest level of knowledge about the EU, the marginal effect is the smallest and is 
not statistically significant. For people with medium level of knowledge about the EU, 
the marginal effect is largest and statistically significant at 0.1% level: a unit increase in 
the content exposure for those with medium level of EU knowledge results in 25.2% 
increase in one’s likelihood to vote. For those with the highest level of EU knowledge, 
the marginal effect is slightly lower than for the previous group, at 20.1% and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. 
This is a very interesting scenario. Keeping all other explanatory variables at 
their means and considering media as providing information to voters, for a person with 
little knowledge about the EU, exposure to EU news does not influence their decision-
making about participation in the election. These people may just not be interested in 
the EU or politics at all and would not pay attention to media discussion. For people 
who have some knowledge about the EU, being exposed to EU news increases their 
likelihood to vote. These people may possibly be searching for additional information to 
help them decide whether to vote and who to vote for, and the media are likely to be 
providing them with this information. Finally, although exposure to EU news increases 
the likelihood of voting for people with the highest level of EU knowledge, the marginal 
effect is smaller than for the previous group. Many of these people may have already 
made their decision about participation in the election, while, for the remainder, the 
extra information they find in the media can make the difference between voting or not.  
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Figure 5.4: Marginal effects of the content exposure on voting in the EP elections for 
individuals grouped according to their knowledge about the EU 
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Figure 5.5 shows the varying marginal effects of the content exposure on voting 
in the EP elections for individuals grouped according to their interest in politics. While 
high knowledge about politics of the EU does not necessarily mean that the person will 
vote, one would expect people highly interested in politics to exercise their franchise; 
nevertheless, the correlation between these two variables is just 0.3.This analysis aims 
to show what role exposure to EU news plays in the relationship. For groups of people 
both with no or low interest in politics and with medium interest, the marginal effects of 
content exposure are statistically significant on the 5% level. The effect is slightly 
higher - by 0.4% - for the no/low political interest group where a unit of change in the 
content exposure results in 17.4% increase in the likelihood to vote. The marginal effect 
is not statistically significant for those with high interest in politics. This could suggest 
that these people have already decided to vote and, thus, exposure to EU news does not 
make an impact on their decision.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Marginal effects of the content exposure on voting in the EP elections for 
individuals grouped according to their interest in politics 
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Figure 5.6 shows the varying marginal effects of the content exposure on voting 
in the EP elections for individuals grouped according to their interest in the EP election 
campaign. This was determined by a direct question to respondents about how 
interested they were in the campaign. As these two measures, interest in politics and 
interest in the campaign, seem to be closely related, it is important to note that the 
correlation coefficient between them is just slightly over 0.5, signifying a rather weak 
relationship. Nevertheless, the analysis shows a pattern similar to the previous three 
charts: exposure to EU news does not have a statistically significant effect on the 
likelihood of voting for people with high interest in the campaign, and has the largest 
effect for those with medium interest in the campaign. For people with no or little 
interest in the EP election campaign, the marginal effect is 14.7% and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. For those with medium interest in the campaign, the 
marginal effect is larger and statistically significant at 1% level: for these respondents, 
likelihood to vote increases by 18.7% with a unit increase in the content exposure.   
 
 
Figure 5.6: Marginal effects of the content exposure on voting in the EP elections for 
individuals grouped according to their interest in campaign 
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Figure 5.7 shows the varying marginal effects of the content exposure on voting 
in the EP elections for individuals grouped according to their level of feeling European. 
This is signified by responses to a question that asks people whether they identified 
themselves with their own nationality, being European, or a combination of these. This 
analysis aims to show the connection of ‘Europeanness’ to voting in the EP elections. 
The results show that the marginal effect of the content exposure is statistically 
significant only for the group with medium level of feeling European: for respondents in 
this category, one unit change in the content exposure results in 23.8% increase in the 
likelihood to vote.  
An account for this could entail a similar explanation to that suggested for the 
previous charts: people who do not feel European are probably not interested in voting 
in the EP elections and would not be influenced by the media. On the other hand, people 
with a high level of feeling European most likely intend to vote anyway, so exposure to 
EU news does not influence their decision-making. It is respondents between these two 
categories that may feel European to a certain extent but need additional information, 
from the media, to make them decide whether or not to vote.  
 
 
Figure 5.7: Marginal effects of the content exposure on voting in the EP elections for 
individuals grouped according to the feeling European variable 
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Figure 5.8 shows the varying marginal effects of the content exposure on voting 
in the EP elections for individuals grouped according to their evaluation of their 
country’s EU membership. This analysis aims to show how attitude toward the EU 
membership filters the media effects. The marginal effect of exposure to EU news is 
statistically significant at the 0.1% level for those who see their country’s EU 
membership as a good thing: a unit change in the content exposure increases the 
likelihood to vote by 17.7%.  
Following the reasoning used in the previous chart, one could suggest that those 
who do not see EU membership as a good thing have made their decision on whether to 
vote or not, to abstain or to vote for someone with a similar opinion and exposure to 
media does not impact their decision. On the other hand, the information in the media 
has a great impact on the voting decision of those who do see EU membership as a good 
thing.  
 
 
Figure 5.8: Marginal effects of the content exposure on voting in the EP elections for 
individuals grouped according to their evaluation of the EU membership 
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Figure 5.9 shows the varying marginal effects of the content exposure on voting 
in the EP elections for individuals grouped according to their engagement in the EP 
election campaign. This is measured by respondents’ answers on how often in the 
weeks leading up to the election they were exposed to news and information about it in 
various media outlets, or whether they attended a political rally. This variable is closely 
related to the interest in campaign variable, with a correlation coefficient just above 0.5, 
but they each measure a different aspect of respondent’s attitude to the campaign. 
Similarly, this variable, as the main variable of interest, content exposure, captures the 
exposure of respondents to media in the weeks prior to the election. The engagement in 
campaign variable includes very little information about the content of the information 
respondents were exposed, thus capturing less specific media effects.  
Interestingly, the largest marginal effect, statistically significant at 1%, is for 
those with no or low levels of engagement in the campaign: a unit change in the content 
exposure results in 26.2% increase in the likelihood to vote. For those with medium 
level of engagement in campaign the marginal effect is slightly smaller at 17.9% and 
statistically significant at 5%. The effect for those with high level of engagement in the 
campaign is not statistically significant.  
 
Figure 5.9: Marginal effects of the content exposure on voting in the EP elections for 
individuals grouped according to their engagement in the campaign 
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Figure 5.10 shows the varying marginal effects of the content exposure on 
voting in the EP elections for individuals grouped according to their age. This analysis 
aims to show if and how age mediates media effects on voting. The results reveal that 
the marginal effects of exposure to EU news are the highest and statistically significant 
at the 5% level for groups of voters aged between 18 - 42 and 43 - 59 (19.2% and 18.8% 
respectively) signifying a little over 1% increase in the likelihood of voting with a unit 
change in the content exposure. Such results can well be explained with the usual 
reasoning that older people have developed a habit of voting, or non-voting, and thus 
exposure to media does not impact their decision. Young people, on the other hand, are 
less likely to have developed a habit of voting and are probably searching for additional 
information to help them decide whether to vote.  
 
Figure 5.10: Marginal effects of the content exposure on voting in the EP elections for 
individuals grouped according to their age 
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5.4. Multilevel Model, Media Types 
 
 
 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 present results of multilevel analysis, comparing the effects 
of exposure to EU news between media types; Figure 5.4 shows results for exposure to 
newspapers, and Figure 5.5 outlines the effects of exposure to television. Existing 
research suggests that there are differences and the analysis here provides additional 
evidence for this. The data analyses are run using the same model as in the previous 
multilevel model (see the model in the previous section) but, as the coefficients for 
other explanatory variables remained nearly unchanged compared to the previous 
analysis, the table only shows the odds ratios for the media variables of interests: 
content exposure in all newspapers (quality and tabloid) and on all television channels 
(commercial and public television). Both individual level and level 2 variance measures 
are the same as in the full model including all media; examining particular media types 
does not add any further explanatory power to the model.  
The tables clearly shows that exposure to EU news in newspapers has a 
statistically significant effect on one’s likelihood to vote, significant at the 0.1% level. 
A unit increase in the content exposure to EU news in newspapers increases one’s 
likelihood of voting by 57.5%. We get a clearer picture of this relationship when 
looking separately at tabloid and quality newspapers: a unit increase in content exposure 
to EU news in tabloid newspapers decreases one’s odds of voting by 38% while 
exposure to quality newspapers increases those odds by a factor of 4.2 These findings 
are in line with the existing literature and expectations due to the nature of the content 
of the two newspaper types; that is, the tabloids publish rather negative and sensational 
news compared to the more objective and informative news in the quality newspapers. 
Content exposure to EU news on all television channels and on commercial 
television channels does not have a statistically significant effect. Nevertheless, a unit 
increase in content exposure to EU news on public television boosts one’s odds of 
voting by 65%. As with newspapers, these findings reflect the nature of the content of 
the commercial and public television: the latter is likely to present more news on 
politics and economics, while commercial television channels tend to broadcast lots of 
soft, sensational news, in which the EU rarely fits.    
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Table 5.4: Multilevel model, content exposure by media type - newspapers 
 
Content exposure / 
media outlet 
Newspapers 
Tabloid 
newspapers 
Quality 
newspapers 
Media variables       
Newspapers 1.575   
 (0.000)***   
 Tabloid newspapers   0.616 
   (0.000)*** 
 Quality newspapers     4.153 
    (0.002)*** 
Observations 27,069 27,069 27,069 
L2 observations 28 28 28 
Log likelihood -12414.02 -12419.59 -12395.26 
lnsig2u -1.699 -1.726 -1.689 
SE (lnsig2u) (0.2807) (0.2809) (0.2808) 
Sigma_u 0.4277 0.4220 0.4297 
SE (sigma_u) (0.06) (0.0593) (0.0603) 
rho 0.0527 0.0513 0.0531 
SE (rho) (0.014) (0.0137) (0.0141) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * <0.05 
  
 
 
 
Table 5.5: Multilevel model, content exposure by media type – television 
 
Content exposure / 
media outlet 
Television 
Commercial 
television 
Public 
television 
Media variables       
Television 1.569   
 (0.054)   
 Commercial television 
 
0.895 
 
 
(0.662) 
 Public television 
 
  1.650 
 
  (0.026)* 
Observations 27,069 27,069 27,069 
L2 observations 28 28 28 
Log likelihood -12423.87 -12425.64 -12423.27 
lnsig2u -1.727 -1.725 -1.724 
SE (lnsig2u) (0.2807) (0.2809) (0.2807) 
Sigma_u 0.4217 0.422041 0.4224 
SE (sigma_u) (0.0592) (0.0593) (0.0593) 
rho 0.0513 0.0514 0.0515 
SE (rho) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0137) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * <0.05 
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5.5. Summary  
 
 
 
The data analysis failed to falsify my hypotheses tested in this study. Examining 
the visibility of EU news and the effects of exposure to EU news on likelihood to vote, 
those with higher values of the content exposure, i.e. those more frequently exposed to 
news about the EU are more likely to vote in the EP election. The effects in the 
multilevel model show a relatively large, statistically significant impact of content 
exposure: for a unit increase in the combined content and exposure measure, people’s 
likelihood to vote increases four times.  
The logistic regression results show diverse effects of numerous variables 
between the countries of Western and Central and Eastern Europe. Importantly, the 
content exposure effects are, as expected, not statistically significant in the CEE 
countries. Furthermore, the statistically significant CEE dummy used in the full logistic 
model shows that respondents in the CEE countries are almost just half as likely to vote 
in the EP elections compared to those in the WE countries. This is supported by the 
actual turnout figures. 
I also examined the media effects across groups of observations based on 
different characteristics. The findings are in line with previous research. For example, 
media effects on the likelihood to vote are higher for those with medium levels of 
knowledge about the EU than those with the lowest levels, for those not close to a party 
than those close to one, and for those who see the EU membership as a good thing than 
for those who do not.   
Findings about the differences in the effects of exposure to EU news on various 
media outlets also support previous research: exposure to EU news in newspapers, both 
quality and tabloid, has stronger impact on the likelihood to vote than news on 
television, and exposure to EU news in tabloid newspapers is likely drive people away 
from voting compared to exposure to quality newspapers, which is conversely likely to 
mobilize people.   
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CHAPTER 6  
 
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS: TONE OF EU NEWS  
 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter I examined the effects of exposure to EU news on 
likelihood to vote, looking for evidence that those respondents with higher values of the 
content exposure, i.e. those more frequently exposed to news about the EU, are more 
likely to vote in the EP. I found small but statistically significant effects aligning with 
the “minimal effects” findings from previous studies. As expected, these effects were 
not statistically significant in the CEE countries, suggesting that these countries’ unique 
post-Communist characteristics diminish any potential impact of exposure to EU news. 
I further analyzed the media effects across groups of observations based on different 
characteristics, including identification with a political party or knowledge about the 
EU. The findings are in line with previous research, pointing to the influence of other 
factors on the effects of media exposure. Finally, I also looked into the differences in 
the effects of exposure to EU news on various media outlets, finding results that support 
previous research: exposure to EU news in newspapers has stronger impact on the 
likelihood to vote than news on television, and exposure to EU news in quality 
newspapers is likely to mobilize people compared to exposure to tabloid newspapers 
which, conversely, tends to drive people away from voting.  
These lastly mentioned findings are likely to be related to the actual content of 
the various media types rather than purely their classification. Tabloid newspapers and 
commercial television channels tend to include less political news and, therefore, less 
news about the EU compared to quality newspapers and public television channels. 
Tabloid newspapers are also more likely to publish sensational news, which can often 
be negative news about the EU, compared to the other media types. In this chapter, I 
therefore test the role of the tone of EU news in the relationship between exposure to 
EU news and voter turnout. I examine whether more frequent exposure to media outlets 
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with more EU news with positive or negative tone increase voter participation in the 
2009 EP elections. 
The tone of the news summarizes how the news evaluates the EU, whether it 
refers to the EU, its representatives and institutions in a positive or negative way. The 
effects of exposure to news with a specific tone have been widely discussed, but 
researchers have yet to reach a consensus. Some suggest that positive news mobilizes 
while negative news demobilizes, but others believe that any tone in the news makes the 
information more easily memorable, thus any tone of the news would be likely to 
mobilize people to vote.  I base my assumptions on the latter approach, expecting to 
find no difference between the effects of exposure to positive and negative news as they 
both provide information about the EU and the elections. Additionally, the little 
presence of positive and negative EU news in the media is likely to cause these 
variables to play an insignificant role in the media-turnout relationship.  
As in the previous part of the analysis, I expect to find weaker media effects in 
the CEE countries with the tone of the news playing insignificant role in this 
relationship. Regarding the various media types, I expect to find stronger, positive 
effects of exposure to both positive and negative EU news in the newspapers, especially 
quality newspapers. Finally, as tabloid newspapers and commercial television tend to 
present a higher proportion of news evaluating the EU in a negative light, I expect 
exposure to negative news in these outlets to have demobilizing effect on participation 
in the elections.  
In the analyses on the following pages, I find a number of mixed results. The 
effects of positive and negative content exposure lack statistical significance in the 
multilevel model, suggesting that neither exposure to positive or negative EU news has 
any impact on one’s likelihood of voting. However, examining marginal effects for the 
various groups of countries and observations does bring noteworthy results. Comparing 
the effects in the Western and CEE EU member states, I find statistically significant 
effects of exposure to positive EU news in the Western EU member states. Similarly, 
looking at the different groups of observations, based on, for example, respondents’ 
gender or interest in politics and the EP election campaign, I find positive effects of 
exposure to positive EU news with the size of the marginal effects higher than in the 
previous chapter. Finally, comparing the effects across the various media types, I find 
significant, relatively strong, mobilizing effects for positive EU news in quality 
newspapers and negative effects for exposure to positive EU news in tabloids and on 
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commercial television. Exposure to negative EU news does not yield any statistically 
significant results. These mixed results suggest that there indeed are diverse media 
effects of exposure to positive and to negative EU news, but they vary across the 
various media types as well as groups of observations, likely to be dependent on the 
actual amount of news with positive or negative tone that respondents are exposed to. 
The chapter is organized in the following way: first, multilevel models including 
positive and negative content exposure to all media outlets are presented; second, the 
media effects are compared across groups of countries. These groups are based upon 
whether a country is post-Communist, official turnout, and the proportion of EU news 
in the country’s media. Third, effects of positive and negative content exposure are 
compared among groups of observations split by numerous variables, such as age, 
knowledge about the EU, interest in politics, etc. Fourth, the effects of exposure to 
positive and negative EU news in different media types are examined using multilevel 
models, including comparisons between newspapers and television, quality and tabloid 
newspapers, and commercial and public television.  
 
 
6.1. Multilevel model, all media 
 
 
 
To obtain more insight into whether the type of news can impact differently on 
one’s likelihood of voting, I examined the exposure to positive and negative EU news, 
i.e. news that evaluates the EU and its representatives or institutions in a positive or 
negative light. Existing research suggests that there may be no difference in the size and 
direction of the effects between positive and negative news provided there is ‘tone’; 
both types of news are equally memorable because the specific tone (as opposed to 
neutral news) helps people interpret and thus remember the information. The other 
strand of research suggests that negative news is likely to discourage people from 
voting, while positive new makes them more likely to vote.  
Nevertheless, there is very little EU news with tone - around 4% on average - 
and most is neutral. This, of course, varies greatly between countries, but less so 
between media types. The low proportion of EU news with a positive or negative tone 
may explain the lack of statistical significance for the two main variables a 
Nevertheless, charts on the following examine the effects of exposure to positive and 
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negative news across groups of observations and offer additional findings. Table 6.1 
presents the results of multilevel analysis of the effects of positive and negative content 
exposure. The effects shown do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance, 
suggesting that being exposed to positive or to negative EU news content does not have 
any impact on one’s likelihood to vote. All the other variables show similar size, 
direction and significance of the effects. Such findings make one believe that being 
exposed to more news about the EU that positively or negatively evaluate the EU and its 
institutions has no impact on one’s decision to vote. We’ll nevertheless see some 
positive findings later in this chapter, examining various media types. 
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Table 6.1: Multilevel model, positive and negative content exposure 
 
  
Positive content 
exposure 
Negative content 
exposure 
Media variables     
Positive content exposure 19.894  
(0.274)  
Negative content exposure    1.054 
  (0.977) 
Political variables     
Exposure to campaign 2.448 2.466 
  (0.132)*** (0.133)*** 
Interest in campaign 2.040 2.041 
  (0.046)*** (0.046)*** 
Interest in politics 1.093 1.094 
  (0.024)*** (0.024)*** 
Habitual vote 1.575 1.577 
  (0.057)*** (0.057)*** 
Party ID 1.290 1.289 
  (0.045)*** (0.045)*** 
Evaluating EU membership as good 1.177 1.177 
(0.022)*** (0.022)*** 
Satisfaction with democracy in country 1.098 1.098 
(0.023)*** (0.023)*** 
Demographic variables     
Gender male=1 0.944 0.946 
  (0.031) (0.031) 
Age 1.022 1.022 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Education in years 1.015 1.015 
  (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
Still studying dummy 0.344 0.341 
  (0.096)*** (0.095)*** 
Contextual variables     
CEE 0.580 0.570 
  (0.194) (0.193) 
Year of accession 0.987 0.987 
  (0.008) (0.008) 
Compulsory vote 2.740 2.731 
  (0.781)*** (0.784)*** 
Time till next national election 1.205 1.213 
(0.088)* (0.089)** 
Country level visibility of EU news 0.998 0.998 
(0.009) (0.009) 
Observations 27069 27069 
L2 observations 28 28 
Log likelihood -12425.137 -12425.739 
lnsig2u -1.742 -1.728 
SE (lnsig2u) (0.281) (0.281) 
Sigma_u 0.4186 0.4216 
SE (sigma_u) (0.0589) (0.0592) 
rho 0.0506 0.0512493 
SE (rho) (0.0135) (0.0137) 
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05   
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6.2. Positive and Negative Content Exposure in Western vs. Central and Eastern 
European Countries 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I examined the diverse effects of, not only, content 
exposure, on respondents’ likelihood to vote between WE and CEE countries. The 
results failed to falsify my hypothesis, showing that the effect of content exposure is 
statistically significant in the WE countries, but not in the CEE countries. On the 
following pages, I examine the effects of positive and negative content exposure, i.e. 
exposure to news that positively or negatively evaluate the EU, and the variations of 
these effects between the two country groups.  
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 show the results of the logistic analysis run under three 
different specifications: (1) for all observations across all countries, (2) for CEE 
countries only, and (3) for WE countries only. In these two tables, I only show that main 
variables of interests as the effects for all other variables included in the models were 
nearly identical to the results shown in Table 5.3.  
The results in Table 5.2 are in line with those in Table 5.3: positive content 
exposure has a large statistically significant effect across the whole EU and in the WE 
countries only, but it is not significant in the CEE countries. The odds ratios are of a 
great size; this is likely to be caused by the fact that more than a half of all observations 
have been assigned positive content exposure of the value of zero; therefore, the large 
odds ratios, and coefficients not shown here as well, are likely to be caused by outliers 
with extreme values. To further support this lack of media effects in the CEE countries, 
the CEE dummy in the first model is negative and statistically significant, showing that 
those in the CEE countries are 40% less likely to vote in the EP elections.  
Table 6.3 shows the results for the logistic model with the negative content 
exposure. While the odds ratios do show negative effect, these effects do not reach the 
levels of statistical significance. Nevertheless, the CEE dummy in the first model again 
shows that those in the CEE countries are around 45% less likely to vote in the EP 
elections compared to those in the WE countries.   
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Table 6.2: Logistic regression showing odds ratios, positive content exposure. 3 models 
including (1) all countries, (2) CEE countries only and (3) WE countries only 
 
 
EU27 CEE WE 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Positive content exposure 13,661.136 2,292.957 2,434.133 
 
(32,093.825)*** (11,167.256) (7,014.113)** 
CEE 0.610     
 (0.041)***     
Observations 27,069 10,054 17,015 
Log likelihood -12705.66 -5332.74 -7139.69 
Pseudo R2 0.23 0.22 0.19 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
 
Table 6.3: Logistic regression showing odds ratios, negative content exposure. 3 models 
including (1) all countries, (2) CEE countries only and (3) WE countries only 
 
 
EU27 CEE WE 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Negative content exposure 0.185 0.753 0.149 
 (0.293) (2.888) (0.265) 
CEE 0.557     
 (0.039)***    
Observations 27,069 10,054 17,015 
Log likelihood -12713.53 -5334.00 -7142.88 
Pseudo R2 0.22 0.22 0.19 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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6.3. Marginal Effects for Groups of Observations – Positive and Negative 
Content Exposure 
 
 
 
The following pages include the same analysis as in the previous chapter, only 
using positive content exposure and to negative EU news. The patterns in the results are 
similar to those in the previous section, but the marginal effects of content exposure are 
much higher here compared to when only the visibility of the news is considered, 
regardless of tone. This suggests that the tone of the EU news does matter and more EU 
news with positive or negative tone leads to higher likelihood of voting. This confirms 
previous research suggesting that news with some tone makes the information more 
memorable and, thus, is more inclined to have an effect on one’s likelihood to vote.  
Figure 6.1 shows the varying marginal effects of the positive content exposure 
on voting in the EP elections for individuals grouped according to the same variable, 
positive content exposure. As in the previous section that looked at the visibility of EU 
news, this analysis aims to show the difference in the effects of exposure to media based 
on the amount of positive EU news and the extent of respondents’ exposure to it. 
Interestingly, the results are highest for the group with the lowest and medium levels of 
positive content exposure; nevertheless, they are not statistically significant. For those 
with the highest levels of content exposure, the marginal effect is still higher compared 
to the effects of content exposure considering visibility not the tone, at 144.2% and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The large size of the effects is likely due to the 
lack of normal distribution in the data, the very high proportion, more than 50%, of 
observations being assigned zero for this measure, and outliers with extreme values.  
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Figure 6.1: Marginal effects of the positive content exposure on voting in the EP 
elections for individuals grouped according to the same variable, positive content 
exposure 
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Figure 6.2 shows the varying marginal effects of the positive content exposure 
on voting in the EP elections for individuals grouped according to their party ID. This 
analysis aims to show how being close to a party and being exposed to EU news impact 
one’s chance of voting. As in the previous section with the visibility of EU news, the 
marginal effect is higher for those who are not close to a party; nevertheless, the effects 
for both groups here are much higher than in the previous section and both are 
statistically significant. For those not close to a party, a unit change in the positive 
content exposure brings 214.7% increase in the likelihood of voting; for those who 
report being close to a party, this is just a half, 98.1% increase. These findings are in 
line with existing research as those who are close to a party are likely to know who to 
vote for, and, thus, they are decided to vote. On the other hand, for those not close to a 
party, there is much space left for information from the media to help them decide who 
to vote for and whether to vote at all. And as this chart shows, being exposed to positive 
news is likely to help people decide to vote.  
 
Figure 6.2: Marginal effects of the positive content exposure on voting in the EP 
elections for individuals grouped according to their party ID 
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Figure 6.3 shows the varying marginal effects of the positive content exposure 
on voting in the EP elections for individuals grouped according to gender. In relation to 
the effects of exposure to positive EU news, there is very little difference in the effects 
on the likelihood to vote between men and women and they both are statistically 
significant at 1% level. For women, a unit change in the positive content exposure 
results in 137.2% increase in the likelihood of voting; for men this is 152.6%. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Marginal effects of the positive content exposure on voting in the EP 
elections for individuals grouped according to gender 
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Figure 6.4 shows the varying marginal effects of the positive content exposure 
on voting in the EP elections for individuals grouped according to their knowledge 
about the EU. As in the previous section, this analysis aims to show how knowledge 
mediates media effects. This chart shows statistically significant marginal effects for all 
groups of respondents. The effects are again much stronger than when only the visibility 
of EU news, without the tone, is considered. For those with the lowest levels of 
knowledge about the EU, a unit change in the content exposure results in 177.7% 
increase in the likelihood to vote; for those with the medium knowledge levels, this is 
120.1%; and for those with the highest levels of knowledge about the EU, this is 
104.1%.  
This, indeed, suggests that for those who know the most about the EU, exposure 
to positive news has little impact on their decision to vote as they are probably decided 
whether to vote and who to vote for and do not require any additional information. On 
the other hand, for those with less knowledge about the EU, exposure to positive news 
about the EU provides them with additional information necessary to vote and as the 
information is positive, evaluating the EU and its institutions and representatives in a 
positive light, it helps them make the decision to vote.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
155 
 
Figure 6.4: Marginal effects of the positive content exposure on voting in the EP 
elections for individuals grouped according to their knowledge about the EU 
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Figure 6.5 shows the varying marginal effects of the positive content exposure 
on voting in the EP elections for individuals grouped according to their interest in 
politics. We see a similar pattern as in the previous chart examining knowledge about 
the EU as well as in the corresponding charts examining the impact of the exposure to 
EU news in the previous section. The analysis shows that being exposed to positive EU 
news has the highest and most statistically significant marginal effects for those with 
either no, little, or medium interest in politics. For those with no or little interest in 
politics, a unit change in the exposure to positive EU news increases the likelihood of 
voting by 206.1%; for those with medium level of interest in politics, this is 125.1%%. 
The effect for those with the highest interest in politics is not statistically significant. 
It seems to be exactly those people who are not interested in politics that are the 
most susceptible to be influenced by positive news; they probably will not be 
consciously looking for information, so if they are exposed to positive news about the 
EU it is likely to have a strong impact on their decision to vote.  
 
 
Figure 6.5: Marginal effects of the positive content exposure on voting in the EP 
elections for individuals grouped according to their interest in politics 
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Figure 6.6 shows the varying marginal effects of the positive content exposure 
on voting in the EP elections for individuals grouped according to their interest in 
campaign. This analysis shows similar results to the previous chart; it is again those 
with no or only little interest in the election campaign that are most likely to affected by 
a change in the positive content exposure. For this group of respondents, the marginal 
effect is 198.3%, statistically significant at the 0.1% level. The effects are not 
statistically significant for groups of respondents with medium or high interest in the 
election campaign. 
 
Figure 6.6: Marginal effects of the positive content exposure on voting in the EP 
elections for individuals grouped according to their interest in campaign 
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Figure 6.7 shows the varying marginal effects of the positive content exposure 
on voting in the EP elections for individuals grouped according to the extent they feel 
European. The results further support what previous analyses in this paper has 
suggested: those groups of respondents who do not have the highest levels of interest in 
politics or election campaign or who do not feel very European are the most likely to 
decide to vote based on a small change in the content exposure. In other words, these 
respondents are the most likely to decide to vote after reading or watching additional 
news story that positively evaluates the EU or its institutions and representatives.  
In this case, for those not feeling European or those with low levels of feeling 
European, the marginal effect is  125.5% and is statistically significant at 5% level. For 
those with medium levels of feeling European, the effect is higher at 184.2%, and 
significant at 0.1% level. The marginal effect is the weakest and not statistically 
significant for those with high levels of Europeanization.  
 
 
Figure 6.7: Marginal effects of the positive content exposure on voting in the EP 
elections for individuals grouped according to the extent they feel European 
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Figure 6.8 shows the varying marginal effects of the positive content exposure 
on voting in the EP elections for individuals grouped according to their evaluation of 
EU memberships. The results show a 30% difference in the marginal effects of positive 
content exposure between those not evaluating EU membership as a good thing and 
those doing so. For those not evaluating EU membership as good, a unit change in the 
positive content exposure results in 123.6% increase in the likelihood of voting; this is 
173.4% less for those evaluating EU membership as good, and effects for both groups 
are statistically significant at 1% level. These results suggest that those not in favor of 
EU membership are more likely to be positively influenced by positive EU news than 
those already in favor of the EU membership. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8: Marginal effects of the positive content exposure on voting in the EP 
elections for individuals grouped according to their evaluation of EU membership 
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Figure 6.9 shows the varying marginal effects of the positive content exposure 
on voting in the EP elections for individuals’ grouped according engagement in the EP 
election campaign. The results follow the patterns from previous figures: the effect is 
the strongest and statistically significant at 0.1% level for those with no or low levels of 
engagement in the campaign. For the respondents in this group, a unit change in the 
positive content exposure results in 226.5.1% increase in the likelihood to vote. For 
respondents with the medium levels of campaign engagement, this makes marginal 
effect of 118.2%, statistically significant at 5% level. The effect is not statistically 
significant for those with high levels of engagement in the campaign.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.9: Marginal effects of the positive content exposure on voting in the EP 
elections for individuals’ grouped according engagement in the EP election campaign 
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Figure 6.10 shows the varying marginal effects of the positive content exposure 
on voting in the EP elections for individuals grouped according to their age. This 
analysis confirms that effects of media are strongest for younger respondents who most 
likely have not developed a voting habit. For the youngest voters aged 18 - 42, a unit 
change in the positive content exposure results in 202.1% increase in the likelihood to 
vote, statistically significant at 1% level, and for those aged 43 - 59, this is 126.5% 
increase. The marginal effect on the likelihood to vote for respondents older than 60 is 
not statistically significant.  
 
 
Figure 6.10: Marginal effects of the positive content exposure on voting in the EP 
elections for individuals grouped according to their age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
162 
 
The marginal effects of the negative content exposure were not statistically 
significant for most of the groups used. Only the two variables used to create groups, 
the actual negative content exposure and gender, have shown statistically significant 
results and are shown here.  
Majority of marginal effects for the different groups of observations did not 
yield a statistically significant effect; therefore these charts are not shown here. Figure 
6.11 shows the varying marginal effects of the negative content exposure on voting in 
the EP elections for individuals grouped according to the same variable, the negative 
content exposure. The marginal effect is statistically significant for those with medium 
and the highest exposure to negative EU news. For those with medium levels of 
negative content exposure, the marginal effects are positive 516%. For those with the 
highest levels, a unit change in this variable result in 86.6% decrease in respondents’ 
likelihood to vote, statistically significant at the 1% level. This is the first occurrence 
where exposure to negative EU news lead to lower levels of likelihood to vote. As 
mentioned previously for the case of positive content exposure, the very large size of 
the marginal effects is cause by the lack of normal distribution in the data as well as 
skewness; a very high proportion of observations have been assigned a zero value for 
the negative content exposure. Consequently, the outliers with extreme values for this 
variable are likely to boost to marginal effects to such great sizes.  
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Figure 6.11: Marginal effects of the negative content exposure on voting in the EP 
elections for individuals grouped according to the negative content exposure 
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6.4. Multilevel Model, Media Types 
 
 
 
The following two sets of tables examine the varying effects of the exposure to 
positive and negative EU news across different media types. Tables 6.4 and 6.5 look at 
positive news. The variance on both individual level and level 2 stays around the same 
percentage as in the main multilevel mode, over 5% at the individual level and over 
42% at level 2.   
Comparing exposure to positive EU news in all newspapers and on all television 
channels, only the first variable has a statistically significant effect, but a large one, 
increasing the odds of voting more than 39 times. This might be because newspapers 
not only include more news stories than television; newspapers also tend to report more 
positive news than television news. It is important to keep in mind that there were fewer 
news coded in the television broadcasts than in newspapers overall, and that the 
proportion of positive news within both, but especially on television, is very low.  
Looking within newspapers, a unit increase in the exposure to positive EU news 
in tabloids decreases one’s odds of voting by 95%. Reading positive EU news in quality 
newspapers increases the odds of voting by a great amount - the strongest media effect 
we have seen so far, shown in millions in the table. This effect is large but it is 
important to remember that not only the proportion of positive EU news is very low, 
more than 50% of observations score 0 on the positive content exposure to quality 
newspapers, which means that this effect is based in a relatively small sample. It 
appears, however, that, even if positive, the ‘sensational’ quality of news in tabloids 
results in people tending to trust less them than quality newspapers. Therefore, if they 
read something positive about the EU in a quality newspaper, they are more likely to 
believe it and allow it influence their decision to vote.  
From the two types of television channels examined here, it is the exposure to 
positive EU news only on commercial television that has statistical significance and, as 
with the case of tabloids, it is negative significance, decreasing the odds of voting by 
94%. Commercial television also tends to have lower reputation than public television 
when it comes to the trustworthiness of the news; thus, even when the news is positive, 
people tend to not believe it. The coefficients for other variables are the same as in the 
previous tables, thus are not shown here. 
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Table 6.4: Multilevel model, positive content exposure by media type - newspapers 
 
Positive content 
exposure/media outlet 
Newspapers 
Tabloid 
newspapers 
Quality 
newspapers 
Media variables       
Newspapers 39.452    
 (0.002)**    
Tabloid newspapers   0.049  
   (0.025)*  
Quality newspapers  
(in millions) 
    191.0 
    (0.000)*** 
Observations 27,069 27,069 27,069 
L2 observations 28 28 28 
Log likelihood -12420.705 -12423.316 -12403.724 
lnsig2u -1.731 -1.709 -1.694 
SE (lnsig2u) (0.2810) (0.2810) (0.2810) 
Sigma_u 0.4208 0.4256 0.4287 
SE (sigma_u) (0.0591) (0.0598) (0.0602) 
rho 0.0511 0.0522 0.0529 
SE (rho) (0.0136) (0.0139) (0.0141) 
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05   
 
 
 
Table 6.5: Multilevel model, positive content exposure by media type - television 
Positive content 
exposure/media outlet 
Television 
Commercial 
television 
Public 
television 
Media variables       
Television 0.307    
 (0.119)    
Commercial television  0.063  
  (0.012)*  
Public television    2.631 
    (0.292) 
Observations 27,069 27,069 27,069 
L2 observations 28 28 28 
Log likelihood -12424.526 -12422.604 -12425.182 
lnsig2u -1.698 -1.748 -1.756 
SE (lnsig2u) (0.2810) (0.2810) (0.2820) 
Sigma_u 0.4279 0.4173 0.4156 
SE (sigma_u) (0.0602) (0.0587) (0.0587) 
rho 0.0527 0.0503 0.0499 
SE (rho) (0.0140) (0.0134) (0.0134) 
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05    
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Table 6.6 and 6.7 shows the results of the multilevel models analyzing the 
effects of negative content exposure across different media types. Exposure to negative 
EU news in all newspapers or all television channels does not have a statistically 
significant impact on the likelihood of voting. Nevertheless, examining the two 
newspaper types separately brings more insight to the issue. Being exposed to negative 
EU news in tabloid newspapers decreases the odds of voting by 85%, while exposure to 
such news in quality newspapers increases the odds by a great factor, shown in millions 
in the table. This suggests that it is really the type of media that matters, not the actual 
content or tone of the news; negative news has a different influence on respondents 
when it appears in tabloid or in quality newspapers. As with positive news in quality 
newspapers on the previous pages, the very low proportions of negative EU news are 
likely to be behind the large results here.  
On the contrary to the results for positive content exposure on various television 
types, examining the negative content exposure presents statistically significant effect 
for public television, with a unit increase boosting the odds of voting by a factor of 7. 
As in the case of negative news in quality newspapers, it is clear that the tone of the EU 
news does not play a role, but it is the actual media type that matters here.  
 
Table 6.6: Multilevel model, negative content exposure by media type - newspapers 
Negative content 
exposure/media 
outlet 
Newspapers 
Tabloid 
newspapers 
Quality 
newspapers 
Media variables       
Newspapers 0.693    
 (0.511)    
Tabloid newspapers   0.147  
   (0.001)***  
Quality newspapers     0.295 
(in millions)     (0.000)*** 
Observations 27,069 27,069 27,069 
L2 observations 28 28 28 
Log likelihood -12425.524 -12420.223 -12410.583 
lnsig2u -1.735*** -1.756*** -1.694*** 
SE (lnsig2u) (0.2810) (0.2810) (0.2800) 
Sigma_u 0.4200 0.4156 0.4287 
SE (sigma_u) (0.0590) (0.0585) (0.0601) 
rho 0.0509 0.0499 0.0529 
SE (rho) (0.0136) (0.0133) (0.0141) 
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05   
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Table 6.7: Multilevel model, negative content exposure by media type - television 
Negative content 
exposure/media 
outlet 
Television 
Commercial 
television 
Public 
television 
Media variables       
Television 0.992    
 (0.992)    
Commercial 
television 
 0.295  
(0.144) 
 
Public television    7.038 
    (0.027)* 
Observations 27,069 27,069 27,069 
L2 observations 28 28 28 
Log likelihood -12425.739 -12424.672 -12423.284 
lnsig2u -1.728*** -1.707*** -1.724*** 
SE (lnsig2u) (0.2810) (0.2810) (0.2810) 
Sigma_u 0.4216 0.4259 0.4223 
SE (sigma_u) (0.0592) (0.0598) (0.0593) 
rho 0.0512 0.0522 0.0514 
SE (rho) (0.0137) (0.0139) (0.0137) 
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05   
 
 
 
 
 
6.5. Summary 
 
 
 
The multilevel model examining the effects of positive and to negative content 
exposure did not produce any statistically significant result, suggesting that neither 
exposure to positive or negative EU news has any impact on one’s likelihood of voting. 
Nevertheless, when I examined the marginal effects of these variables for various 
groups of observations, the direction of the effects is in line with those in the previous 
chapter (where only the visibility of EU news was taken into account) but in the case of 
positive EU news, the marginal effects are much higher. This suggests that the tone of 
the EU news does matter and more EU news with positive or negative tone leads to a 
higher likelihood to vote. This confirms previous research suggesting that news with 
some tone makes the information more memorable, and, thus, the news is then more 
likely to have an effect on one’s likelihood to vote. 
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However, this seems to be the case only for exposure to positive EU news as the 
majority of models run for the groups using negative content exposure are not 
statistically significant. The results that are statistically significant are demobilizing to 
women more than men and to those with high levels of exposure to negative EU news. 
These findings support the line of research claiming that positive news mobilizes voters, 
while negative news demobilizes them. In this case, it is mostly that negative news does 
not have any effect.  
The multilevel analysis of positive content exposure in various media types 
showed significant, relatively strong, mobilizing effects for positive EU news in quality 
newspapers and negative effects for exposure to positive EU news in tabloids and on 
commercial television. These results are in line with existing research. Interestingly, 
looking at the multilevel analysis of negative content exposure in various media types, 
we also see mobilizing effects for quality newspapers and public television, but 
demobilizing effects for tabloid newspapers. This suggests that the effects are not really 
dependent on the tone of the news, but, rather, on the type of news, determined by the 
news outlet.  
Examining country groups, the expectations are further confirmed in that the 
marginal effects of exposure to positive EU news are statistically significant only in the 
Western EU member states, not in the CEE countries. No results for country groups for 
the negative content exposure were statistically significant.  
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CHAPTER 7
 
 
THE POTENTIAL POWER OF THE NEWS 
 
 
 
 
Having established that exposure to news, while accounting for its content, plays a 
significant role in explaining turnout in the 2009 EP elections, I will now explore the 
extent of the potential power of the news. Keeping the values for all variables the same, 
except for the content exposure, and using the coefficients of the current equation, I 
now look into how the turnout would change if the content exposure across the EU 
countries either increased or decreased.  
I proceeded in the following steps. I first calculated coefficients from the earlier 
regression equation and obtained the mean values for each variable for each country. 
Then using these and the logistic regression specification, I predicted the probability of 
voting in each country and obtained an estimated turnout for each country. After this, I 
introduced a single deviation increase to the content exposure, keeping everything else 
the same. I added one standard deviation, calculated for each country, to the content 
exposure for each country and used the coefficients and other variables at country-level 
means to compute a new probability of turnout estimates. Therefore, I computed the 
turnout probability once more but now with a standard deviation increase in the content 
exposure.  
Lastly, I followed the above procedure with two standard deviations rather than 
one, and then I followed the same steps decreasing the means of the content exposure in 
each country by one and two standard deviations. The results clearly show that if people 
were exposed more often to more news about the EU, the turnout could increase. The 
degree of the turnout change caused by the alternation of the media variable differs 
across countries, but it is clear that there is a positive relationship between turnout and 
media exposure. The data contained in the Figures below illustrate the results. It is also 
important to note that what is shown in this section is the turnout estimate based on the 
voter survey, as opposed to the official turnout. As I have mentioned earlier, turnout is 
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generally overreported in voter surveys (e.g. Cassel 2003, Karp and Brockington 2005, 
Franklin and Wessels 2010); thus, the figures shown here are higher than the officially 
reported turnout.  
The logistic analyses examining the media effects across the CEE and WE groups 
of countries in the previous two chapters showed that the effects of content exposure did 
not reach levels of statistical significance for the CEE countries. While this suggests 
that in these countries media do not play a role in people’s decision to vote in the EP 
elections, it could also be caused by the fact that the visibility of EU news is lower in 
these countries compared to the WE countries. This current chapter is purely 
hypothetical and works on the assumption that exposure to EU news does have an 
impact on one’s decision to vote in the EP election. While the strongest potential effect 
of the increased content exposure measure on turnout is shown for the CEE countries, 
these results need to be treated with caution.  
Figure 7.1 shows the estimated turnout and how it changes based on the variation in 
the content exposure as explained above. The graph clearly shows that the more the 
content exposure increases then turnout, too, increases - and vice versa. One can also 
see that the difference in the turnout between two standard deviations less and two more 
is steepest for the CEE countries, at 29%.  
Comparing the current turnout estimate with its change prompted by 2-standard 
deviation increase in the media variable, the turnout increases by 9%, 6% and 14% for 
the whole EU, the Western EU countries, and the CEE countries respectively. As 
everything else is being kept constant, this could be interpreted as the largest impact of 
the change in the media variable taking place in the CEE countries.  In the discussion of 
hypotheses earlier I suggested that as citizens in the CEE countries tend to know less 
about the EU in general, just some exposure to news about the EU can make a great 
difference to their knowledge about the EU and, consequently their turnout. Also, 
turnout in the Western EU countries is already relatively high compared to the CEE 
countries, so there is not that much space in that country group for further increase.   
It is also important to notice the sizes of the standard errors for the estimated 
turnout which decrease as turnout increases. This decrease is the most visible for the 
whole EU, by approximately 8%, around 7% for the Western EU countries, and only 
3% for the CEE countries. Nevertheless, these differences could also be the result of the 
number of observations in each group of countries as this is the smallest for the CEE 
group. 
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Figure 7.1: Estimated turnout and its variations, EU 
 
 
 
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 then show the turnout estimates for each country and their 
changes based on one and two standard deviation changes in the media variable 
respectively. The countries are ordered according to the size of the difference ranging 
between the lowest and the highest turnout within each country. Table 7.1 gives the 
overview of all the turnout estimate values following the changes in the content 
exposure to media. It is clear and somewhat expected that change in the content 
exposure by two-standard deviations produces larger deviations in the turnout estimates 
compared to the one-standard deviation changes.  
As noted above, it is the CEE countries where the change in turnout is the 
largest depending on the alternation of the content exposure, with Hungary and Poland 
leading the table. Increasing current values of content exposure in Hungary by two-
standard deviations increases turnout estimates by 18% and in Poland by nearly 20%. 
The difference between the lowest and the highest turnout for these two countries is 
39% for Hungary and 37% for Poland.  
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The exception to this are Finland, The Netherlands, and Portugal, where two-
standard deviation increases raises turnout by 39%, 36%, and 27% respectively, from 
the lowest to the highest points, and by 14%, 14%, and 12% respectively, from the 
current, unchanged, turnout estimate to the highest. On the other end of the graph, 
Malta, Wallonia and Italy have the lowest differences in turnout between their lowest 
and highest points of 0.9%, 3.6%, and 3.8% respectively.  
There is an interesting situation for Flanders where an increase in the content 
exposure actually lowers turnout, by just 2% between the lowest and the highest turnout 
point, while decrease in the media variable actually boosts turnout. A further 
examination of the content of the media in the Belgian Flanders region would be 
required to help solve this interesting puzzle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Estimated turnout and its variations, +/- 1 standard deviation, by country 
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Figure 7.3: Estimated turnout and its variations, +/- 2 standard deviations, by country 
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Table 7.1: Estimated turnout and its variations, by country 
 
  
Turnout 
(-2 SD) 
Turnout 
(-1 SD) 
Turnout 
Turnout 
(+1 SD) 
Turnout 
(+2 SD) 
AT 76.2% 80.6% 84.3% 87.4% 89.9% 
BE-F 97.0% 96.6% 96.2% 95.6% 95.0% 
BE-W 92.8% 94.0% 94.9% 95.8% 96.5% 
BG 58.6% 62.7% 66.7% 70.4% 73.8% 
CY 75.3% 83.6% 89.5% 93.4% 95.9% 
CZ 34.6% 43.1% 52.1% 60.9% 69.0% 
DE 71.8% 78.4% 83.8% 88.1% 91.3% 
DK 86.7% 91.0% 97.7% 96.1% 97.4% 
EE 57.0% 64.4% 71.2% 77.2% 82.2% 
EL 72.3% 77.1% 81.2% 84.8% 87.7% 
ES 72.3% 74.8% 77.1% 79.3% 81.3% 
FI 52.1% 65.4% 76.7% 85.1% 90.8% 
FR 64.4% 69.4% 74.0% 78.2% 81.8% 
HU 39.6% 50.4% 61.2% 70.9% 79.0% 
IE 78.4% 85.5% 90.5% 93.9% 96.2% 
IT 89.2% 90.3% 91.3% 92.2% 93.0% 
LT 28.5% 34.1% 40.3% 46.7% 53.3% 
LU 80.3% 87.4% 97.0% 95.3% 97.2% 
LV 65.5% 72.2% 78.0% 82.9% 86.9% 
MT 93.6% 93.8% 94.0% 94.3% 94.5% 
NL 53.8% 65.7% 75.8% 83.7% 89.4% 
PL 25.1% 33.3% 42.7% 52.6% 62.3% 
PT 55.7% 63.8% 71.2% 77.6% 83.0% 
RO 41.6% 49.5% 57.4% 65.0% 71.8% 
SE 79.8% 85.0% 89.0% 92.1% 94.3% 
SI 51.8% 62.1% 71.5% 79.3% 85.4% 
SK 31.9% 38.6% 45.8% 53.3% 60.5% 
UK 49.7% 56.5% 63.0% 69.1% 74.6% 
EU 62.2% 68.6% 74.7% 79.4% 83.6% 
WE 73.3% 79.0% 84.2% 87.4% 90.2% 
CEE 43.4% 51.0% 58.7% 65.9% 72.4% 
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7.1. Summary 
 
 
 
The analyses on the previous pages give a strong indication that a change in the 
amount of exposure to EU news on its own evokes variations in turnout. The 
relationship is positive here, showing that with an increase in content exposure (i.e. the 
frequency of exposure to the news on the EU, as well as the number of these news) 
turnout increases as well, keeping all other variables constant. The same process is 
observed when the media variable decreases and turnout becomes lower.  
While the results of the logistic analyses in the previous two chapters suggest that 
that the effects of content exposure are not statistically significant for the CEE 
countries, this could be an implication of the lower visibility of EU news in the CEE 
countries compared to the WE countries. The analysis presented in this chapter is purely 
hypothetical and works on the assumption that exposure to EU news does have an 
impact on one’s decision to vote in the EP election. The discussion here is therefore 
hypothetically discussing how the turnout would change, if the content exposure, 
including visibility of EU news and people’s exposure to it, changed.   
Across the whole EU, one-standard deviation increase in the content exposure 
raises the turnout estimate by nearly 5%, while two-standard deviation increases boost it 
by 9%. There are great differences across groups of countries as well as individual 
countries; these differences may originate from numerous factors, including the size of 
the existing (original) turnout estimate, the current visibility of EU news as well as the 
characteristics of individual countries and their citizens. With some exceptions, the 
potential power of the news seems to be larger in the CEE countries, suggesting that 
since both the turnout and the EU news visibility were lower in these countries 
compared to the Western EU countries, there is more scope for change. It is also very 
likely that if the visibility of EU news were higher in the CEE countries, the effect of 
content exposure on participation in the EP elections could be statistically significant 
there.  
The analysis in this chapter assigns media a great power in boosting voter turnout 
in the EP elections. As I mentioned earlier in this study, news media, including 
newspapers and television, constitute the main source of information for most citizens, 
especially when it comes to remote issues that they cannot experience first-hand. While 
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people can often learn about local politics by talking to their neighbors and family, they 
are less likely to find out about the functioning of the EU and its politics through talking 
alone. Therefore, people rely almost exclusively on the news media for EU-related 
news. Even though online and social media might be playing a much larger role 
nowadays, in 2009, it was the traditional news media that were cited as the most used 
tool to access news. 
Despite the media’s immense responsibility to inform people about the EU, the 
visibility of EU news is very low, which precludes people from easily accessing the 
information they need to vote in the EP elections. It is therefore no surprise that 
increasing content exposure, i.e. both the visibility of EU-related news and people’s 
exposure to it, might potentially lead to higher turnout in the EP elections, as shown in 
the analysis in this chapter. The analysis suggests that the vicious circle described 
earlier in this study could be prevented: if there are more news about the EU in the 
newspapers and on television, then, given that people are exposed to these news, they 
will receive the necessary information about the EU, the EP, and the elections. 
According to the mobilization theory, media might serve as a mobilizing force. By 
making the information about the elections easily accessible to the public, media help 
decrease the cost of voting for the citizens. It is not only learning about the functioning 
and policy making of the EP, but also finding out about the voting procedures and 
details on where to vote and how exactly to do it. Consequently, as stated by the rational 
choice theory of voter turnout, as the costs of voting decreased, people would be more 
likely to vote. Higher turnout in the EP elections would ensure that more groups of EU 
citizens are well represented by the EP and that the EU policies in fact respond to 
people’s needs.   
Editors of newspapers and television newscasts have the difficult job of selecting 
the stories that they believe would be popular among the public. While the EU may not 
be the easiest topic to sell, it is an important one as, increasingly more and more, the EU 
is really becoming an integral part of many people’s lives. One of the ways to boost the 
interest to EU-related news is to increase the intensity of election campaigns carried out 
by the parties and MEP candidates. Research has shown that intense election 
campaigns, close races and opposing views by different candidates increase news 
coverage. Often the problem with the EP election campaigns is that they focus mostly 
on national issues, rather than EU-related issues. Intense campaigning would therefore 
boost news coverage but the content would still remain restricted to national issues. 
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A solution for this could be having EP election campaigns regulated by the EU. For 
example, the EU could set some minimum time that needs to be devoted to EU issues in 
the campaign, and they could also increase the limited funding for the EP campaigning, 
which varies across countries. Parties from within would also need to prioritize the EU 
issues in their campaigns and ensure they send out the message that the EP elections 
matter and that the outcome of the election will impact people’s everyday lives. This 
along with more news about the EU and the EP elections could then draw more people 
to the elections polls and help improve the legitimacy of the EU. Such measures seem to 
be especially important in the CEE countries where the influence of the media is not 
statistically significant at the moment. With the help of a more visible EU-related news 
coverage, exposure to media could potentially play a stronger role in bringing people to 
EP elections polls.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
Democratic legitimacy crisis of the EU has been present on academic and 
political research agendas since the early days of the European Community. A great 
deal of research has been carried out on this topic, but no one has proposed any definite 
solutions so far. After initial attempts to improve the crisis by concentrating on output 
legitimacy, i.e. the EU institutions and how they govern people, researchers shifted their 
interest onto the input legitimacy, looking into people’s participation in the policy-
making processes and the EU’s responsiveness to them (Héritier, 2003; Horeth, 1999; 
Schmidt, 2010). 
The EP is the only EU institution elected directly by its citizens, and despite an 
increase in its powers over the decades, it is still not nearly as powerful as, for example, 
the European Commission. Furthermore, as turnout figures show, EU citizens clearly do 
not take advantage of the opportunity to elect their respective country representatives to 
the EP; which directly damages the EU’s legitimacy. The fact that only 43% of the 
EU’s citizens expressed their preferences in the 2009 EP elections means that large 
groups of population are not represented by the MEPs. This legitimacy crisis is more 
pronounced in the CEE countries where the turnout was only 28.3%. Although there are 
great variations across the EU member states, turnout in the EP elections is generally 
lower than national elections and it has been decreasing ever since the first election in 
1979. This decrease has slowed down only in the last two elections. 
One of the solutions available to strengthen the EU’s legitimacy is to boost 
turnout in the EP elections. Despite the EP making great efforts to attract more people 
to the polls, EU citizens are still reluctant to turn out to vote for the parliament. There 
are many reasons put forward to account for this, but one of the most persistent 
suggestions has been that people simply know very little about the EU and the EP. Lack 
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of knowledge about the EP can directly prevent people from voting because they do not 
know where to vote, who to vote for, or what the purpose of their vote is. It might also 
lead them to believe that the EU is not related to their everyday lives, and thus, there is 
no reason to become involved in the organization’s affairs.  
Easy access to information about the EU could therefore help increase people’s 
knowledge about it and subsequently boost the turnout. By providing a wide range of 
relevant information about the EU, the national media could contribute to the 
strengthening of the EU’s input legitimacy (Héritier, 2003). National media, however, 
have been blamed for publishing too little news about the EU affairs. At the same time, 
the EU has been accused of issuing information that is too technical to make sense to 
the general public, which renders it unlikely to be picked up by the media as well. 
Additionally, due to the second-order nature of the EP elections, campaigning is less 
intensive than it is in national elections, giving little to the media to write about. 
I argue that this is a vicious circle: as there is less at stake at the EP elections and 
their results do not decide who runs an individual country, political parties and 
candidates therefore devote less interest, time, and money to the EP election campaigns 
compared to national election campaigns. There is then little for the media to write 
about, and the lack of news concerning the EU and the EP elections results in citizens 
not receiving sufficient information about these topics. They might also be confused 
about whether the elections matter since it seems that neither the media, nor the political 
parties, nor the candidates is actually concerned about them. As a result, many people 
choose not to vote in the EP elections simply because they do not know what the EP 
does, the specific purposes of the elections, where they can vote, or who to vote for.  
This chain of events is detrimental to the EU legitimacy but, as I show in 
Chapter 7, it could be prevented if the media reported more on the EU, the EP elections, 
parties, and candidates. I show that turnout rises with an increase in people’s exposure 
to EU-related news as well as with an increase in the visibility of this news. Throughout 
my thesis, I argue that, due to the reasons outlined above, people who are more often 
exposed to a high amount of news concerning the EU are more likely to vote in the EP 
elections. My results show a relatively strong, statistically significant, positive 
relationship between people’s exposure to news about the EU in the weeks prior to the 
2009 EP elections and their participation in the elections.  
I further argue that the tone of the news, defined as whether the story evaluates 
the EU or the EP positively or negatively, does not influence the effects of the exposure 
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to news. As long as the EU news is well visible, exposure to it has a positive impact on 
people’s likelihood to vote. My data analysis shows that rather than the tone of the EU-
related news, it is the type of the media outlet that yields media effects of varying 
directions, since the content presented in the newspapers and on television shows a wide 
range of topics depending on the type of the media outlet. Newspapers tend to publish 
more EU news than television channels, and, similarly, quality newspapers and public 
television channels include more news about the EU than tabloid newspapers and 
commercial television channels. I find clear differences in the effects of content 
exposure across various media types. Exposure to EU news in newspapers, both quality 
and tabloid, has stronger impact on the likelihood to vote than exposure to EU news on 
television. Additionally, exposure to EU news in tabloid newspapers is likely to drive 
people away from voting compared to exposure from quality newspapers, which, to the 
contrary, is likely to mobilize people. Both of these effects occur regardless the tone of 
the EU news, i.e. whether the news is neutral, positive or negative.  
The magnitude of the impact created by exposure to positive and to negative EU 
news, especially across different media types, is influenced by the low proportions of 
EU news with a positive or a negative tone. There are great outliers on both ends of the 
spectrum, i.e. news outlets with very high and with very low proportions of either 
positive or negative EU news. These outliers cause the media effects to reach very large 
sizes, and thus the results need to be treated with caution.   
The relationship between content exposure and voting in the 2009 EP elections 
is not as straightforward in the CEE countries as it is in the WE countries. According to 
the conclusions I reached with a multilevel model, the most suitable model for the 
dataset I use, being a citizen of a post-Communist country does not have any impact on 
whether people vote or not. When using a basic, logistic specification, the results show 
that citizens of CEE countries are less likely to vote in the EP elections. However, when 
the logistic model is run separately for the 10 CEE countries and for the 17 WE 
countries, the effects of content exposure do not reach levels of statistical significance 
in the CEE countries. These results suggest that, as hypothesized, content exposure 
doesn’t bear any influence on the citizens of the CEE countries in contrast to the 
citizens of the Western EU member states. This is likely to be the result of very low 
visibility of EU news in the national media of the CEE countries. 
The EP elections turnout is already much lower in the CEE countries compared 
to the WE countries. This is due to a range of historical, political, and social reasons 
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related to the post-Communist legacy of these countries. CEE citizens have not been 
able to develop a voting habit since the fall of the Communist regime; they do not trust 
political parties, elites or the media. Following the EU accession negotiations in 2009, 
when they were required to adopt many EU rules and regulations, many feel as if their 
countries are inferior or insignificant members of the organization. These characteristics 
are also related to the lack of interest in and knowledge about the EU on the part of CEE 
citizens.  
All these points play a role in the simulation scenario in Chapter 7: the effects of 
increasing content exposure on the likelihood to vote are greater in the CEE countries, 
compared to the WE countries. This suggests that as a result of the aspects outlined 
above, along with low levels of turnout and EU news visibility, there is simply more 
scope for change in the CEE countries. Even though the analyses in Chapters 5 and 6 
show that the media effects are not statistically significant in the CEE countries, the 
simulation presents a hypothetical discussion about what would happen if the visibility 
of the EU news, as well as people’s exposure to it increased. It is likely, that if both of 
these increased, the media effects may in fact become statistically significant.  
Media might be a very powerful tool if political elites, and media editors 
themselves, made use of it. I have shown that when people are exposed to more news 
about the EU, they are more likely to vote in the EP elections. Although some of the 
effects are relatively modest, they do reach conventional levels of statistical 
significance. The relative insignificance of the effects may simply be due to the large 
sample size and high variation across observations, as other studies examining media 
across countries reach similar outcomes (e.g. Barabas, Jerit, Pollock, Banducci, Stevens 
and Schoonvelde, 2014).  
With the aim of avoiding the typical faults of survey research on media effects 
and voting behavior, I utilize the respondents’ self-reported exposure to specific 
newspapers and television newscasts. The survey questions regarding respondents’ 
exposure to media are worded in a way to make the recall easier and increase the 
accuracy of the exposure level. Similarly, the question about whether respondents voted 
in the 2009 EP election is framed to minimize the impact of social desirability, 
suggesting that non-voting is a common occurrence and that many people in fact do not 
vote in the EP elections. Nevertheless, overreporting of both turnout and exposure has 
been taken into account in the outcomes of the study. While I showed the difference 
between the official turnout in the EP election and the self-reported turnout, there is no 
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possibility to check the real exposure to EU news. The turnout overreporting rate varies 
across the countries, and the exposure overreporting rate is likely to vary as well. 
Looking at the two groups of countries, the CEE and WE EU member states, citizens in 
CEE countries overreport their turnout to a slightly lesser degree than WE citizens, but 
since the exposure to media seems to be higher in the CEE countries, it is possible for 
the rate of overreporting to be higher there compared to the WE countries. 
Consequently, it is likely that the cross-country differences in overreporting these two 
measures, rather than actual differences in turnout across the countries, cause the 
diversity observed in media effects between the two country groups.   
Matching respondents’ exposure to particular news outlets with the news content 
in these outlets allows me to get a precise idea of the content that respondents were 
likely exposed to. This method offers great advantages for the study of media effects, 
but since it’s quite a challenge to obtain the necessary data, it can only be used on 
unique occasions (Stevens and Banducci, 2013; Stevens and Karp, 2012; Stevens et al. 
2011). As my analysis in Chapter 5 shows, without accounting for the content of the 
news, exposure alone does not have a statistically significant effect on one’s likelihood 
to vote. Similarly, the effects of country-level aggregated measure of EU news visibility 
do not reach levels of statistical significance, i.e. only the content of the news does not 
have a statistically significant impact on voter turnout either. It is therefore crucial to 
combine both of these measures when studying the media effects in order to capture the 
whole picture.  
I am not aware of any other study that compares individual-level media effects 
between WE and CEE EU countries (or, as they are often referred to, the ‘old and new 
member states’). Although they both belong to the same community, the recent histories 
of these two groups of countries significantly differ, which impacts, among other things, 
the voting behavior of their citizens. This comparison offers an insight into the different 
mobilization processes in place in these countries prior to the EP elections. Previous 
research has suggested that media play a role in people’s decision to vote in the EP 
elections and that this role is likely to be different in the CEE countries. I take this 
proposition further to find that not only higher exposure to more EU news boosts one’s 
likelihood to vote across the EU, but also that this is not the case for the CEE countries 
where these effects are not statistically significant. Furthermore, very little is known 
about media effects specifically in the CEE countries, so, utilizing both media content 
and exposure, my findings help fill this gap. 
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Despite critiques of research design issues in media effects studies, it is an 
expanding field. Great insights have been revealed especially in the recently developed 
studies on the new media, including online news media and social networks. The study 
of news coverage in and media effects of traditional media is important since media 
tend to represent the public opinion in a country, or at least the opinion of the political 
and economic elites. They serve as a mediator between the elites, whether on a national 
or EU level, and the public. Independent mass media are extremely important for the 
functioning of a democratic country and also a democratic entity, such as the EU. On a 
daily basis, media provide information about the political affairs and are the essential 
tool for citizens to learn about events and issues that are remote to them and which they 
cannot experience personally, such as the EU. Media therefore play a crucial role in the 
democratic processes of the EU, and in this study I showed how powerful it can be to 
help boost voter turnout in the EP elections and, as a result, help strengthen the EU’s 
legitimacy.   
I used the PIREDEU survey and media data covering all countries in the EU. 
Such datasets, along with the unique setting of the EP elections, allowed me to study 
those participating, and not participating, in the same event across 28 political and 
media contexts. Utilizing multilevel modeling, I was able to include country-level and 
individual-level variables to examine the impact of all the variables on voter turnout. I 
assessed to what extent the mass media actually fulfilled their function as information 
providers and mobilizers, and whether they can be helpful in improving the EU’s 
legitimacy. The findings show that at the time of 2009 EP election, national media in 
most EU countries did not fulfill these functions as it provided very little news about the 
EU and the EP elections. Exposure to this content had, nevertheless, a positive impact 
on people’s likelihood to vote. In the CEE countries, the EU news coverage was 
especially low, and the media effects were not found there. Nevertheless, in Chapter 7, 
using simulation analysis I showed that the potential impact of media on voter turnout 
can be vast if the EU news content is increased substantially. Such a message could play 
a major role in the next EP elections campaign.  
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APPENDIX A MEDIA STUDY 
 
 
Codebook Extract 
 
VISIBILITY OF EU NEWS 
 
In the 2009 media study codebook, there is a filter variable (V13) asking, “Does 
the story mention either the European Union (EU*), its institutions or policies or the 
European Parliamentary elections or the campaign? (Schuck et al. 2010) 
* Or synonyms such as ‘Brussels’ (when EU is meant), Europe (when EU is meant), EU 
countries (if explicitly referred to as such), EU member states (if explicitly referred to as 
such). EU institutions include the European Central Bank (ECB), for instance” (Schuck 
et al. 2010). 
 
1 = no 
2 = yes 
 
When chosen “yes”, the coder was directed to answer numerous questions about 
content. One of these questions asked to choose a topic from the specific EU- topic list. 
This filter variable allowed me to use this measure directly and by simple cross 
tabulation get the share of EU news from there. 
 
 
TONE OF EU NEWS 
 
In the 2009 media study codebook, question V26 asks: “Explicitly: Does the 
story evaluate the EU, and if so, how? ‘The EU’ here refers to the EU as a political 
institution as such, not to single, more specific institutions such as the EP or the EC. 
Also code if synonyms are used which clearly refer to the EU as such, e.g., “Europe” 
(when in fact the EU is meant / but not if Europe is only referred to as a geographical 
entity) or “Brussels” (when in fact the EU is meant).” (Schuck et al. 2010) 
 
1= not mentioned 
2= mentioned but not evaluated 
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3= negative 
4= rather negative 
5= balanced/mixed 
6= rather positive 
7= positive 
For the purpose of this study, categories 3 and 4 were recoded as ‘negative’ and 
categories 6 and 7 were recoded as ‘positive’. The combination of these two then 
created ‘biased’ news category. 
 
For the list of media outlets coded in each country and for further details see Schuck et 
al. 2010.  
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APPENDIX B VOTER STUDY 
 
 
Questionnaire Extract 
 
The following table presents the questions from the 2009 EES Voter Survey 
used in this study, using UK survey wording. The table also includes the details of the 
construction of the measures used (van Egmond et al. 2009). 
 
Table B.1: Voter survey questions and notes on calculations of measures 
 
VARIABLE SURVEY QUESTION/NOTES 
Dependent 
variable 
  
Vote in the 2009 
European election 
Q24. A lot of people abstained in the European Parliament 
elections of June 4, while others voted. Did you cast your vote? 
(1) Yes, voted (2) no, did not vote. 
Media variables   
  Respondents’ exposure to news outlets was obtained from the 
following questions; 0 -7 (days) answers were recalculated  
into 0-1:  
Q8: In a typical week, how many days do you watch the 
following news programmes? 
Q12.In a typical week, how many days do you read the 
following newspapers?  
For media data information see above. 
Content exposure The measures between 0 - 1 were then multiplied by the 
visibility (amount in %) of EU news in each news outlet a 
respondent was exposed to. Respondent’s content exposures to 
each outlet were then aggregated (rowmean function in Stata), 
obtaining an average measure of how much EU news a 
respondent was exposed to during the campaign. See Chapter 3 
and Figure 3.1 for detailed overview of the calculation. 
 
Using the media exposure and content measures, variables 
including content exposure to particular media outlets are then 
created. These include content exposure in newspapers, on 
television, in tabloid newspapers, in quality/broadsheet 
newspapers, on public television channels and on commercial 
television channels.  
Positive / negative 
content exposure 
These measures are calculated following the same steps as the 
previous variable, the only difference being that instead of the 
amount of EU news in each news outlet, the amount (%) of 
positive/negative news in each outlet is used. These variables 
are then also recalculated into categorical and separate variables 
for particular media outlets are created. 
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Campaign   
  How often did you do any of the following during the four 
weeks before the European election? How often did you: 
(see below) 
Answers are then: often/sometimes/never 
Read about 
election in 
newspapers 
Q17. Read about the election in a newspaper? 
Watched TV 
program about 
election 
Q16. Watch a program about the election on television? 
Looked into 
website about 
election 
Q20. Look into a website concerned with the election? 
Attended public 
meeting/rally 
Q19. Attend a public meeting or rally about the election? 
Talked to 
friends/family 
about election 
Q18. Talk to friends or family about the election? 
Exposure to 
campaign 
Factor of the previous five variables, they all load on one factor 
with the factor Eigenvalue of 2.37, with all factor loadings 
higher than 0.45 and p>0.01; recoded onto scale 0-2. 
Interest in 
campaign 
Q23. Thinking back to just before the elections for the European 
Parliament were held, how interested were you in the campaign 
for those elections: very, somewhat, a little, or not at all? 
Political variables   
Interest in politics Q78. To what extent would you say you are interested in 
politics? Very, somewhat, a little, or not at all? 
Habitual voter, 
i.e. voted in the 
last national 
election, dummy 
Q27. Which party did you vote for at the General Election of 
xxxx?  
--then a list of parties was offered. I recoded all responses 
answering a name of a party or ‘voted blank’ as 1 and the others 
as 0. 
Party ID Q87. Do you consider yourself to be close to any particular 
party? If so, which party do you feel close to? 
--I created a dummy variable: answers mentioning a party were 
coded as 1 (i.e. as identifying with a party), others as 0. 
EU membership 
is good 
Q79. Generally speaking, do you think that [your country's] 
membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, 
or neither good nor bad? 
Europeanness Q82.Do you see yourself as…1 [respondent's country 
nationality] only;  2 [respondent's country nationality] and 
European; 3 European and [respondent's country nationality]; 4 
European only 
Satisfaction with 
country’s 
democracy  
Q84. On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way 
democracy works in [your country]?Very satisfied/Fairly 
satisfied/Not very satisfied/Not at all satisfied 
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Respondent’s 
characteristics 
  
Gender (male) Dummy; Q102. Are you male or female? 1=Male 
 
Age  Q103. What year were you born? Variables recoded into years – 
how old a respondent is. 
 
Education (age 
when finished full 
time education) 
Q100. How old were you when you stopped full-time 
education? (age in years, 2 digits) (98) still studying 
Still studying Dummy; 1=respondent still studying 
Occupation Q122: And in your current job, what is your main occupation? 
Please tell us about your last job, what was your main 
occupation? 
[Open-ended] 
 
Social class 
(subjective) 
Q114. If you were asked to choose one of these five names for 
your social class, which would you say you belong to - the 
working class, the lower middle class, the middle class, the 
upper middle class or the upper class? 
 
Living in a rural/ 
urban area 
(subjective) 
Q115. Would you say you live in a rural area or village/small or 
middle-sized town/suburbs of large town or city/large town or 
city? 
Living standard 
(subjective) 
Q120. Taking everything into account, at about what level is 
your family’s standard of living? If you think of a scale from 1 
to 7, where 1 means a poor family, 7 a rich family, and the other 
numbers are for the positions in between, about where would 
you place your family? 
 
Knowledge about 
the EU 
Set of 7 true/false questions about the EU. Knowledge 
calculated as number of correctly answered questions/total 
number of questions (7). 
Q92-Q98. Now some questions about the European Union and 
Britain. For these questions, I am going to read out some 
statements. For each one, could you please tell me whether you 
believe they are true or false? 
 
 
 
Q92. Switzerland is a member of the EU 
Q93. The European Union has 25 member states 
Q94. Every country in the EU elects the same number of 
representatives to the European Parliament. 
Q95. Every six months, a different Member State becomes 
president of the Council of the European Union 
Q96. The British Secretary of State for Children, schools and 
families is Ed Balls.  
Q97. Individuals must be 25 or older to stand as candidates in 
British general elections. 
Q98. There are 969 members of the British House of Commons 
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Country level 
variables 
  
Country-level 
amount of EU 
news in a media 
Aggregated amount of EU news in all country’s media outlets 
(see above). 
Country-level 
campaign 
exposure 
Aggregated campaign exposure (see above). 
Country-level 
interest in 
campaign 
Aggregated interest in campaign (see above). 
Year of EU 
accession 
Year 
Time till next 
national election 
In months. 
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APPENDIX C CONTEXTUAL STUDY 
 
 
Codebook Extract 
 
The following table includes details of the country-level variables from the Contextual 
dataset (see Czesnik et al. 2010). 
 
Table C.1: Contextual variables description 
 
Contextual 
variables 
  
Compulsory 
voting 
Dummy; 1=compulsory voting country, 0.5 for Italy (V2.5). 
Eurozone Dummy; 1=country is a member of Eurozone (V7.17). 
Multiple 
elections 
Dummy; 1=country had more elections in the day of the 2009 EP 
election (V1.6). 
Proportionality 
of electoral 
system 
Measure of proportionality of electoral EP system in a given 
country - Gallagher Index  
See V2.1 in Czesnik et al. (2010) and Gallagher (1991). 
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APPENDIX D DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
 
Table D.1: Descriptive statistics, individual level variables 
 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
Content exposure 27069 0.064 0.067 0 0.580 
----WE 17015 0.070 0.073 0 0.580 
----CEE 10054 0.055 0.053 0 0.452 
Content exposure in newspapers 27069 0.147 0.213 0 0.805 
----WE 17015 0.171 0.235 0 0.805 
----CEE 10054 0.107 0.161 0 0.738 
Content exposure on television 27069 0.103 0.092 0 0.503 
----WE 17015 0.104 0.100 0 0.503 
----CEE 10054 0.103 0.078 0 0.294 
Positive content exposure 27069 0.007 0.009 0 0.103 
----WE 17015 0.008 0.010 0 0.103 
----CEE 10054 0.006 0.006 0 0.037 
Positive content exposure in 
newspapers 
27069 0.010 0.019 0 0.214 
----WE 17015 0.012 0.023 0 0.214 
----CEE 10054 0.006 0.011 0 0.072 
Positive content exposure on television 27069 0.023 0.032 0 0.191 
----WE 17015 0.025 0.036 0 0.191 
----CEE 10054 0.020 0.023 0 0.074 
Negative content exposure  27069 0.010 0.012 0 0.120 
----WE 17015 0.012 0.014 0 0.120 
----CEE 10054 0.006 0.007 0 0.048 
Negative content exposure in 
newspapers 
27069 0.014 0.035 0 0.292 
----WE 17015 0.020 0.042 0 0.292 
----CEE 10054 0.005 0.011 0 0.057 
Negative content exposure on 
television 
27069 0.025 0.032 0 0.167 
----WE 17015 0.029 0.034 0 0.167 
----CEE 10054 0.020 0.026 0 0.100 
Exposure to media 27069 0.2471 0.1695 0 1 
----WE 17015 0.2339 0.1646 0 1 
----CEE 10054 0.2696 0.1752 0 1 
Exposure to election campaign 27069 0.640 0.400 0 2 
----WE 17015 0.670 0.410 0 2 
----CEE 10054 0.580 0.380 0 2 
Interest in campaign 27069 2.330 0.940 1 4 
----WE 17015 2.400 0.940 1 4 
----CEE 10054 2.210 0.940 1 4 
Interest in politics 27069 2.560 0.900 1 4 
----WE 17015 2.670 0.890 1 4 
----CEE 10054 2.370 0.880 1 4 
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Evaluating EU membership as good 
thing 
27069 1.360 0.880 0 2 
----WE 17015 1.470 0.830 0 2 
----CEE 10054 1.180 0.940 0 2 
Feeling of “Europeanness” 27069 0.700 0.710 0 3 
----WE 17015 0.700 0.690 0 3 
----CEE 10054 0.710 0.750 0 3 
Satisfaction with democracy in country 27069 1.480 0.850 0 3 
----WE 17015 1.660 0.820 0 3 
----CEE 10054 1.170 0.820 0 3 
Occupation 27069 4.991 3.118 1 12 
----WE 17015 4.786 3.075 1 12 
----CEE 10054 5.345 3.158 1 12 
Social class 27069 2.472 1.001 1 5 
----WE 17015 2.536 0.100 1 5 
----CEE 10054 2.365 0.994 1 5 
Rural/urban living 27069 2.350 1.193 1 4 
----WE 17015 2.339 1.175 1 4 
----CEE 10054 2.368 1.223 1 4 
Living standard 27069 4.036 1.194 1 7 
----WE 17015 4.147 1.169 1 7 
----CEE 10054 3.849 1.213 1 7 
Age (years) 27069 50.29 16.82 18 99 
----WE 17015 50.11 16.42 18 96 
----CEE 10054 50.59 17.46 18 99 
Education (number of years) 27069 24.67 19.05 9 98 
----WE 17015 25.32 19.71 9 98 
----CEE 10054 23.58 17.84 9 98 
Knowledge about the EU 27609 0.557 0.268 0 1 
----WE 17015 0.570 0.264 0 1 
----CEE 10054 0.534 0.272 0 1 
Year of accession to the EU 27069 1987 18.81 1958 2007 
----WE 17015 1977 16.84 1958 2004 
----CEE 10054 2005 1.200 2004 2007 
Time until next national election 27069 1.870 1.330 0 5.780 
----WE 17015 1.900 1.430 0 5.780 
----CEE 10054 1.810 1.150 0.010 3.450 
Visibility of EU news, country-level 27069 0.360 0.117 0.143 0.620 
----WE 17015 0.386 0.125 0.143 0.620 
----CEE 10054 0.315 0.087 0.155 0.452 
Proportionality of electoral system 27069 6.184 2.754 1.93 13.43 
----WE 17015 5.782 2.860 2.62 13.43 
----CEE 10054 6.865 2.419 1.93 10.52 
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Table D.2: Descriptive statistics, country level variables 
 
Variable N Count: 0 %: 0 Count: 1 %: 1 
Vote in the 2009 EP 
election 
27069 7958 29.40% 19111 70.60% 
----WE 17015 3629 21.33% 13386 78.67% 
----CEE 10054 4329 43.06% 5725 56.94% 
Habitual vote 27069 8052 29.75% 19017 70.25% 
----WE 17015 4477 26.31% 12538 73.69% 
----CEE 10054 3575 35.56% 6479 64.44% 
Party ID 27069 12586 46.50% 14483 53.50% 
----WE 17015 7295 42.87% 9720 57.13% 
----CEE 10054 5191 52.63% 4763 47.37% 
Gender (male=1) 27069 15128 55.89% 11941 44.11% 
----WE 17015 9194 54.03% 7821 45.97% 
----CEE 10054 5934 59.02% 4120 40.98% 
Still studying 27069 25489 94.16% 1580 5.84% 
----WE 17015 15956 93.78% 1059 6.22% 
----CEE 10054 9533 94.82% 521 5.18% 
Compulsory vote* 27069 22066 81.51% 4003 14.79% 
----WE 17015 12012 70.60% 4003 23.53% 
----CEE 10054 10054 100% 0 0% 
CEE 27069 17015 62.86% 10054 37.14% 
Eurozone 27069 11040 40.78% 16029 59.22% 
----WE 17015 3002 17.64% 14013 82.36% 
----CEE 10054 8038 79.95% 2016 20.05% 
Multiple elections 27069 25068 92.61% 2001 7.39% 
----WE 17015 15014 88.24% 2001 11.76% 
----CEE 10054 10054 100% 0 0 
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Table D.3: Correlations – individual level variables, part 1 
 
  
Vote in 
the EP 
elections 
Content 
exposure 
Positive 
content 
exposure 
Negative 
content 
exposure 
Exposure 
to 
campaign 
Interest in 
campaign 
Interest 
in 
politics 
Content 
exposure 
0.1714 1 
    
  
Positive 
content 
exposure 
0.1265 0.5489 1 
   
  
Negative 
content 
exposure 
0.1203 0.4851 0.3575 1 
  
  
Exposure to 
campaign 
0.3178 0.2937 0.1773 0.1996 1 
 
  
Interest in 
campaign 
0.3774 0.2245 0.1913 0.1386 0.5134 1   
Interest in 
politics 
0.2931 0.2525 0.1598 0.159 0.481 0.5195 1 
Habitual 
vote 
0.204 0.1222 0.0451 0.1063 0.1906 0.1866 0.238 
Party ID 0.1812 0.1048 0.0529 0.1004 0.1931 0.2041 0.2593 
EU 
membership 
good 
0.1677 0.1107 0.0207 0.0315 0.1505 0.1789 0.2197 
Satisfaction 
with 
democracy 
0.1299 0.0944 0.0656 0.1281 0.0837 0.1286 0.1137 
Gender 0.0184 0.0622 0.0306 0.0443 0.0912 0.0348 0.1406 
Age 0.1739 0.123 0.129 0.1269 0.0792 0.1548 0.1329 
Education -0.0245 -0.0212 -0.0575 -0.0072 0.0469 0.0021 0.029 
Still studying -0.0507 -0.0477 -0.0604 -0.0377 0.0071 -0.0243 -0.0185 
Knowledge 
about EU 
0.0259 0.0124 -0.0036 0.0195 0.0228 0.008 0.0238 
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Table D.4: Correlations – individual level variables, part 2 
 
  
Habi-
tual vote 
Party 
ID 
EU 
memb
er-ship 
good 
Satis-
faction 
with 
demo-
cracy 
Gender Age 
Edu-
cation 
Still 
studying 
Content 
exposure 
  
      
  
Positive 
content 
exposure 
  
      
  
Negative 
content 
exposure 
  
      
  
Exposure to 
campaign 
  
      
  
Interest in 
campaign 
  
      
  
Interest in 
politics 
  
      
  
Habitual 
vote 
1 
      
  
Party ID 0.3623 1 
     
  
EU 
membership 
good 
0.114 0.1173 1 
    
  
Satisfaction 
with 
democracy 
0.0973 0.0861 0.2299 1 
   
  
Gender 0.0273 0.0425 0.0769 0.0356 1 
  
  
Age 0.1517 0.1234 0.0046 0.0057 -0.0378 1 
 
  
Education -0.0971 -0.0338 0.0646 0.0571 0.0219 -0.3903 1   
Still studying -0.1186 -0.0415 0.0268 0.0267 0.0114 -0.3821 0.9582 1 
Knowledge 
about EU 
0.01 0.0319 0.0257 -0.0006 0.0072 -0.002 0.0231 0.0103 
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Table D.5: Correlations – country level variables 
 
  Vote in the 
EP 
elections 
No. 
MEPs 
Voting 
procedure 
Treshold CEE 
Year of 
EU 
accession 
Compulsory 
voting 
Next 
national 
election 
No. MEPs -0.0204 1             
Voting procedure 0.0082 -0.0774 1           
Treshold -0.1603 0.1878 0.3094 1         
CEE -0.2305 -0.2577 0.0107 0.524 1       
Year of EU 
accession 
-0.1642 -0.5173 0.106 0.2794 0.7032 1     
Compulsory voting 0.1451 -0.1279 0.0056 -0.3553 -0.3554 -0.3458 1   
Next nat.election 0.0452 -0.092 0.1269 -0.2571 -0.0328 0.1901 -0.2185 1 
EU news 0.1096 -0.2984 -0.0327 -0.1733 -0.2939 0.0784 0.3286 0.1123 
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